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Abstract 
The outsourcing of military responsibilities to private contractors is most 
comprehensively encapsulated not in armed security contracting, which dominates 
the literature, but in the supply of the armed forces. Military logistics, broadly 
conceived, stretches back the furthest in history and involves among the largest 
manpower and sums of money expended by defence enterprises. Drawing on the 
United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) since the end of the 
Second World War, this dissertation develops a holistic understanding of why states 
outsource military capability, the politics and processes which produce the decisions 
(not) to acquire military services from the market, and the longer-term impact and 
trajectory of defence services acquisition as a result of the way states use private 
contractors in their defence enterprises. Most fundamental to understanding why 
states outsource military capability is an appreciation of the dominant ideas and 
norms that guide policy-makers and constrain decision-making. In defence these are, 
in particular, a state’s defence strategy and posture, strategic culture, and political 
economy. These factors strongly determine the type, size, and shape of the armed 
forces, the weapon systems and services required for their supply, and the sources of 
these products and services. Together with the formal and informal political 
structures of the state, these factors also heavily determine who participates in the 
defence policy process. In the case of the USA and the UK, the general tendencies to 
espouse global defence postures, draw on private enterprise for the supply of goods 
and services, and rely on highly sophisticated, hi-tech weaponry in the conduct of war 
clashed with a lack of resources which were – under these influences – sought to be 
overcome by relying on private providers. The policy processes are similarly biased 
towards business ideas, solutions, and providers while exhibiting a remarkable lack 
of veto-points and veto-players. “More of the same”, i.e. the increasingly routineised 
use of private contractors in the generating of military capability, is therefore the 
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unsurprising outcome of the past decades which witnessed the growing reliance on 
private service providers in the defence enterprise. Outsourcing is not only “here to 
stay”, as authors often conclude; the USA and the UK are formally and doctrinally 
integrating their military and contractor workforces into joint logistics forces that will 
support and supply their armies for decades to come, and concomitantly transferring 
knowledge and assets out of the military and into the private sector for the long term. 
Being improbable from within, change in the USA and the UK would only come about 
as a result of strategic, economic, or ideational “shocks” to this otherwise very stable 
ecosystem. Put in more general terms, changes in the fundamental structural forces of 
defence strategy, economics, and technology, as well as in the formal and informal 
structures of the policy process are most likely to yield significant change in the way 
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Introduction 
Western military forces have always relied on the private sector to some 
extent for basic equipment, life support, and other services. The creation of large, 
mostly self-sufficient, standing peacetime armies during the Cold War was thus an 
historical exception rather than the norm as it is often perceived today.1 The current 
wave of overseas military services contracting, which began in the mid-1980s, 
nonetheless differs in that a qualitatively broader range of services is being 
outsourced to industry, and most importantly that in the course of so doing the public 
and private sectors are continuously blending their workforces.2 It was however not 
until the Iraq War of 2003 that the issue of military services contracting in western 
militaries began to receive sustained attention from scholars and the media.3 Despite 
enjoying much larger breadth and depth, the phenomenon is still predominantly 
associated with the private security industry as epitomised by the now-defunct 
company Blackwater, the images of four of its mutilated employees hanging off a 
bridge in Fallujah, Iraq, in March 2004, and the killing of 17 civilians in Baghdad’s 
Nisour Square in September 2007 by some of its employees.4 
                                                             
1 Christopher Kinsey (2006), Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private 
Military Companies (London: Routledge), chapter 2. 
2 See chapter VI of this thesis in particular. 
3 A cursory glance at relevant bibliographies will prove this point, as almost all works were 
published after 2003 when the phenomenon was already at least two decades old. Notable 
exceptions are David Shearer (1998), Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper, 
Vol. 316 (London: Oxford University Press), and  
 Robert Mandel (2002), Armies without States: the Privatization of Security (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers), the first academic account of privatising security. 
 P.W. Singer’s dissertation that became a bestseller after publication in 2003 was also 
completed before the war on terror, in 2001. Cf. P.W. Singer (2008), Corporate Warriors: the 
Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, upd edn, first publ. in 2003 (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell 
University Press), and P.W. Singer (2001-2002), “Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security,” in International 
Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 186–220. 
4 See in particular Jeremy Scahill (2007), Blackwater: the Rise of the World’s Most Powerful 
Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books), an international bestseller. 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, the majority of works address armed security 
contractors in international security,5 their roles in contemporary wars,6 the impact 
of contracting on the control of force, civil-military relations, and state authority,7 and 
the regulation of armed contractors.8 In recent years, research branched out to 
include normative,9 sociological, postcolonial, and gender analyses of private security 
contracting.10 While focusing almost exclusively on armed contracting,11 paying it an 
                                                             
5 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2011), Security beyond the State: Private Security 
in International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), and  
 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers. 
6 Christopher Kinsey (2009), Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq: Transforming 
Military Logistics (London; New York: Routledge), 
 David Isenberg (2009), Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International), and  
 Robert Young Pelton (2007), Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: 
Three Rivers Press). 
7 Anna Leander (2006), Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate 
Use of Force (Soveria Mannelli [Catanzaro]: Rubbettino),  
 Elke Krahmann (2010), States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press),  
 Meghan O'Keefe (2011), “Civil-Private Military Relations: The Impacts of Military 
Outsourcing on State Capacity and the Control of Force”, Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Montreal Hotel, Montréal, 
Québec, 16 March 2011, accessed 21 November 2013, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p500011_index.html, 
 Thomas C. Bruneau (2011), Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National 
Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 
 Molly Dunigan (2011), Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military 
Effectiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), and  
 Deborah D. Avant (2005), The Market for Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
8 See e.g. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (2007), From Mercenaries to Market: the Rise 
and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press),  
 Andrea Schneiker (2010), “How to Avoid State Regulation? The Power of Private Military 
and Security Companies”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Theory vs. Policy? 
Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, The Loews New 
Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA, 17 February 2010, and the volume by Alexandra et al. 
9 See e.g. Laura A. Dickinson (2011), Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a 
World of Privatized Foreign Affairs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press),  
 Mervyn Frost (2008), “Regulating Anarchy: the Ethics of PMCs in Global Civil Society,” in 
Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations, eds 
Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (London: Routledge), pp. 43–55,  
 and Mervyn Frost and Christopher Kinsey (2012), “Ethical Accounting for the Conduct of 
Private Military and Security Companies,” in Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 92–108. 
10 Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini, eds (2008), Private Military and 
Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-Military Relations (London: Routledge), 
 Kateri Carmola (2010), Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics, 
Contemporary security studies (London: Routledge),  
 Paul Higate (2012), “'Cowboys and Professionals': the Politics of Identity Work in the 
Private and Military Security Company,” in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 2, pp. 321–341,  
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undue degree of attention as I argue below, the literature has remained remarkably 
silent about the political underpinning of military outsourcing, the role of contractors 
in the defence political process, and the long-term defence political ramifications of 
contracting. This thesis sets out to rectify these limitations by broadening the scope 
beyond private military and security companies (PMSCs) and security contracting, 
and by addressing this oversight of the academic literature. 
Research Questions 
The present study develops a holistic understanding of overseas military 
services contracting in the defence policy process. To reach this objective, it is 
necessary to establish the drivers, the politics and process, and the policy-relevant 
effects of military outsourcing. Importantly, it is necessary to establish the 
relationship between these factors, and how they reciprocally affect one another over 
time. Under the overarching research interest in the role, relevance, and impact of 
military services contracting on the defence policy process, the research questions 
thus ask, respectively: 
 
1) Why do states contract for military capability overseas, i.e. what are the 
drivers of military services contracting? 
2) How does outsourcing figure in politics and political decision-making, and 
how is it conducted on the ground? That is, what role do contractors and 
contracting play in the policy process? 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 Amanda Chisholm (2013), “The Silenced and Indispensible: Gurkhas in Private Military 
Security Companies,” in International Feminist Journal of Politics, pp. 1–22, 
 Saskia Stachowitsch (2013), “Military Privatization and the Remasculinization of the State: 
Making the Link Between the Outsourcing of Military Security and Gendered State 
Transformations,” in International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 74–94, 
 Alison Hawks, doctoral dissertation on the civilian-to-military transition of soldiers and 
contractors, at King’s College London, forthcoming, and  
 Andreas Krieg, doctoral dissertation on the ethics of outsourcing security in low-interest 
conflicts, at King’s College London, forthcoming. 
11 Partial exceptions are Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson, eds (2012), 
Contractors and War: the Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press), and Kinsey, Private Contractors and Iraq. 
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3) How does contracting affect the broader defence enterprise and policy 
process in the long term? That is, how does it affect the future of defence 
policy, and what is its own future? Why are we witnessing the 
entrenchment of contractorisation rather than its reduction? 
 
In addressing these questions, the study covers the entire timeline of the 
policy process from its context via decision-making to implementation and feedback 
effects and accounts for both the structure and agency of contractorisation in the 
defence policy process. As the following review demonstrates, the relevant academic 
literature yields insights into some of these questions while displaying limitations 
towards others. 
Critical Literature Review 
The following literature review is tailored to the research interest of this 
study. It therefore does not survey the entire literature on PMSCs but bypasses 
several subsets such as the expansive literature on the regulation and legal status of 
PMSCs and their employees. Moreover, no comparable studies or sizeable debate 
exist about the second and third research questions. The following thus targets the 
literature’s key analytics and assumptions that can inform this study and enable us to 
generate the hypotheses and argument of this dissertation. 
History and Drivers of Military Services Contracting 
Like the literature on military contracting more generally, analyses of the 
drivers of military outsourcing focus on security services. Singer identifies two broad 
developments that aided the emergence of the industry – the transformation of 
warfare, and the “privatization revolution” that strengthened and eventually 
established pro-privatisation logics, narratives, and practices in the public domain.12 
                                                             
12 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 49. 
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The central assumption for the shift “from make to buy”, according to defence 
economist Hartley, is that contractors display “high-powered efficiency incentives” 
that public actors supposedly lack.13 Singer, Avant, and Krahmann agree that, 
furthermore, worldwide cuts in defence budgets and armed forces released a highly 
skilled workforce to a global security market. That market eventually grew because 
conflict levels after the Cold War did not recede as hoped but increased, which neither 
states nor multilateral or international organisations successfully tackled.14 
Krahmann is not content with these functional arguments because they do 
not explain the variation in contracting practices among similar states such as the 
United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany. She argues 
convincingly that ideology, mostly regarding political economic organisation and 
civil-military relations, is a relevant intervening variable that explains both the 
propensity for and the scope of military outsourcing.15 Petersohn argues similarly for 
going beyond mere path dependency and functionalist concerns. He suggests that the 
occurrence and degree of outsourcing are more comprehensively explained by a 
sociological-institutionalist understanding that accounts for the power of norms and 
ideas, namely the growing preference for a civilian-heavy force mix as opposed to the 
previous uniformed-heavy preference.16 Abrahamsen and Williams also concur and 
point out that the success of these narratives and ideas are representative of 
processes of “technologisation” and specialisation, such as militaries turning into 
core-competency forces.17 
Kinsey’s work expands the analysis on several counts. On the one hand, his 
examination of the UK security services industry is more aware of its roots in the 
                                                             
13 Keith Hartley (2011), The Economics of Defence Policy: a New Perspective (London: 
Routledge), pp. 233–235. 
14 Avant, Market for Force, pp. 34–38, Krahmann, States, Citizens, pp. 9–11, and Singer, 
Corporate Warriors, pp. 49–60. 
15 Krahmann, States, Citizens, pp. 9–11. 
16 Ulrich Petersohn (2011), “Military Privatisation: Changing the Military-Civil Force Mix,” in 
European Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 146–156 
17 Abrahamsen and Williams, Security beyond the State, pp. 5–6. 
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mercenarism of the 1960s, and more generally of the long history of public-private 
cooperation in the supply of armed force.18 He thereby highlights that the 
contemporary wave of governments’ reliance on private service providers extends 
back beyond the “neoliberal revolution” of the 1980s, even regarding the use of 
contractors overseas. Moreover, his work is particularly sensitive to the importance 
of differentiating the services that the private sector provides to the armed forces,19 
and does not falsely assume – like most of the literature at least implicitly suggests – 
that the phenomenon of military services contracting can be grasped by focusing on 
private security providers. Even though Singer’s typology – which identifies three 
types of companies rather than services – and book are aware of the logistics industry 
and its importance,20 his argument and in particular the problems he identifies are 
predominantly drawn from the examination of military combat services, a short-lived 
phenomenon of the 1990s.21 Krahmann employs the term private military companies 
“rather than referring to particular types of companies or services” because her aim is 
to highlight that they are replacing uniformed personnel and form an integral part of 
civil-military relations.22 While in principle this is admissible given her research 
interest, it is nonetheless problematic because not all types of contracts can be 
assumed to have the same impact, role, or importance for military missions, civil-
military relations, and policy-making.23 
                                                             
18 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers, pp. 50-54, 64-65, and 98–109. 
19 Kinsey provides a two-dimensional typology that focuses on a provided service rather than 
the type of company, which is more helpful than Singer’s as many companies provide services 
across the spectrum. See ibid, pp. 9–10. 
20 His “tip-of-the-spear” typology separates logistics, training and consulting, and combat 
services. See Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 91–92. 
21 Ibid, pp. 97-100 and 151-229. This is despite Singer citing the famous quote that 
professionals talk about logistics rather than strategy, which is the domain of amateurs; Ibid, 
p. 247. 
22 Krahmann, States, Citizens, p. 8. 
23 A direct result of such undue generalisation is misconstrued impacts of outsourcing for 
instance on civil-military relations, where it is argued, that the uniformed personnel are losing 
their distinctive character. As “their” tasks are now also provided by private contractors, their 
expertise is no longer seen as “specialist”. See e.g. Leander, Eroding State Authority, p. 109. 
 However, militaries undergoing limited contractorisation are in fact supposed to 
concentrate on combat, i.e. on tasks which are exclusively performed by them (since they are 
17 
Taylor’s brief examination of the drivers of support services contracting 
offers several hypotheses. Being exploratory they require further empirical 
consideration, but as a whole his perspective is compelling, and the factors he 
identifies can serve as explanatory variables for the variation among cases. First, he 
lists the place of the private sector in the delivery of public services more broadly. 
This relies much on the belief in the benefits of competition and in private sector 
efficiency more generally.24 Secondly, the reinterpretation of organisations in terms of 
core competency drives military services contracting.25 Thirdly, Taylor argues that 
different defence postures affect the propensity to outsource military support 
services provision. In the Cold War Western states focused on fielding systems 
without planning for their long-term deployment away from home bases. The 
increased importance of sustainability in overseas theatres of operation however 
exposed the lack of capability within the armed services of the USA and the UK to 
maintain aircraft and other systems.26 Taylor is thus possibly the only author who not 
only identifies the relevance of posture but also does not take it as a constant given. 
Fourth, Taylor also points out how the rate of technological change heavily influences 
the propensity to outsource support capabilities. For equipment to translate into 
military capability, it requires (among others) training, infrastructure, and support. 
Not only the sophistication of new systems, but also the rapid rate at which they are 
introduced into the armed forces, make it increasingly likely that the armed forces 
will have to contract for support for training in the use of the systems, maintenance 
                                                                                                                                                                      
not outsourced to the private sector). Thus, whereas uniformed personnel in the past also 
fulfilled technical and other support functions mirroring much work which was also 
conducted in the civilian sphere, the gap between professional soldiers and society should in 
fact be growing. What is in fact being ‘normalised’ or ‘civilianised’ is the participation in short-
of-combat activities which are quite possibly mission-critical. 
24 Trevor Taylor (2004), “Contractors on Deployed Operations and Equipment Support,” in 
Defence Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 184–198, at pp. 185–186. 
25 Ibid, pp. 186–190. 
26 Ibid, pp. 190–191. 
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services, and the related infrastructure.27 As chapter VI shows, the decreasing size of 
the armed forces further propels these dynamics. Finally, Taylor argues that short 
and sudden operations are less likely to contain a sizeable contractor contingent.28 
Again, the ongoing integration of public and private workforces especially in the 
support area may challenge this hypothesis. It remains plausible, however, that large, 
possibly protracted lower-interest operations will see more capability outsourced, 
while short, existential confrontations would dampen the overall share of the 
contractor contingent in the total deployed force. 
Arguing along political-theoretical lines like Krahmann rather than empirical 
ones as most authors above, Cusumano in his dissertation argues that a neoclassical 
realist explanation focusing on resource extraction and societal labour mobilisation is 
the most convincing international-theoretical explanation for military services 
contracting.29 His thesis, however, like virtually all authors merely acknowledges 
three central factors in passing that I argue are fundamental for the ecosystem of 
military services contracting: first, strategic posture and commitments, and the 
requirements they create; secondly, the longer-term defence economic and defence-
industrial policies that heavily affect how these supplies are provided, including 
particularly the role of industry; and thirdly how the implementation of defence 
policy with contractors affects both posture and supply. 
Summarising, tweaking, and synthesising the above is Kruck’s powerful 
“synthetic theory” of military outsourcing.30 His parsimonious theory of the drivers of 
military outsourcing examines drivers that are specific to military domains and differ 
                                                             
27 Ibid, pp. 191–193. 
28 Ibid, pp. 193–195. 
29 Eugenio Cusumano (2012), Power under Contract: Domestic Political Constraints and Military 
Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, PhD Dissertation at the European 
University Institute, accessed 22 November 2013, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/22690 (abstract). 
30 Andreas Kruck (2013), “Theorising the Use of Private Military and Security Companies: a 
Synthetic Perspective,” in Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp. 112–141. 
 At the time of its publication, the paper confirmed the research and the approach that this 
author had conducted and applied until that time, and added further valuable insights. 
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in their degree of general validity, and then synthesises them into “thin” explanatory 
variables. He also applies sequencing which examines the interplay of these drivers 
and factors over time. The key take-away is that ideas explain broader trends across 
nations – in line with Krahmann’s book – while calculations of political cost (risk 
transfer away from uniformed to private sector personnel) are more nation-specific, 
and technical or resource dependencies best explain the occurrence or absence of 
outsourcing of specific capabilities. Importantly, through sequencing he shows how 
military services contracting becomes “norm-alised”, incrementally accepted as an 
acceptable or even a standard practice.31 Like the other studies, however, he also 
takes the strategic context and its ramifications as constant givens rather than 
assigning them the same fluid, contested, and changeable characteristics that he 
assigns the other variables. 
Thus, to identify the drivers of military outsourcing, this study examines a 
range of strategic, ideational, political-economic, and technological factors. 
Politics and Processes of Contracting 
While the factors above can be viewed as at least partly external to the 
political process, there remains the decision to be taken about whether and how to 
outsource capability both for a first time and then later as an increasingly 
standardised, default practice. Long-time industry observer and author David 
Isenberg rightly criticises that laws and debates on military outsourcing focus on the 
use and activity of contractors but neglect those preceding decisions.32 The literature 
on these issues is thus much thinner than that on either the drivers or the effects and 
future of contractorisation. It is conjecture to argue why that is the case; possibly they 
fall in the cracks between classical examinations of the military-industrial complex on 
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32 David Isenberg (2011), “When to Contract, Not How to Contract: that is the Question,” in 




the one hand and the more classical fields of interest group politics and the policy 
process on the other. While the former focuses heavily on production rather than 
services as well as on the domestic level, the latter typically does not study the 
defence policy process. This thesis offers solutions to both shortcomings by providing 
an interdisciplinary approach to studying overseas outsourcing within the defence 
policy process. 
The literature agrees that military services contracting is no longer a partisan 
phenomenon. Its invigoration in the 1980s and some of its more problematic side-
effects are associated with conservative governments in the USA and the UK. The 
practice of outsourcing, which Stanger calls “laissez-faire contracting” is closely 
associated with the Republican administration of President Bush, Jr.33 However, the 
view that government is a problem and concomitantly the transfer of ever more 
responsibilities to the market are no longer only associated with the political right. 
The politics behind reducing the number of government employees has become a 
bipartisan endeavour, with government spending no longer being viewed as the 
prime indicator of the size of government.34 It was centre-left governments in the late 
1990s and early 2000s that dramatically accelerated and widened its scope.35 
Outsourcing, then, is part and parcel of a policy process that desires a larger role for 
and stronger presence of non-state interests (both for-profit and not-for-profit). What 
will be interesting to see is which of these non-state actors are best able to realise 
their core beliefs and interests. 
The academic literature therefore, while providing insights into some 
structural aspects of the relationship between contractorisation and the policy 
                                                             
33 Allison Stanger (2009), One Nation under Contract: the Outsourcing of American Power and 
the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press), p. 163. 
34 Ibid, pp. 12–13. 
35 See ibid, p. 163. 
 In Germany, outsourcing actually only began under a centre-left government as the state – 
under a conservative administration – chose not to follow the example of its Anglo-Saxon 
allies; See Krahmann, States, Citizens, pp. 158–177. 
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process, offers virtually no detailed examination of how the political decisions to 
pursue contracting came about, how individual contracts operate scandal-free on a 
daily basis (i.e. the majority), who is involved in the political decision-making process 
about the acquisition of military services, or how this affects the politics and policy 
process in the long term. Kinsey’s examination of contractor services in Iraq is a 
partial exception in so far as he first traces the operation of a series of contracts and 
then finds that contractors “are now part of the decision-making process as to 
whether an operation should go ahead”36 due to their role as key enablers of military 
force. Other authors highlight the potential risks to state sovereignty due to the ever-
shrinking “core” of inherently governmental functions, as well as the unclear divisions 
between advising and deciding.37 Verkuil highlights the problem of ownership in the 
decision-making process: when a policy-maker signs off on a recommendation made 
by a consultant – whose decision was it?38 Berndtsson’s case study on PMSCs’ role in 
defining security, their self-image, and their effects on the public-private divide also 
makes an important contribution in this context.39 Mohlin’s study, finally, examines 
the strategic use of contractors based on the two probably most detailed 
examinations of training contracts in the Balkans and Liberia. He however 
deliberately excludes the fluid politics of these contracts to focus on the strategic use 
of security contractors and produce several important findings about the strategic 
rationale for and benefits of employing contractors in overseas theatres of 
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pp. 3-4 and 109-11. 
38 Ibid, p. 44. 
39 Joakim Berndtsson (2012), “Security Professionals for Hire: Exploring the Many Faces of 
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pp. 303–320. 
22 
operation.40 All these analyses thus occur on the macro-level, leaving the micro-level 
to be assessed by others. 
Overall, Abrahamsen and Williams are right to criticise that even though 
contractors may be able to considerably affect political agendas, decision-making, and 
the distribution of knowledge and competences, there is a severe, alarming dearth of 
empirical examinations of security privatisation. As a result, the field has been 
vulnerable to speculative over-generalisation due to a priori reasoning at the expense 
of “sustained empirical research and theoretical reflection”.41 Charles Smith’s first-
hand story, published a year later, is a rare example that does go to the core as well as 
the political context of one of the most-mentioned and costly yet least-understood 
contracts, the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).42 
This thesis thus confronts two blind spots; first, the literature does not 
address the decision-making processes and the politics that led and continue to lead 
to outsourcing. Secondly, the literature does not offer in-depth examinations of the 
policy processes that produce contracts and the problems associated with them, the 
relationships that are involved, and the effects they may have on higher political 
deliberations and the longer-term future of military outsourcing. 
                                                             
40 Among these rationales are contractors’ low salience, securing influence in new regions, 
paving the way to a regular presence in a new region, and providing capability the government 
lacks.  
 See Marcus Mohlin (2012), The Strategic Use of Military Contractors: American Commercial 
Military Service Providers in Bosnia and Liberia 1995-2009, Strategian tutkimuksia. 
Julkaisusarja 1 Strategic research. Series 1, Vol. no. 30 (Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, 
Strategian laitos), p. 226. 
41 Abrahamsen and Williams, Security beyond the State, pp. 5–6. Their study tackled these 
shortcomings by examining domestic security services, mostly in Africa. 
42 See Charles M. Smith (2012), War for Profit: Army Contracting vs. Supporting the Troops 
(New York: Algora Publishing).  
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Long-Term (Policy) Effects of Military Services Contracting 
The examinations on the long-term effects of military services contracting 
again mostly neglect the policy process.43 Avant published the seminal study on the 
ramifications of the privatisation on political, functional, and social control of force.44 
She measures the effects on capabilities, financing and deploying force, and the values 
dominating the decision-making process.45 Kinsey assumes that contractors will most 
dramatically affect military force structure in the logistics sphere,46 and is proven 
right by the ongoing formal integration of contractors into military force structure 
especially in the UK, discussed in chapter VI, which should also lead to the inclusion of 
contractors into strategy and doctrine as called for by Bruneau.47 
Anna Leander went one step further than Avant, suggesting that military 
authority shifts towards private contractors simply because of their presence and 
participation. She argues that private military companies domestically increase their 
direct control over defence matters, indirectly reshape public authorities through 
lobbying and being hired, and weaken public actors in a zero-sum manner.48 She also 
argues that companies hold significant power not only to define security and threats – 
which is undisputed given the prominence of think tanks and business 
representatives in advising government – but also to set security policy agendas,49 
which are rather large complexes to “set”, more so in a concerted manner. 
Unfortunately, these theoretically well-developed hypotheses are not sustained by in-
depth empirical data. The evidence provided, such as contractors writing doctrine for 
                                                             
43 They rather focus on civil-military relations, military effectiveness, and the control of force. 
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44 Avant, Market for Force, p. 43. 
45 In strong states, outsourcing should lead to some functional loss, while politically the state 
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the U.S. military on how to use contractors on the battlefield, is certainly valid but 
ultimately anecdotal rather than conclusive. To make such broad claims about the big 
picture of defence policy-making and the discourses and practices shaping it, it is 
necessary to go beyond individual instances and establish and trace such processes 
comprehensively within their context and structure, which this study accomplishes. 
Singer, while sharing some of the concerns above and discussing possible 
effects of contracting on balances of power, alliances, and international cooperation,50 
also notes the potential problem of dependency on a contract source, or at least the 
possible difficulties of replacing a company. Moreover, the different motivations of 
government and contractors – security and profit, respectively – can in certain 
situations be seriously at odds and exacerbated if the profit motive undermines the 
military profession and practices more generally.51 Smith provides detailed evidence 
in his books and an interview with this author regarding these issues that is discussed 
in chapter VI. 
The importance of sequencing the analysis should be recalled here. The 
iterative character of military outsourcing requires scholars to reassess drivers at 
different points in time and regarding different military capabilities. The incremental, 
systematic, and formalised outsourcing of support services in the 1980s and 1990s, 
from this perspective, then set the scene for and possibly enabled the much broader 
contracting out of responsibilities up to the battlefield and much closer to the “core” 
of military responsibilities. Sequencing enables us to examine two developments of 
central interest to this study: first, the creation and evolution of incentives to 
outsource rather than maintain capabilities and capacities in-house, and secondly the 
conditions under which the trajectory, which so far pointed towards consolidating 
                                                             
50 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 174–190. 
51 Ibid, pp. 151 and 204-205. 
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and further expanding outsourcing, may change course.52 Examining the policy 
process through its cycles therefore highlights how through reiteration the context, 
scope, ramifications, and likely future of military services contracting evolve. 
Stanger indicates how some of these factors may be interrelated in the USA. 
Since extensive government contracting (beyond defence) endures, she points out 
that the status quo benefits the very same people who would have to overturn it. 
“Wartime contracting is big business, and business has deep pockets that appeal to 
any elected official” and “has lobbies that keep their interests squarely in decision 
makers’ minds. ... Changing the status quo will mean stepping on the toes of some 
very powerful and wealthy interests, always a significant impediment to meaningful 
change.”53 The UK government’s push for outsourcing, most importantly pressure on 
the implementing levels of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to act like and self-identify 
as market players, led to bureaucratic and organisational changes54 which this study 
shows further institutionalise contracting as standard practice well into the future. 
Laura Dickinson offers a compelling examination of some of the ramifications 
of overseas military outsourcing for “public law values”.55 She identifies the US 
legislature’s severe lack of awareness of or input into defence services contracts, 
including highly value-relevant ones such as the training of foreign forces, as a key 
obstacle to public participation and oversight.56 Another key problem is that Freedom 
of Information (FOI) legislation does not apply to contractors.57 
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Defense (DOD) see J. Michael Brower (1997), “Outland: the Vogue of DOD Outsourcing and 
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53 Allison Stanger (2012), “Contractors' Wars and the Commission on Wartime Contracting,” in 
Contractors and War: the Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations, eds Christopher 
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54 Matthew Uttley (2005), Contractors on Deployed Military Operations: United Kingdom Policy 
and Doctrine (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), pp. 31–37. 
55 These are fundamental respect for human dignity, public participation in decision-making, 
and transparency and anti-corruption. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace, pp. 8–9. 
56 Ibid. 
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Finally, several authors identify a real or potential militarisation of foreign 
policy in relation to outsourcing. This relationship can go both ways and is possibly 
reciprocal: a militarised foreign policy may be more likely to draw on contractors, 
while the availability of contractors may increase the propensity for militarised, 
possibly risky foreign policies.58 This concern is appraised in chapters V and VI. 
In summary, the literature cautions against a loss of state control over 
defence-related matters from agenda-setting to the control of military assets and 
force, and a potential clash of state and contractor interests. It warns of a militarised 
foreign policy, and a potential de-politicisation and technologisation of defence. It also 
suggests that contracting is here to stay both because of technological dependency 
and the high hurdles and likely opposition faced by anybody wishing to change the 
status quo. This is not a conspiracy or a “fault” of business, but inbuilt into the wider 
defence system. What remains wanting is a comprehensive analysis of whether and 
why the future is likely to see more military outsourcing that is cognisant of and 
linked to the drivers, politics, process, and impact of military services contracting. 
Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis addresses and capitalises on several of the findings and blind spots 
identified above and thereby makes contributions to several sets of the literature. 
 
First, the thesis contributes a conceptual approach that enables theorising the 
defence policy process, locating the private sector therein, and opening the long-
separated domain to debates with the wider field of policy studies. The literature –
                                                             
58 See Stanger, One Nation under Contract, p. 83. Anna Leander (2007), “Portraits in Practice: 
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presented at the 6th Pan-European Conference of the SGIR, Torino, 12-15 September 2007, 
pp. 12–15, argues that states and business support and re-shape each other, empowering 
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 not only on military contracting but also on defence policy-making – has not yet 
examined (the politics of) contracting and outsourcing within the defence policy 
process. It therefore offers neither a theoretical approach nor a related debate on 
either issue. This study fills this gap by outlining a theoretical approach that builds on 
established theories of the policy process that have not yet been applied in the realm 
of defence policy. In so doing, it also opens up the field to interdisciplinary cross-
fertilisation with the political science literature on the policy process, thereby 
challenging the separation of foreign and defence policy studies from virtually all 
other domains of domestic policy. 
 
Secondly, the thesis rectifies the literature’s insufficient differentiation 
between outsourced services and appreciation for their policy relevance, as well as its 
undue focus on PMSCs at the expense of strategically more relevant and 
representative services. Following a domain-of-application approach, it devotes most 
attention to support services and foreign military assistance. These services are 
delivered overseas, represent the largest share of outsourced military services in 
terms of manpower and cost, are of prime strategic importance, and governments 
depend on them. They are therefore of superior value for this study’s purpose of 
identifying the drivers, process, and future of military outsourcing. First, as Kinsey 
hypothesises and chapter VI confirms, logistics contractors will have the most 
substantial impact on military force structure.59 Secondly, even an ideal-typical core 
competency military will retain those capabilities that involve the use of force. 
Therefore, there cannot be a relationship of dependency between the government 
and industry regarding security services knowhow while this is certainly the case 
regarding various logistics and other support services. It is thus a much more 
promising avenue towards reaching an understanding of the politics and long-term 
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relevance of military services contracting to focus on those domains in which the US 
and UK governments by now have to draw on contractors rather than choose to do so 
for instance because of political expediency. Both governments – even if they wanted 
to –60 could not get rid of companies such as KBR, DynCorp, or Lockheed Martin 
unless they chose to discontinue operating a defence policy. Political will prevailing, 
however, they could do without security contractors immediately. This study 
therefore examines services for which governments depend on the knowhow of 
industry for the long term and that are thus most likely to be relevant to this 
investigation that seeks to understand the longer-term, big picture of day-to-day 
military outsourcing. Finally, by focusing on services delivered overseas, it 
contributes a new facet to the literature on defence economics and the politics of the 
domestic defence services industrial base. 
 
Thirdly, this study ends the PMSC-literature’s bypassing of the politics of 
military services contracting, and in how far outsourcing is woven into and affecting 
the structure, agency, and future of the defence policy process. It represents the first 
comprehensive study that addresses, most succinctly, the questions of who decides 
when, where, and why about generating and using military capability for foreign and 
defence political objectives. It thereby goes beyond the overly general statements that 
are typically based on extreme cases by examining the regular workings of 
contractorisation. In so doing, it explains the foundations of the mostly macro-level 
assumptions noted above that focus on high-political international security decisions 
but do not make clear the links between contract implementation and these high-
level decisions. This study examines the implementing level in depth and can thereby 
better estimate the “trickle-up” effects and the systemic role of industry in sustaining 
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the defence enterprise that has aided the emergence of contractors in the first place. 
These analyses contribute to the debate about what other authors call the US political 
system’s “bias towards business” or, more generally capitalist societies, the 
“structural power of business”.61 
 
Fourth, the study expands our knowledge of both the drivers of military 
services contracting and their wider context by strengthening our understanding of 
the links between strategy, military posture and requirements, and the defence 
economic and industrial policies and systems that deliver these requirements. It 
thereby challenges the literature’s static understanding of military posture, arguing 
that it belongs to the fundamental drivers of military services contracting, and shows 
that the high-tech demands of some militaries are not without alternative. In essence, 
it adds a strategic component and one based on the location of knowledge, meaning 
that much of outsourcing is about acquiring knowhow, technologies, and intellectual 
property for the pursuit of higher strategic objectives within a wider ideational 
context. Crucially, rather than proposing one-directional causalities, this study 
identifies and traces iterative, reciprocal, and circular dynamics between the drivers, 
politics, process, ramifications, and future of military outsourcing. 
 
Finally, the study also contributes to the debate about the militarisation of 
foreign policy. Stanger approximates the point when she mentions the “wildly 
ambitious agenda” of the administration of President George W. Bush and how it 
interacted with the ideological belief in small government to result in laissez-faire 
contracting.62 The fundamentally changeable rather than static nature of both specific 
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foreign policy agendas as well as military postures more generally however is not 
discussed either there or in the rest of the relevant literature. This study’s 
examination of both the links and the causality between strategy, posture, and 
outsourcing therefore not only improves our understanding of the drivers of military 
services contracting, but also of the relevance of contracting within militarised 
foreign policies. 
 
In summary, drawing on political, strategic, economic, technological, and 
ideational considerations, this study makes both a holistic contribution to the full 
trajectory of military outsourcing, as well as contributions to key specific aspects of 
the process. It thus improves our understanding of both the domestic and 
international determinants of foreign and defence policy by mapping the links 
between grand strategy, ideas, and defence economics, technology, and politics. 
Relevance Beyond Academia 
As the review above pointed out, military services contracting elicits a range 
of questions, reactions, and concerns that are of relevance beyond academia. This 
thesis will contribute to answering and better understanding several of them. 
Perhaps most importantly, the thesis underscores that outsourcing is as much 
a consequence of a wide variety of factors as it is a cause of change and reason for 
concern. In highlighting the many structural drivers of contractorisation that trace 
their origins back many decades, it sensitises us to the fact that any attempt at 
grappling with outsourcing must take these bigger pictures into account as well as the 
very wide variety of domains that have experienced contractorisation. Wider societal 
and political debates about military outsourcing should thus not base their approach 
to the military services industry merely on observations of armed contractors in Iraq 
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(for instance). By raising our awareness of the fact that contracting is to a large extent 
a result of deeper processes, it should become clear that the most promising 
approaches to informing and affecting contracting policy and practice should also, if 
not primarily, address those deeper strategic, economic, and other factors. In other 
words, those with an interest in the larger questions of the state-industry relationship 
and the determinants of manpower, force structure, and acquisition policy, can only 
succeed if they are cognisant of the multi-layered causal relationships that undergird 
them in order to best be able to comprehensively and successfully address them. The 
consequence will not only be a better-informed debate but one that is more likely to 
achieve results by orienting attention to the truly effective factors, and possibly by 
making the objectives more realistic in the face of the sheer scope, complexity, and 
linkages of the phenomenon. This naturally most concerns those who wish to change 
the status quo as they wish to challenge rather than reproduce those structures and 
processes that created and sustain the phenomenon. 
Secondly, by improving our understanding of the many links between defence 
policy, politics, technology, industry, and economics, as well as military force 
structure (including conscription) and aspects of foreign policy, this study highlights 
the close intertwinement of numerous civilian and military domains. It thereby 
enables a more holistic perspective that takes into account the complexity of foreign 
and defence policy and is simultaneously able to grapple with it. Put differently, it 
enables a debate to be cognisant of the bigger picture that connects the often abstract 
issues of grand strategy or a country’s strategic culture with very specific policies 
such as acquisition or outsourcing. The relationship between society and the defence 
enterprise in particular is marked by a lack of sustained conversation between the 
two domains, the sheer disinterest among much of the electorate in foreign and 
defence policy, and yet the appreciation of that same electorate for the centrality of 
the policy domains in question. In providing both a wide and deep account of the 
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issues at hand, this study hopes to contribute to a conversation that is not yet nearly 
well-enough developed.63 
Finally, the above big-picture contributions are composed of numerous 
specific analyses and insights that improve our understanding of each of them as well 
as of their linkages. This includes how the trajectory of defence strategy and strategic 
culture in the USA and the UK generates both military requirements and incentives 
for actors to behave in certain ways. It also includes detailed observations of who is 
able to access and participate in the political process, and why that is the case. And 
finally it includes numerous new insights into how and by whom military contracts 
are developed and implemented on the ground. It thus gives a face to the millions of 
individual little processes and activities that collectively comprise the defence 
enterprise, and represents knowledge that is crucial to informing both the wider 
debate as well as individual decision-makers when they deliberate policies but are 
unsure which stakeholders and domains to take into account. This thesis thus 
improves our understanding of both the wider issues as well as the operation of many 
of its component parts, enabling us both to target the relevant components we may 
wish to affect, but also bearing in mind the big picture which these activities 
ultimately feed into. 
Thesis Outline 
Following this introduction, the remainder of this thesis is divided into six 
chapters and a conclusion. Chapter I discusses theory, methodology, and methods. It 
first justifies drawing on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Policy 
                                                             
63 The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London is one of the few who seek to generate 
and engage in this wider societal debate, focusing on the place of industry in defence and 
society. This thesis additionally highlights the incentives and avenues of influence between 
those actors. 
 Cf. Royal United Services Institute, “Defence, Industries and Society,” accessed 14 April 
2014, available at https://www.rusi.org/research/programmes/ref:P4D89F6CAC2395/. 
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Network Theory (PNT), conducting a qualitative analysis, and applying a method of 
structured, focused comparison. It then discusses case selection and data 
requirements, collection, and analysis. The remaining chapters’ organisation closely 
follows from PNT and the three research questions. 
Chapters II and III analyse the context of the defence policy process in relation 
to military services contracting. They establish the historical trajectory of and 
background to the contemporary defence policy process and military outsourcing 
therein. Chapter II examines the expansiveness of grand strategic postures in the USA 
and the UK, their longevity, and the reasons for this longevity from the Cold War until 
today. Chapter III draws on these analyses to identify the ramifications of these 
postures for supplying the armed forces. It develops a step-by-step understanding of 
how postures and strategic cultures lead to technological and manpower 
requirements, and how the USA and the UK have sought to meet these requirements 
and generate the required military capabilities within ideational, defence economic, 
and defence-industrial contexts. Together, chapters II and III accomplish three things: 
first, they expand the literature on the drivers of military services contracting. 
Secondly, they offer a detailed examination of the links between grand strategy, 
posture, requirements, technology and technologisation, force structure, political-
economic ideology, and outsourcing; existing studies neglect at least some of these 
factors, or view some of them as static rather than as dynamic. Thirdly, having 
established the background to the contemporary policy process, these chapters 
develop assumptions about the likely shapes of policy networks, policy outcomes, and 
the future trajectory of military outsourcing which are then examined in chapters IV, 
V, and VI. 
Chapter IV asks “who makes defence services acquisition policy today?” It 
maps these networks in detail in the USA and the UK. The chapter identifies each 
network’s bias towards business, assesses the structural power of business, and 
34 
suggests that they affect the future making of defence policy. This is because they 
reinforce the contextual forces identified in chapters II and III and heavily constrain 
the operations of the sub-domains that are examined thereafter, thus limiting the 
likelihood of change ‘trickling up’ from within. 
Chapters V and VI examine the politics and execution of two overseas military 
responsibilities – foreign military assistance and military support services – and 
specifically the role of contractors therein. Both chapters first establish the political 
and military relevance of the respective military responsibilities and the drivers of 
their increased contractorisation. While chapter V examines in detail the 
implementation of such contracts within the relevant networks, chapter VI focuses on 
identifying the future trajectory of military services contracting more generally. Both 
chapters discuss policy-relevant ramifications and issues that mostly correspond to 
those identified in the literature review above, and identify factors that explain both 
the similarities as well as the differences between the USA and the UK. Both chapters 
close with assessments of how the implementation of individual military 
responsibilities feeds back and can thereby serve to both reinforce the status quo but 
also to potentially unsettle it. 
This structure reveals the benefits of sequencing. Accounting for the 
fundamentally reciprocal and iterative nature of the process each variable is, at some 
point, independent or dependent. While grand strategy is independent at first, it is 
conceptualised as potentially changing in the conclusion of every later chapter. 
Military logistics, at first dependent on strategy and ideas, later acts as the variable 
that shapes policy networks. Policy outcomes, finally, first depend on the above 
before feeding back to potentially affect it. The study thus remains sensitive to 
structure and agency and their interaction and impacts over time, so that as a result 
we arrive at a more nuanced and hopefully accurate picture of the drivers, politics, 
process, ramifications, and future of military outsourcing across a long period of time. 
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The conclusion draws the argument and findings together, and systematises 
them to argue for their broader validity beyond the cases studied here. It then 
discusses the limitations of this dissertation, identifies avenues for future research 
that emerge from this study, and thereby reappraises the academic and broader 
societal contribution this study makes. 
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I.  Theory, Methodology, and Methods 
This chapter introduces the theoretical and methodological approach that 
was developed to answer this study’s three interconnected research questions. Under 
the overarching research interest in the role, relevance, and ramifications of military 
services contracting for the defence policy process, they ask: 
 
1) Why do states contract for military capability overseas, i.e. what are the 
drivers of military services contracting? 
2) How does outsourcing figure in politics and political decision-making, and 
how is it conducted on the ground? That is, what role do contractors and 
contracting play in the policy process? 
3) And how does it affect the broader defence enterprise and policy process in 
the long term? That is, how does it affect the future of defence policy, and 
what is its own future? Why are we witnessing the entrenchment of 
contractorisation rather than its reduction? 
 
The chapter begins by introducing the phenomenon under study, i.e. military 
services contracting in the wider defence policy process. It then justifies the choice of 
the theoretical and conceptual framework, i.e. the Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
Policy Network Theory. Last, it makes the case for using a qualitative, case-oriented 
methodology by presenting the case studies (the outsourcing of military logistics and 
foreign military aid in the USA and the UK), and discussing how the author gathered, 
analysed, and evaluated data through a method of structured, focused comparison. 
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I. 1.  The Phenomenon: Military Services Contracting and 
Contractors in the Defence Policy Process 
The phenomenon under study here is military outsourcing within the policy 
process. Outsourcing signifies the substitution of public actors with private firms in 
the provision of services, a move that is often called the shift “from make to buy”.64 
The policy process is defined in more detail below, but it essentially describes the 
comprehensive political process from its context and background to the specific 
decision-making environment and process through to the implementation of 
decisions and its feedback effects for future iterations. Combined, this thesis is thus 
interested in whether, why, how, and to what extent military outsourcing (as a 
practice) occurs at all, outsourcing and contractors (as actors) figure in the policy 
process, and how they affect the process’s future trajectory. 
The timeline for this study stretches from the end of World War II until 2013. 
The structures of the defence enterprise and the policy process in both countries 
under study were set in the late 1940s and to a considerable extent persist until 
today.65 Perhaps most importantly, they instituted large standing peacetime armies at 
the time, and set up centralised defence ministries. The starting point underscores 
one of this study’s contentions, namely that the contemporary wave of military 
outsourcing stretches back in history much further than the neoliberal revolution of 
the 1980s or the end of the Cold War around 1990. The year 2013 was a point in time 
when the phenomenon faced a potentially critical juncture in its trajectory. The US 
and UK militaries were winding down some of the longest military operations in their 
histories in the course of which outsourcing boomed. With the deployments coming 
to an end, the future of outsourcing was one of many issues being debated in both 
states. The reappraisal could have potentially led to either embracing outsourcing 
more fully for the long term (and thus building on what had been practiced for over a 
                                                             
64 Hartley, Economics of Defence Policy, pp. 233–235. 
65 The country cases examined here are the USA and the UK, see more in section I.3.i. 
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decade) or else changing course and reining in the practice.66 This endpoint not only 
helps understand the present state of affairs but is also particularly well suited for an 
analysis that seeks to understand the reasons for and the degree of the entrenchment 
of military outsourcing as well as its likely future trajectory; after all, critical junctures 
often set the scene for the longer-term future.67 
I. 2.  Policy Network Theory and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework 
I. 2. i. A Fresh Approach to Studying the Defence Policy Process 
The ‘PMSC literature’ offers only limited and incomplete empirical 
considerations and theoretical conceptualisations for the examination of the politics 
of military services contracting and of contractors’ place in and impact on the policy 
process. Existing approaches help answer the first and third research questions on 
the causes and consequences of contracting, but not of the role, place, and activities of 
outsourcing and contractors in the politics and policy process of military outsourcing. 
In fact, the literature on defence policy-making more generally remarkably lacks 
frameworks that account for contractors and contractorisation. This may result from 
the focus on the use of contractors in current military operations and regulatory, 
state-theoretical, and civil-military issues on the one hand, and on the assumption 
that contractorisation can somehow be subsumed under interest group politics on the 
other hand. It is my contention, however, that contractorisation differs significantly 
from traditional interest group activities. Unlike arms manufacturers, whose activities 
and services were traditionally limited to the home base and domestic economy, 
                                                             
66 As these debates typically failed to appreciate the strong force exerted by strategic and 
technological requirements, a reversal of course was actually less likely than some policy-
makers may have hoped at the time. This is discussed in chapter III and the Conclusion. 
67 See e.g. Kathleen Thelen (2002), “The Explanatory Power of Historical Institutionalism,” in 
Akteure - Mechanismen - Modelle: Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen, ed. Renate 
Mayntz (Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus Verlag), pp. 91–107, at p. 97. 
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overseas services contracting delivers services up to the frontline in active warzones 
over extended periods of time. Its contributions to and potential impacts on the 
deliberations about and the delivery of military force thus differ substantially in three 
respects. First, geographically the service industry differs from the classical military-
industrial complex in that the benefits to electoral districts and domestic jobs are 
much less palpable. Secondly, regarding the levels of government, services 
contractors cooperate on a daily basis with all implementing levels while also 
lobbying the senior leadership. Moreover, they integrate their workforces over 
extended periods of time, enabling them to inform and potentially affect the thinking 
and acting of individuals across the government hierarchy. Thirdly, the timeline of 
services contracting is more comprehensive. It covers the entire period from research 
and development via implementation to evaluation, i.e. it does not end with the 
delivery of a product. 
While the PMSC-literature therefore offers no approach for studying 
contractorisation within the policy process, existing theories and models of defence 
policy-making are not suitable either. The latter are typically designed for specific 
countries or even specific bureaucracies, and acknowledge that the position and 
relevance of a given actor may vary depending on the issue. This study however 
examines multiple countries and issues relating to military outsourcing, so that these 
approaches are not appropriate.68 
Historical institutionalism shares with this study comprehensive research 
interests, and the acknowledgement of the importance of historical context, time, and 
                                                             
68 In the case of the USA, for instance, this often takes the shape of concentric circles of 
individuals, agencies, and other institutions, with the President in the centre. A typical 
“textbook” model is offered by Amos A. Jordan, William Jesse Taylor, and Michael J. Mazarr 
(1999), American National Security, Political science, 5th edn, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press), p. 218. Similar models are offered by Sam Charles Sarkesian, John Allen 
Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala (2008), US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and 
Politics, 4th [completely revised] edn, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), and Ilan Peleg 
(2009), The Legacy of George W. Bush's Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond Neoconservatism 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 104–105. 
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sequencing.69 It is suitable to identify the general types of incentives produced by 
institutions and political structures, and is increasingly developing an understanding 
of why institutions (do not) gradually change. This suggests that it may be feasible to 
address our first and third research questions, and has in fact been used by authors 
for related inquiries.70 However, it is ill-suited to answer the second research 
question on military outsourcing within the policy process. Institutionalism seeks to 
identify the impact of political, economic, or social structures (material and 
ideational) on agency. It is not interested in individual policies unless they constitute 
norms and thus shape future decisions,71 or in the details of decision-making 
processes. It thus somewhat ignores the explanatory power of agency by 
overemphasising that of structure and therefore unsurprisingly does not provide a 
toolbox for us to conceptualise the individual actor level of analysis, namely how 
decision-making and implementation operate in detail, who is involved therein and 
why, and what effects these actions have regardless of whether they are immediately 
institutional or not. 
 
This study therefore takes a fresh approach to studying the defence policy 
process. The literature review and the preceding discussion indicated characteristics 
required of our framework and theory, and the observations we must be able to make 
in applying them. They must not be biased towards a specific country or policy 
domain. They should be capable of sequencing the analysis to grasp the iterative, 
cyclical nature of outsourcing and the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
                                                             
69 Thelen, “Explanatory Power of Historical Institutionalism”, pp. 93–98. 
70 On developments regarding institutionalism’s ability to grasp gradual change, see in 
particular James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds (2010), Explaining Institutional Change: 
Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press). 
 Institutionalist and ideational approaches were used most notably by Avant, Market for 
Force, Petersohn, “Military Privatisation”, and Krahmann, States, Citizens. 
71 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (2005), “Introduction: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies,” in Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies, eds Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 3–39, at p. 12. 
41 
drivers, process, and outcomes. They must also accommodate the multi-levelled, 
diverse drivers of contractorisation, and grasp the potentially equally multi-levelled 
influence of contractorisation on the policy process. Moreover, they must 
conceptualise actors in such a way that accounts for their position and activities 
within the policy process, their political interests and beliefs, and that can measure 
the determinants of their relative power so as to enable us to estimate the relative 
chances of success of actors and their proposed policies. In so doing, they must be 
able to grasp the sources of both continuity and potential change. Before introducing 
and making the case for the ACF and PNT, two brief preliminaries are in order. 
First, to organise the study of the policy process, this study draws on Ostrom’s 
classification of frameworks, theories, and models.72 Frameworks are the most 
abstract. They organise enquiry by providing general variables and universal 
elements that theories about a phenomenon must include. Theories specify the 
elements that are relevant to particular kinds of questions about phenomena and 
postulate the general relationship between them. Their goal is to explain a 
phenomenon’s processes and predict outcomes. Models, finally, make precise 
assumptions about a particular process based on a limited number of variables and 
parameters.73 This study mostly remains on the level of theory as it does not focus on 
a specific, individual issue or decision. Thus, the ACF provides the broad categories 
for an analysis grounded in PNT and aiming to arrive at a general understanding of 
the phenomenon of contractorisation within the defence policy process. 
Secondly, a general understanding of the policy process is necessary to 
understand the choices made below. Leading scholar Paul Sabatier defines the policy 
process as “[involving] an extremely complex set of elements that interact over 
                                                             
72 Elinor Ostrom (2007), “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 21–64, at pp. 25–26. 
73 Ibid. 
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time”.74 Policy-making occurs in “subsystems” (or “domains”), covers long time-spans 
of a decade or more, and involves a large number and wide variety of state and non-
state actors who differ in their interests, values, perceptions, and preferences. 
Programmes operate in policy domains (such as defence acquisition), and because of 
the high stakes and clashes of beliefs, interests, and money, policy disputes are 
marked by selective, possibly false representation of evidence.75 
I. 2. ii. The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
There are two major framework for the study of the policy process. The 
institutional analysis and development framework is “interested in how institutions 
affect the incentives confronting individuals and their resultant behavior.”76 This 
study however does not examine collective action problems involving a known 
population of consumers and therefore draws on the other major framework – the 
ACF – that is well suited to making the necessary observations. 
The ACF is based on three fundamental assumptions: on a macro-level it 
assumes that policy-making usually occurs among specialists within domains, and 
that their behaviour is affected by factors derived from the broader context. On a 
micro-level it rejects rational choice and views actors as following either a logic of 
appropriateness (i.e. rule-following) or of consequences (i.e. maximising the good). 
On a meso-level, it argues that the best way to grasp the multiplicity of actors 
involved in the process within the policy subsystem is to view them as aggregated 
into “advocacy coalitions”.77 
                                                             
74 Paul A. Sabatier (2007), “The Need for Better Theories,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. 
Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 3–17, at p. 3. 
75 Ibid, pp. 3–4. 
76 Ostrom, “Institutional Rational Choice”, p. 21. 
77 Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible (2007), “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Innovations and Clarifications,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press), pp. 189–220, at pp. 191–192. Sabatier has developed the framework 
over the course of several decades. 
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The framework became popular in large part “because it reintroduces the 
concept of ideas and their origins”.78 Moreover, its relative indifference to the legal 
status of actors reflects the realities of contemporary policy-making better than 
traditional approaches that limit policy-making to self-contained government 
agencies, or that equate actors’ beliefs with their official backgrounds. The ACF 
includes judges, researchers, journalists, and intellectuals in addition to legislators, 
government officials, and interest group leaders,79 and interest groups are not limited 
to lobbies or others interested in immediate material benefit.80 It thereby 
acknowledges not only the importance of ideas regardless of where they originate, 
but also the centrality of knowhow. This makes it particularly useful to frame policy 
processes that are marked by non-governmental actors who generate and potentially 
hold a monopoly on crucial information and technology –81 such as contractors. 
Consequently, it is sensitive to the potential of technologies or other “shocks” to 
redistribute political resources, thereby unsettle the status quo and change the 
trajectory.82 
Two defining characteristics of actors and advocacy coalitions are their beliefs 
and resources. Beliefs are divided into four tiers, with actors coalescing around one of 
them.83 “Deep core beliefs” are the most comprehensive and undergird a person’s 
“general normative and ontological assumptions”. “Policy core beliefs” apply the deep 
core beliefs to individual policy domains (for instance foreign or defence policy), 
while “policy core policy preferences” in turn apply to subsystems (for instance 
defence acquisition). The latter preferences “are highly salient”, often act as the main 
                                                             
78 Keith Dowding (1995), “Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network 
Approach,” in Political Studies, Vol. 43, pp. 136–158, at p. 150. 
79 Sabatier and Weible, “ACF”, pp. 196–197, 200. 
80 It is here viewed as any “collection of individuals with intensely held preferences who 
attempt to influence government policies to benefit its own members” who “keep themselves 
well informed regarding legislation in that area” into contrast to the general public. Charles L. 
Cochran and Eloise F. Malone (2010), Public Policy: Perspectives and Choices, 4th edn, (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p. 80. 
81 Sabatier and Weible, “ACF”, pp. 189, 192. 
82 Ibid, pp. 191–192. 
83 Ibid, pp. 194–196. 
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source of division of different actors as they project an understanding of how a policy 
subsystem ought to look like, and thus provide visions that guide coalition strategy. 
“Secondary beliefs”, finally, cover less than a subsystem but rather specifics of a 
programme or policy and require relatively little counter-evidence to change.84 
Regarding belief-based policy behaviour, the ACF hypothesises that “when policy core 
beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable”. 
Also, “[actors] within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues 
pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects.”85 Alliances that 
are split along pro-/anti-contracting lines can thus be assumed to be stable for longer 
periods of time, while they are more likely to be split on individual policy decisions 
regarding the details of the use of contractors in specific instances. 
Resources of actors and coalitions are not limited to their finances. Rather, 
coalitions can hold a mix of the following: “formal legal authority to make policy 
decisions”, public opinion, information, “mobilizable troops”, finances, and a skilful 
leadership.86 Individual actors are therefore still divided into state agents and non-
state interest intermediators based on the first, critical type of resource, but their 
aggregation into coalitions ends the sharp division.87 Actors mobilise their resources 
throughout the policy process to identify problems, place them on the agenda, 
deliberate them, decide on a policy, and evaluate the outcome. In addition to the 
resources proffered by the ACF, this study also measures access to those with formal 
decision-making power. Even if access does not automatically translate into “formal” 
power as the first type of resource, it still indicates a significantly enhanced potential 
to affect government decision-making and introduces additional nuance to the 
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87 Cf. Silke Adam and Hanspeter Kriesi (2007), “The Network Approach,” in Theories of the 
Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 129–154, at pp. 133–
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analysis. Since this study maps the generic policy process this is particularly feasible 
to predict the potential influence of actors or coalitions that may form in the future. 
Unlike postulated by the ACF, agents here are not seen to act in accordance 
either with the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequences,88 but the “logic 
of practicality” as proposed by Pouliot.89 It is ontologically prior to the other two and 
therefore more parsimonious; rather than asking which of two logics an actor may or 
did follow in a particular case, the logic of practicality builds on an understanding of 
the background to the act.90 This background explains which course of action is 
deemed more practicable (or feasible). Since this study seeks a broad understanding 
of the policy process and its long-term trajectory, working off the basis of practicality 
is more promising. 
In sum, this framework provides the following general variables and 
universal elements to organise our enquiry into the policy process: policy occurs in 
specialised domains; actors are aggregated into advocacy coalitions that pursue 
specific policy goals; actors have various public and non-state backgrounds from 
across the political or economic hierarchy; actors and coalitions hold four-tiered 
beliefs of varying stability; actors hold material and immaterial resources; and actors 
follow the most practicable path in a given situation. 
I. 2. iii. Policy Network Theory 
Policy network approaches have been used in studies of foreign policy, 
especially regarding the impact of globalisation and other transnational 
developments on foreign policy processes.91 Overall, however, policy process theories 
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90 Ibid, p. 258. 
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remain predominantly within the fields of domestic political studies, and (like the 
ACF) Policy Network Theory has not yet been significantly applied to defence policy. 
PNT is the most appropriate policy process theory for this study: unlike all other 
approaches, it is not primarily, let alone exclusively concerned with policy change or a 
clearly identified “consuming” population, but rather more generally with grasping 
the entire policy process.92 The ACF and PNT are also a sensible combination of 
framework and theory as neither focuses exclusively on policy adoption or is limited 
to a particular geographic or political context.93 
PNT departs from the understanding that the model of the unitary, fairly self-
contained, hierarchical, and state-centred political decision-making system has and 
always had little to do with reality.94 It is based on the view that policy networks 
“reflect the relative status or power of particular interests in a policy area” and that 
they influence, but do not determine, policy outcomes.95 Networks are thus 
predominantly defined by their composition (i.e. constituent actors) and their 
structure (i.e. the relations between actors).96 Policy networks can then be applied in 
a generic way to describe empirically possible types and patterns of interaction in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 For other relevant examples see Elke Krahmann (2003), Multilevel Networks in European 
Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate), and Miles Kahler, ed. (2009), Networked Politics: Agency, 
Power, and Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
92 These approaches are in particular the “Punctuated-Equilibrium”, “Multiple Streams”, 
“Innovation and Diffusion”, “Large-N Comparative”, and “Social Construction and Policy 
Design” theories and frameworks. Cf. the respective chapters in Paul A. Sabatier, ed. (2007), 
Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edn, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). The monograph by 
renowned scholar Thomas A. Birkland (2010), An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, 
Concepts, and Models of Public Policy Making, 3rd edn, (Armonk, NY; London: M. E. Sharpe) lists 
fewer approaches, and none that are not contained in Sabatier’s volume. 
93 Cf. also Edella Schlager (2007), “A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of 
Policy Processes,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press), pp. 293–319, at p. 298. 
94 Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, p. 132. 
95 Tanja A. Börzel (1998, Summer), “Organizing Babylon: On the Different Conceptions of 
Policy Networks,” in Public Administration, Vol. 76, pp. 253–273, at p. 258. 
96 Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, p. 133. 
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policy domains,97 as this study does in relation to defence (services acquisition) 
policy. 
PNT is ideally suited to a sequenced, iterative analysis as proposed earlier. 
First, it takes a comprehensive perspective on the policy process by encompassing 
three levels and stages that are illustrated below (see Figure 1 on p. 52) and discussed 
in the next sections: the context of policy networks, their composition and operation, 
and policy outcomes. In the first view, the contextual factors act as independent 
variables while network composition is dependent; in the second stage the network is 
independent and policy outcomes are dependent. Policy outcomes, finally, affect the 
next conceptual cycle in that they can reaffirm or unsettle the context and/or the 
networks.98 This triad represents this study’s conceptual logic and is therefore 
discussed next in more detail. 
The Context of Policy Networks 
Three-tiered contextual factors influence the emergence, composition, and 
structure of policy networks. Focusing on the context of a network means viewing the 
network’s emergence, composition, and structure as dependent variables, influenced 
by a set of transnational and international, national, and domain-specific forces. These 
contextual factors can be either general or situational, meaning that they either affect 
the network continuously over extended periods of time, or they occur suddenly and 
potentially act as “shocks”. Shocks unsettle the status quo, for instance by affecting 
the valuation of actors’ resources, the admission to the network, and thus the 
network’s composition and structure.99 
The transnational or international context is the international policy 
environment, which here predominantly concerns the security environment and 
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as shocks both figure prominently especially in chapters III and VI. 
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international trends in defence economics and technology. Studies have shown, for 
instance, that convergence across states is more likely to occur when states use the 
same policy instruments (such as outsourcing) rather than only pursue the same 
policy goals (such as cost savings).100 
The national context is strongly defined by three components. First is the 
formal institutional structure of the state, which mostly concerns the relative 
strengths of the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and the degree of 
institutionalisation of power-sharing between the state, industry, and labour.101 The 
very different roles of the legislatures in the policy processes in the USA and the UK 
considerably affect the conduct of defence policy in general and the differences in 
specific domains.102 The second component is the administrative arena which is the 
main locus of public-private interaction. Here, the relative centralisation of both state 
and non-state actors, and the state’s autonomy from interest mediators are of prime 
relevance.103 Centralisation refers to the number of actors involved on either side, 
while autonomy concerns the ability of the state to make policy with more or less 
concern for the non-state side.104 And thirdly, informal structures, such as modes of 
access and informal exchanges of information, are increasingly accounted for.105 They 
are very relevant in this study, as – in the words of one interviewee – this is where 
most of the work gets done.106 
The domain-specific level most directly incentivises actors to participate in 
the subsystem, provides resources for group formation, raises expectations among 
                                                             
100 Ibid, p. 135. Chapters V and VI appraise this assumption regarding the USA and the UK. 
101 These analytics are typically derived from the standard-setting author in this area, Arend 
Lijphart (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press). 
102 This argument is developed in chapters IV and V. 
103 Peter J. Katzenstein (1978), “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign 
Economic Policy,” in Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced 
Industrial States, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), 
pp. 295–336, at p. 308. 
104 Chapter IV in particular relies on this component. 
105 Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, p. 140. 
106 Cf. personal interview with Dr Frank Camm. Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation. 
RAND Corp. Offices, Arlington, VA (17 April 2012). 
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the public, and is the immediately visible and salient part of the process that produces 
traceable effects.107 In our case it is defence (services acquisition) policy. In terms of 
forming part of the wider policy-making arena, policy domains are defined by two 
central characteristics: sectoralisation and system integration. Sectoralisation 
“denotes the degree to which a network is protected by isolation from other policy 
domains” and is “important for regulating spill-overs of problems or strategies from 
other networks.”108 It is measured in terms of decision-making power in the network 
and the autonomy of deciding state-actors.109 System integration denotes the 
institutional and ideological affiliation of a policy domain with broader state 
components, such as defence services acquisition with overall defence, security, or 
even government policy. A high degree of system integration may “[serve] as a 
protective cover since a political assault ... is perceived as threatening the whole 
system.”110 The attempts to exempt defence from the budget cuts in the USA known as 
“sequestration” illustrates that the defence domain there enjoys a considerable 
degree of system integration.111 This is further underscored by the active role the US 
defence industry as part of “democracy’s arsenal” is assigned in producing security.112 
As the emergence of policy networks is an empirical issue, no level can be 
viewed a priori as stable or as the most influential on the network’s emergence, 
                                                             
107 Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, pp. 141–142. 
108 Marian Döhler (1991), “Policy Networks, Opportunity Structures and Neo-Conservative 
Reform Strategies in Health Policy,” in Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations, eds Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt am Main; Boulder, CO: Campus 
Verlag; Westview Press), pp. 235–296, at p. 243. 
109 Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman (1989), “Strong States and Weak States: 
Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies,” in British Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 19, pp. 47–67, at p. 51. 
110 Döhler, “Policy Networks”, p. 243 
111 Cf. Lawrence J. Korb, Alex Rothman, and Max Hoffman (2012), “Gunpoint Stimulus,” in 
Foreign Policy (02 July 2012), accessed 30 November 2012, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/02/gunpoint_stimulus?page=full and 
Cheryl Pellerin (2011), “Service Chiefs: Sequestration Damage Could be Irreversible,” in 
American Forces Press Service (02 November 2011). 
112 Cf. Jacques S. Gansler (2011), Democracy's Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense 
Industry (Cambridge, MA; London: The MIT Press). 
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composition, or structure.113 Moreover, the three levels are not entirely independent 
of one another; transnational influences are refracted on both the national and 
domain-specific levels, and all potentially affect one another over time. For instance, 
the national and/or domain-specific level determines the interpretation of the 
international environment at a certain point in time. Relatively stable threat 
perceptions can create incentives and preferences regarding defence acquisition.114 A 
pre-existing military posture can affect not only the security environment – for 
instance through security dilemmas – but also a state’s national-level tendency 
towards interpreting security problems. This study therefore examines the 
relationship between and the changeable nature of these contextual forces and not 
only their impact on the policy network,115 which is conceptualised next. 
Policy Networks’ Composition, Structure, and Selectivity 
Inside, networks are defined by their composition, structure, and “selectivity”. 
Composition results from formal factors such as working for a government agency, 
but also from market logics or membership in an expert community. Members 
mobilise and exchange resources inside networks in the pursuit of policy 
objectives.116 As noted, they can often be aggregated into advocacy coalitions (which 
are not only a concept; interest groups often form coalitions to lobby on an issue). 
A network’s structure follows from its composition and the interactions and 
relations between its constituent parts. Studies are primarily interested in the 
distribution of power within networks and how this plays out. Power is not defined 
                                                             
113 See Carsten Daugbjerg and David Marsh (1998), “Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating 
the Policy Network Approach with Macro-Level and Micro-Level Analysis,” in Comparing 
Policy Networks, ed. David Marsh (Buckingham; Philadelphia: Open University Press), pp. 52–
71 and Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider (1991), “Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: 
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox,” in Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Considerations, eds Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt am Main; Boulder, CO: Campus 
Verlag; Westview Press), pp. 25–59, at pp. 40–41. 
114 This is currently salient regarding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cyber security. 
115 See chapters II and III. 
116 Kenis and Schneider, “Policy Networks and Policy Analysis”, pp. 41–43. 
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statically but rather by the mix of resources that actors and coalitions hold.117 It 
should be noted that the valuation of resources in different policy domains usually 
also differs; technological expertise, for instance, is more relevant in some fields than 
in others. Together with membership, the interactions of actors and coalitions are 
indicative of the rules of admission to the network, the degree of interest 
mobilisation, and the role of actors (including – importantly – potential veto-players) 
in the deliberation and implementation of policy. They also determine which issues 
are debated and thereby delimit the most likely policy outcomes.118 This is highly 
relevant as it is sometimes argued that contractors become subject matter experts 
who can establish the terms of debates and thus set agendas.119 Network composition 
and structure thus directly affect processes and vice versa.120 
The formulation of policy thus stands at the end of a process in which the 
constraints and opportunities of a network’s structure, composition, and internal 
interactions narrow down the range of policy trajectories and alternatives decision-
makers perceive to be available. This is summarised as “network selectivity”,121 a 
phenomenon that has particularly long-term ramifications and is therefore of central 
concern for this study’s research interest. 
Policy implementation and outcomes then have their own potential long-term 
effects. As dependent variables they are circumscribed to a considerable degree by 
the network’s selectivity. As independent variables, outcomes affect the context, 
                                                             
117 Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, pp. 133–134. 
118 David Marsh and Martin J. Smith (2000), “Understanding Policy Networks: towards a 
Dialectical Approach,” in Political Studies, Vol. 48, pp. 4–21, at pp. 5–6. 
119 See in particular Leander, “Power to Construct International Security”. 
 On agenda-setting, see Birkland, Introduction to the Policy Process, p. 171. 
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structure. See Marsh and Smith, “Understanding Policy Networks”, pp. 5–9. 
121 Döhler, “Policy Networks”, p. 251. 
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network, and individual agents, and can thus potentially unsettle or at least reorient 
the trajectory of the policy process.122  
The below summarises the discussion on policy networks, with arrows 
indicating directions of influence. 
 
 
Figure 1: A model of the policy process according to Policy Network Theory 
 
This chapter now turns to the methodology and method with which this study 
draws on the ACF and PNT. 
I. 3.  Methodology, Methods, and Research Design 
This study conducts a qualitative analysis. It applies the method of structured, 
focused comparison to four cases: the outsourcing of foreign military assistance and 
                                                             




















of military logistics in the USA and UK. The analysis draws on a wide range of written 
and interview data. The following discusses each of these points in detail. 
I. 3. i. Case Selection 
Country Cases: the USA and the UK 
The case selection allows us to draw on relevant, representative cases that 
display both similarities and variances over extended periods of time, and to 
cumulate knowledge on otherwise well-researched country cases. 
To begin with, the USA and the UK are the two foremost cases when it comes 
to the outsourcing of military responsibilities. The phenomenon of military 
outsourcing is clearly displayed in both countries. Given their relative size, 
sophistication, and importance in NATO and international security, many states 
follow one or both states’ examples when contemplating military change and defence 
reform.123 They are therefore particularly representative of the phenomenon of 
military services contracting as well as its likely future (i.e. research questions one 
and three), and the analysis uncovered ample evidence about contractors’ presence 
and involvement in policy networks (i.e. the second research question). 
Moreover, most of the existing research on military outsourcing deals with 
one or both of these countries. Covering other states could of course make a valuable 
contribution to the literature, and critics may argue that they are not sufficiently 
independent from one another or are extreme cases. However, the significant 
differences in their economic size, the role assigned to their defence-industrial bases 
in the production of national security, and the vastly differing roles of their 
legislatures in the policy process defy this potential criticism. In fact, these differences 
introduce considerable nuances into the analysis and findings. Furthermore, 
                                                             
123 Cf. Terry Terriff and Frans Osinga (2010), “Conclusion: the Diffusion of Military 
Transformation to European Militaries,” in A Transformation Gap: American Innovations and 
European Military Change, eds Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff and Frans Osinga (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press), pp. 187–209, at p. 187. 
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revisiting two well-known cases from a substantially different angle makes an 
important contribution as it enables cross-fertilisation and the testing of hypotheses 
of existing studies in so far as they overlap with the present study. This case selection 
thus enables us to cumulate additional knowledge and theoretical considerations 
about the phenomenon of military services contracting. 
Also, regarding the occurrence of outsourcing, they display significant 
variance on the extent of foreign military services contracting, but only minor 
variance regarding military logistics (see table below). To solve this puzzle, this study 
can build on both within-case and cross-case examinations of how the three-tiered 
contextual factors and the respective policy networks create both similar and 
different outcomes over extended periods of time. We should thus arrive at nuanced, 
broad findings that are based on detailed observations of several iterations of the 
policy cycle. 
 
 USA UK 
Degree of Outsourcing 
Military Logistics 
High Very High 
Degree of Outsourcing 
Foreign Military Assistance 
High Low 
Table 1: Degree of outsourcing logistics and foreign military assistance in the USA and the 
UK. 
 
Finally, the USA and the UK are among the least inaccessible for researchers 
(‘easily accessible’ would be an overstatement), and additionally publish by far the 
most relevant primary source material in open fora. 
 
Nonetheless, as any case selection this one has not only advantages but also 
limitations. This author had initially planned to include Germany as a (potentially 
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third) country case study to contrast with the USA, which would have scored “low” on 
both counts in Table 1. The German defence establishment, however, proved very 
difficult to penetrate as a researcher, and has furthermore been undergoing the most 
comprehensive structural reform since the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955. 
Interview and other data was therefore not only difficult to come by (similar to 
France) but also at risk of becoming outdated in the course of researching this study. 
Also, Germany (and sometimes France), which are occasionally examined as 
control cases to the USA and the UK, still share many characteristics with both the UK 
and the USA – from NATO membership to joint defence procurement. This suggests 
that examining the UK in addition to the USA will already draw out many of the 
nuances and explanatory variables that explain the variation between cases without 
facing the structural problems of defence reform in Germany or the hurdles of 
accessibility and limited data availability in Germany and France. 
Finally, as discussed below in section I.3.ii, the wealth of material uncovered 
and the partly exploratory nature of this study meant having to generate many of its 
hypotheses ‘from scratch’, while much of the data had not yet been processed for a 
policy-focused analysis of contracting. This made it unfeasible to include a third 
country case (and thus a fifth and sixth case study in addition to logistics and foreign 
military training outsourcing in the UK and USA) within the confines of this study. 
Overall, therefore, this study stuck to the UK and the USA for the reasons 
discussed above. Importantly, however, in order to overcome the aforementioned 
limitations of this case selection, in the conclusion this study will systematise its 
findings in such a way to make them testable and applicable to other country cases 
and military responsibilities than those examined here. It thereby offers a more case-
independent toolbox for future research, and thus overcomes the limitations of the 
case selection by proposing more case-independent findings. 
56 
Military Responsibilities 
As was discussed in the introduction, the literature displays an undue focus 
on armed contracting at the expense of other services. By focusing on foreign military 
assistance and overseas logistics the study avoids this bias and additionally 
contributes new empirical evidence. The two services are furthermore of 
considerable political and strategic importance, and should thus lead to more 
representative findings about the wider phenomenon than security contracting. 
First, outsourcing military logistics is strategically much more important than 
private security contracting. Logistics is the backbone of military strategy and 
therefore central to the operation of the defence enterprise, its capabilities, and the 
projection of military power.124 Logistics therefore – whether considered or not on 
the political level – at the very least affects defence political capabilities, operations, 
and the trajectory of defence policy.125 Being extensively outsourced, manpower-
intensive, central to military force structure and civil-military relations,126 and 
generally under-appreciated makes it a fitting and original case study. 
Secondly, foreign military assistance adds significant value to the study. 
Whereas logistics is mostly technical and not salient in the wider political debate, 
foreign military assistance is a top-level policy, a tool of foreign policy that is 
deliberated and decided at the highest levels of government.  
In combination, they allow us to examine the immediate politics of military 
outsourcing, the multi-levelled trickle-down effects of government policy on the 
outsourcing of specific capabilities, as well as the ‘trickle-up’ effects on high policy of 
implementing policy with contractors. Also, while logistics is provided to the 
                                                             
124 Cf. Mark Erbel and Christopher Kinsey, “Think Again: Military Logistics. Reappraising 
Military Logistics and its Relevance to Strategy and War,” under review. 
125 See in particular Martin van Creveld (2009), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to 
Patton, 2nd edn, first publ. in 1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),  
 and more recently Matthew Uttley and Christopher Kinsey (2012), “The Role of Logistics in 
War,” in The Oxford Handbook of War, eds Julian Lindley-French and Yves Boyer (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 401–416. 
126 See chapter VI for more details. 
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outsourcing state’s military, foreign military assistance ostensibly first benefits the 
receiving country.127 As chapters V and VI show, this difference of immediate 
beneficiary or consumer helps explain the different practices and outcomes described 
above, i.e. why the UK goes the furthest in outsourcing its own support while 
outsourcing virtually no mission-critical parts of its foreign military aid. 
I. 3. ii. A Qualitative Methodology and Method: Structured, 
Focused Comparison 
The method of structured, focused comparison is structured in that each case 
is confronted with the same set of general questions that reflect the study’s research 
objective. As the research is interested in phenomena, not holistic cases, it is focused 
in that it examines only circumscribed aspects of the historical cases drawn upon.128 
The method is thus well-suited to comparative research (such as this study) that 
discusses a limited phenomenon in a small number of cases, as is discussed next.129 
First, this study has some exploratory characteristics. It is the first systematic 
and theoretical enquiry into the phenomenon of military services contracting within 
the wider policy process. Therefore, it cannot draw on an existing body of research or 
processed data, but must generate its questions and hypotheses almost ‘from scratch’, 
as well as work off of a large volume of raw data. This would not be possible if it had 
to be done for a large number of cases. 
Secondly, in-depth case-oriented analysis can serve heuristic purposes.130 
Despite its limitations this study produces general findings which can help develop 
new theoretical explanations about the phenomenon. It offers a catalogue of 
                                                             
127 US foreign military aid policy, unlike the UK’s, is heavily affected by defence industrial 
policy and interests, as chapter V discusses in detail. 
128 This is drawn from the new standard-setting publication about the method, see Alexander 
Lawrence George and Andrew Bennett (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 67. 
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questions, observations, and relevant types of data to be deployed to other cases and 
to test and expand the theoretical considerations developed here. As a result, it 
suggests avenues for future research into the drivers, politics, process, and 
ramifications of military services contracting.131 
Thirdly, this design overcomes the problem of data availability and 
accessibility. Data is notoriously difficult to come by in security studies in general, and 
on informal decision-making and military outsourcing in particular. Focusing on 
fewer cases that can be researched relatively well alleviates this problem. 
I. 3. iii. Concept Operationalisation 
This section outlines the operationalisation of the concepts that were 
introduced in section I.2. Regarding context, the first observation to be made is the 
expansiveness of (grand) strategic posture,132 its durability, as well as the origins of 
both. Also classified as contextual are several ideational, defence economic, and 
defence technological factors. This includes views on the public-private divide, the 
political-economic organisation of the state, and its stance toward neoliberal 
governance (beyond defence). Specific observations to be made include the stance 
towards and the adoption of core competency in government as this directly affects 
acquisition and force structure policies. It also comprises approaches to meeting the 
capability, manpower, and technological requirements that result from a strategic 
posture. This includes, in particular, the location of knowledge, expertise, innovation, 
and technological change (i.e. especially industry), as well as military force structures. 
On the network level, actors’ beliefs are considered insofar as is necessary to 
identify their respective policy preferences and define the fault lines that divide 
coalitions. A different hierarchisation of strategic-cultural, defence economic, and 
defence-industrial “beliefs” regarding self-sufficiency and subsidies goes a long way to 
                                                             
131 See the section on systematising and generalising the study’s finding in the Conclusion. 
132 Cf. Taylor, “Contractors on Operations, Equipment Support”, pp. 190–191. 
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explaining the occurrence and degree of outsourcing. Generally, the beliefs assumed 
to be of relevance here are preferences regarding the role of government, the views 
on public service as a job or vocation,133 foreign policy preferences regarding the 
country’s role in the world, and civil-military preferences regarding the shape and 
organisation of the armed forces. 
This study measures actors’ resources and their mobilisation in the policy 
process as follows. Formal decision-making power is a property held by actors and 
differs in its value depending on the rank of the person in the government hierarchy 
or the immediate relevance of their portfolio to the policy issue in question. Access to 
decision-makers is measured through reputational analysis134 and by examining the 
inclusion of actors in key fora such as advisory boards and official government 
consultations. Public opinion is expected to be irrelevant here as the general public is 
widely seen to be ill-informed and/or disinterested in national security policy which 
is an endeavour of elites and interest groups.135 Interviewees from government, 
industry, and civil society all acknowledged the relative absence of public concerns 
for defence acquisition issues when compared, for instance, to health care reform. 
The resource of “information” is measured by locating knowhow, knowledge, and 
intellectual property in the various actors. “Mobilisable troops” and “skilful 
leadership” belong together. They are measured by the degree to which the advocacy 
coalitions and their leaderships are able to stay on top of the developments in the 
domain, learn about them possibly before information gets public, remain visible, 
extend their networks, and mobilise their supporters in the event of a policy dispute. 
                                                             
133 The keyword here is the “revolving door” between government and the private sector as a 
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135 See David J. Rothkopf (2005), Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security 
Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: PublicAffairs), pp. 3–5 on the USA, 
 and Robert C. Self (2010), British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945: Challenges and 
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Money, obviously, refers to the funds available to actors to support the pursuit of 
their policy objectives. 
The relevance of contractors and their advocates in the above is then 
contingent on their ability to define the terms of the debate, threat perceptions, and 
agenda-setting; the relative distribution of resources in their favour (or not); their 
presence in all stages of the policy process; and the extent to which they can benefit 
from and capitalise on their participation in the informal parts of the policy process. 
Network sectoralisation, system integration, and selectivity, as well as 
feedback effects of policy implementation are deduced from the observations above 
at the end of each chapter and summarised and systematised in the conclusion. 
I. 3. iv. Data Collection 
This study draws on a wide range of primary source material (printed and 
interviews) in addition to the relevant secondary literatures on contractorisation, 
defence economics, force structure policy, military logistics, foreign assistance, and 
others. Printed sources comprise government publications, reports, and various other 
public releases; industry and non-governmental organisation (NGO) publications and 
press releases; and freedom of information requests. 
The written sources from government and non-state actors produce 
significant insights into their official, publicly stated interests, public advocacy efforts, 
statistics on spending and access to decision-makers, strategies, and legislation. 
Requests in accordance with Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) were submitted in 
the USA and the UK in order to fill gaps in the other sources and to gauge the future 
course of certain policy aspects that are being deliberated but have not yet been 
formally decided or publicised. In total, I consulted over 150 primary sources from 
government, industry, and NGOs. These include press releases, White Papers, 
consultation papers, advisory board studies, trade publications, legislation, and 
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diverse statistics from various government departments of which many had not yet 
been processed for in-depth academic study. 
The FOI requests, which were not always satisfactorily answered, requested 
information on lobbying efforts in various government departments and agencies, 
spending figures on specific policy efforts, figures on the conduct of embedded 
contractors, ongoing plans to integrate uniformed and contractor workforces, and 
details on specific contracts. 
Interviews were conducted to shed light on the expansive and highly relevant 
informal, non-memorialised aspects of the policy process. For instance, the US 
government may publish the terms of reference for a Department of Defense (DOD) 
advisory board to form a task group, and a year later publish the group’s findings or 
recommendations. The interim period, however, is very hard to discern from these 
two sources; interviews help illuminate such grey areas and non-memorialised stages 
of the policy process. Similarly, the identification of key actors, of the various 
perceptions and beliefs, the reputation of actors, and especially their access to 
decision-makers is often only possible by enquiring about them in interviews. 
Interviews are also crucial to deepen the analysis of specific contracts or interactions, 
as chapters IV-VI underscore. Finally, interview data enables the triangulation of 
printed sources, and reading between the sometimes partisan lines of public 
statements. Interview questions were developed in close reference to the theoretical 
framework developed above in order to maximise their utility for the present 
analysis. They enquired about strategy, defence economics, policy network 
composition, advocacy coalitions, individual defence outcomes, and the trajectory of 
the various policies and practices. 
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I conducted approximately fifty interviews, both on and (quite often) off the 
record.136 Interviewees were active or former members of government, military, 
industry, or NGOs. They were identified strategically by affiliation, identification in 
the literature and sources, but only in very few cases through “snow-balling”; despite 
its small size the sample is thus as independent as can be. The importance of these 
actors was further underscored by the fact that – independently from one another 
and the literature – many interviewees were repeatedly identified by others as being 
particularly valuable sources on a given topic. The high number of off-the-record 
interviews was due to the sensitivity of the issues at hand, and the ability of 
interviewees to speak at all. Some would have been required to clear each quote with 
their respective employers while in some cases anonymity was necessary to protect 
interviewees’ identity in the world of arms and defence services trade. As a result, this 
study is able to draw on current and former often high-level industry and government 
representatives who would otherwise not have consented to being interviewed. The 
contribution and insights provided in the interviews that often spanned several hours 
and/or meetings have been invaluable for this study. 
 
This concludes the introductory and conceptual part of this dissertation. The 
organisation of the following chapters is derived from the above and geared towards 
a sequenced analysis. The chapters first identify and establish the key contextual 
factors that undergird the status quo, and trace them over an extended historical 
period of time. Next, they map the high-level defence services acquisition policy 
network and identify system-level selectivities. Finally, they examine in detail the 
politics and process of overseas military services contracting, assess whether they 
confirm the preceding assumptions and analyses, and evaluate their ramifications for 
the future of the policy process (does the future hold “more of the same” in store, and 
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which potential sources of change could alter this trajectory?). The analysis begins 
with the expansiveness and durability of grand strategy and global defence postures, 
two central frames and determinants of the supply of military force. 
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II.  The Strategic Context of Defence Policy-Making: the Scope 
and Durability of Grand Strategy and Posture 
Defence policy-making is fundamentally about reconciling policy with 
capability.137 This chapter covers the former while chapter III builds thereon to 
examine the latter; together they establish the contextual factors as per PNT by 
identifying how defence policies and modes of generating military capability affect 
the propensity to outsource and thus influence the policy networks’ composition and 
the wider policy process. 
Taylor posits that a state’s defence posture affects its propensity to outsource 
military support services.138 Postures are defined by two key variables, namely the 
extent of a military’s overseas presence, and the offensiveness of troops’ operational 
orientation (either defence or power projection).139 The more pronounced these two 
variables are, the more expansive a defence posture is considered to be, and the more 
likely a state should be to seek support from industry in the realisation of its desired 
posture because it demands a certain level of deployability and sustainability.140 
This chapter therefore first identifies the expansiveness of US and UK grand 
strategies and global defence postures since the end of World War II. Additionally, 
this chapter examines the degree and sources of these postures’ durability (or 
longevity). This is important because expansiveness creates high demands for 
military capability as is discussed in chapter III. A durable defence posture should 
thus stabilise demand and potentially lead to the entrenchment of the modes of 
supplying defence with the required capability to which industry and outsourcing are 
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currently integral. Moreover, a durable defence posture also has implications for a 
policy network’s composition and selectivity, and thus for its likely outcomes. Actors 
who are involved in the defence policy process – ranging from current, prospective, 
and hopeful government employees to their private sector suppliers – situate 
themselves in relation to their country’s defence posture. The more durable this 
posture is, the more constrained these actors’ incentives should be to conform to the 
governing mainstream. This is because the chances of success of non-conformist 
views (including potential veto-players) should be lower in the face of a long-
standing, well-established discourse and practice. Put differently, the longer a state 
maintains a very forward-leaning defence posture, the less likely policy-makers 
would be to succeed in their wish to turn to an isolationist posture because they 
would face a system that was built over decades to realise an expansive posture, 
including many people who rely on this posture for their jobs and livelihoods. As a 
result, change in a state’s defence posture becomes incrementally less likely in the 
absence of veritable shocks that unsettle the status quo. By extension, if 
contractorisation is a possible consequence of an expansive posture, it should also 
become more entrenched the longer that posture persists. 
Identifying a posture’s longevity (and the sources of its longevity) in addition 
to its expansiveness is thus also important for later examinations of the politics, 
process, and the future of military outsourcing. In so doing, this chapter highlights 
that this fundamental driver of outsourcing is not a given but subject to constant 
renegotiation, even if the decades-long stability of defence posture may suggest that it 
can be taken as a constant given. 
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II. 1.  The Security Environment: from Superpower Rivalry to 
Unipolarity 
National security policy in the USA is about “formulating and implementing 
national strategy ... to create a favorable environment for US national interests”.141 
British doctrine similarly states that the “security of the UK is rooted in perceptions of 
national sovereignty and interests and how these may be best protected and 
promoted.”142 The international security environment and its interpretation are thus 
key reference points for policy-makers. 
With this in mind, the Cold War, in hindsight and in comparison to today, was 
an era of significant certainty as to the geopolitics and likely security threats in the 
world. According to Andrew Bacevich, “the era’s great antagonisms – the United 
States vs. the Soviet Union, West vs. East, Free World vs. Communist bloc – told you 
pretty much everything you needed to know.”143 The West in general and the United 
States in particular built their strategies around variants of deterrence, with the 
Central Front in Europe – certainly intellectually – being the central locus of the 
confrontation, proxy wars and additional fronts elsewhere notwithstanding.144 In the 
USA, despite following on a trajectory that witnessed the expansion of US global 
military presence since the late 19th century, the posture adopted after World War II 
was novel insofar as it entailed a large standing peacetime army.145 It resulted from a 
new sense of vulnerability following Pearl Harbor and the view that the USA had to 
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assume a more forward posture in order to remain safe at home. By the time of the 
Korean War, the notion that a sustained overseas military presence was necessary 
had taken root in the US national security establishment.146 
The United Kingdom shared this basic understanding of the international 
security landscape in principle. However, following World War II, Britain had to adapt 
to its changing power status, from a global to a de facto regional role. British foreign 
and defence policy also had the added element of colonies around the world. British 
defence policy-makers were therefore faced with two partly diverging loci demanding 
their attention,147 which also manifested themselves in the tensions between 
advocates for a threat-based defence policy (in particular aimed at the Soviet Union) 
vs. a capabilities-based defence policy (aiming at a high degree of global power 
projection capability against diverse potential threats).148 Accompanied by a debate 
that was marked by these two orientations, the UK over the course of the Cold War 
opted for the gradual reduction of its overseas military presence while aiming to 
maintain some level of home-based deployability.149 
Ironically, it was the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact that 
suddenly presented NATO and its member states’ armed forces with an acute threat. 
Without an obvious enemy, militaries came under pressure to downsize while NATO 
had to present a credible mission to justify its continued existence.150 
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II. 2.  Interpreting the Security Environment: Grand Strategy and 
Global Defence Posture 
The response to the end of the Cold War entailed the further expansion of 
defence postures. This was justified by the increasingly expansive and global 
definition and perception of security risks that were to be addressed pre-emptively 
and preventively with military means.151 Inaction was viewed as potentially riskier 
than (possibly premature or illegal) military action, and strategic concepts like 
“preventive defence” proliferated. Western states shifted their attention from 
territorial, state-based threats to the defence of legal norms and insecurities arising 
from “failed”, “failing”, or “fragile” states.152 “Uncertainty”, as the following discussion 
illustrates, became the key qualifier of official defence strategies and reviews. 
II. 2. i. The Scope and Mainstays of Contemporary U.S. Grand 
Strategy and Defence Posture 
From the late 1980s until the mid-1990s efforts by policy entrepreneurs from 
both parties led to the emergence of “a new strategic consensus” among US defence 
policy-makers that required “the US to have the military capabilities to fight and win 
two major theatre wars simultaneously” as well as maintain “overwhelming … 
military power to guard against the emergence of a future peer competitor”.153 The 
USA, in other words entered the unipolar era assuming a posture of primacy, 
regardless of which party or administration was governing. Measured by Pettyjohn’s 
two variables of the extent of overseas military presence and the operational 
orientation of troops, contemporary US posture – called “expeditionary defense in 
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depth” – thus scores high on both counts; it comprises an expansive (and expanding) 
military presence overseas that is moreover increasingly geared towards power 
projection at short notice in potentially far-away theatres rather than in the bases’ 
more proximate environs.154 
The following survey of relevant government policies and sources shows that 
this consensus was maintained to this day. Moreover, it highlights the overwhelming 
cross-party agreement in the USA’s governing bodies and foreign and defence 
political establishment that the national interest extends across the globe, requiring 
the USA to assume responsibility for security and stability across the world and to 
assume global leadership in the absence of fully effective international security 
regimes. First of all, both Presidents Bush, Sr. and Clinton presided over basing 
reviews in the 1990s that – despite seeking to generate savings known as the “Peace 
Dividend” – argued that the USA must maintain a significant overseas forward 
presence.155 Retreating after the disappearance of the Soviet Union would have had 
historical precedents, but the uncertainty as to where future threats and 
contingencies may arise led the USA to adopt a line of ‘better safe than sorry’ and 
maintain a massive overseas presence that keeps expanding with the growing 
number of perceived threats, low-intensity conflicts, and other operations across the 
globe.156 
Successive Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), National Security Strategies 
(NSS), and Defense Guidances then affirmed what came before them and went on to 
further reinforce the fundamental beliefs in the need for US global leadership to 
favourably shape the world, the need for US military superiority, and high-intensity 
activism to reassert both. To begin with, the 1997 QDR rested “on two fundamental 
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assumptions: that the United States will remain politically and militarily engaged in 
the world over the next 15 to 20 years, and that it will maintain military superiority 
over current and potential rivals”. It concluded that if the USA “were to withdraw 
from its international commitments, relinquish its diplomatic leadership, or 
relinquish its military superiority, the world would become an even more dangerous 
place, and the threats to the United States, our allies, friends, and interests would be 
even more severe.”157 Then-Secretary of Defense William Perry noted that the USA for 
the long term had to “continue to shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. 
interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and 
prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond.”158 For Perry this 
followed from “the inescapable reality that as a global power with global interests to 
protect, the United States must continue to remain engaged with the world, 
diplomatically, economically, and militarily.”159 In so doing, the USA – once in combat 
– did “not want a fair fight … but capabilities that will give [it] a decisive 
advantage.”160 
One year later, the 1998 NSS, despite explicitly rejecting the role of world 
policeman, identifies a range of threats of such breadth that inadvertently obliges the 
USA to that role.161 The military is assigned a central role in shaping the international 
environment so as to “protect and promote U.S. interests” by virtue of its overseas 
presence and access to important lines of communication, its technological 
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sophistication, security assistance, defence cooperation, and serving as a role model 
to other nations.162 
Although uncertainty had already been a hallmark in earlier papers, the 2001 
QDR stated as a “central objective” the shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-
based approach to defence planning. It thereby affirmed the de-territorialisation of its 
strategic and operational focus “on how an adversary might fight rather than 
specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur.”163 It 
emphasises that ultimately “U.S. military strength is essential to achieving” peace, 
freedom, and prosperity.164 By addressing the threats to the “[vitality] and 
productivity of the global economy” on land and sea, and in air, space, and 
cyberspace,165 the US defence enterprise would by necessity be involved on a global 
scale. This outlook moreover leads to a key requirement discussed in the next 
chapter: full-spectrum technological and operational dominance. The 2002 NSS 
completed and memorialised this turn by refining the deterritorialisation. On the one 
hand the USA was combating borderless global terrorism, while on the other specific 
threats emanated from “failed” and “failing” states. As these failed states were 
similarly spread across the globe, anything but a global posture and the reiteration of 
global leadership was unthinkable.166 Fittingly, and foreshadowing what in the 2006 
QDR came to be called the “Long War”, the 2002 NSS carried the following quote from 
a speech by President Bush three days after 9/11. The USA's “responsibility to history 
is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. ... The conflict was 
begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our 
choosing.”167 
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The 2006 QDR further vindicated the global stretch not only of US 
responsibilities, but also of more overtly direct influence on other states. To 
operationalise the NSS of that year the USA sought to “[shape] the choices of countries 
at strategic crossroads.”168 Countries could either join the USA or “choose a hostile 
path”,169 language that resembles what Münkler identifies as a quality of imperial 
politics: the impossibility of neutrality.170 In this case it seemingly incorporates the 
goal of preventing the rise of peer-competitors. 
Despite expectations to the contrary, this posture persisted through the first 
administration of President Barack Obama. On the one hand, Obama’s first NSS in 
2010 was “consistent with its predecessors in its definition of American interests, its 
stress on the need for continued U.S. global leadership, the importance of American 
values in its foreign policy, and in its unwillingness to face the hard choices that 
limited means entail”.171 On the other hand, while it may have differed in its more 
complex description of threats, a general preference for multilateralism and for 
influencing the world by example rather than through military might,172 the first 
Obama administration conducted an expansive foreign policy which ultimately did 
not lead to a single lasting legacy but rather entailed the (mostly necessary) 
continuation and conclusion of inherited wars and initiatives.173 This is despite its 
desire to strengthen its national capacity by adopting a “whole of government 
approach” which would give more weight to diplomacy.174 While the 2010 QDR thus 
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slightly realigned US defence posture to focus more on burden-sharing and 
cooperation, it left intact the basic tenets of maintaining a long-term military presence 
overseas and an ability to flexibly “respond to contingencies ... and global security 
needs in distant theatres”.175 Like its predecessors it illustrated the shift from threats 
to harnessing capabilities of deterritorialised risk mitigation covering the full range of 
areas noted above.176 
Finally, on 5 January 2012, President Obama signed a Defense Strategic 
Guidance entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense.”177 The name in itself a testament to the self-assigned role and self-image of 
the USA, it perceives the same range of general challenges and promises active rather 
than reactive responses to these issues. Moreover, despite the extreme budgetary and 
fiscal problems at the time that the guidance explicitly acknowledges, it states that the 
USA will safeguard its economic and security interests in East and South Asia by “of 
necessity [rebalancing] toward the Asia Pacific region,”178 and affirming more generally 
that “there should be no doubt” that the USA will maintain its forces to remain the 
superior fighting force in the world.179 The term “necessity”, like the guidance’s title, 
highlights the seemingly self-evident logics of US defence thinking, letting the 
underlying beliefs which frame strategy formulation become abundantly clear. 
Brooks captures this in the quote that “[most] Americans think of peace as a time in 
which the military is more or less irrelevant. But to the military, it is merely ‘Phase 
Zero’ … on the … ‘spectrum of conflict.’”180 It is therefore unsurprising that the Chief of 
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Staff of the U.S. Army similarly found that the Army, while facing declining budgets, 
must broaden its operational focus and improve its “readiness to respond in force to a 
range of complex contingencies worldwide.”181 This call for increased readiness – 
published in the widely circulated Foreign Affairs – came at a time when the US 
military was still deployed in large numbers to Afghanistan, had fought an air war in 
Libya, and conducted covert campaigns throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and 
South Asia, leaving the reader to wonder what more the US government expects its 
forces to be able to deliver on the strategic level. Be that as it may, the US Army 
shifted the emphasis in its training to meet the demands of African and Pacific 
theatres of operation, suggesting that the USA swiftly set about implementing the 
pivot on the operational and tactical levels.182 
Throughout the post-Cold War era, the USA has thus maintained and further 
expanded its global defence posture, predicated on a grand strategy that assigns the 
country a leadership role in the world as a force for prosperity, peace, and security. 
Consequently, it regards as its key tenets a rapid, globally deployable, and militarily 
superior capability to project force to both continue its perceived positive influence 
and prevent the rise of peer competitors. Faced with recurring financial pressures, 
defence policy-makers kept as their top priority the maintenance of this very 
forward-leaning posture and relegated cost-cutting to second place.183 The next 
section examines the reasons for this durability. 
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II. 2. ii. The Durability of U.S. Grand Strategy and Defence Posture 
As noted, I argue that a more permanent posture more strongly incentivises 
actors to remain within the mainstream, possibly reduces the presence of veto-
players, and certainly makes strategic realignment increasingly unlikely in the 
absence of shocks that would unsettle the three contextual levels 
(transnational/international, national, domain-specific). Ultimately, this means 
continuity not only of strategy and posture, but also of the military requirements to 
implement them and thus of military services contracting. The following therefore 
elucidates the ideational, structural, and agential factors that perpetuate US grand 
strategy and global defence posture, including contractors themselves. By expanding 
the analysis beyond the mere observation of expansive strategy and military posture 
to identifying the sources of their longevity, this study does not take them as givens 
(as the literature has tended to do) but underscores that they are contingent on 
continuous reproduction by a large network of interested actors. In so doing, it 
develops an understanding of the links between strategy, posture, and pro-
contracting advocacy, i.e. the degree to which contractors and their advocates directly 
and indirectly participate in shaping the very strategy and posture which are 
fundamental to continued military outsourcing. Importantly, these sources of 
continuity are also potential sources of change in the future of contracting. 
In the view of Andrew Bacevich, one of the most discerning scholars of the 
grand narratives of US national security policy, the trajectory towards a more 
expansive posture and interventionism and its remarkable continuity are results of a 
fundamental ideational force. To him, it adhered to an imperial grand strategy of 
global openness that is aimed at the trade of goods and the movement of people and 
resources;184 the centrality of the global economy in the official documents surveyed 
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above vindicates this view. Bacevich locates this strategy’s origins long before the 
Cold War. He writes that it is viewed as benign and enlightened in the eyes of its 
architects. However, as the acquiescence of overseas subjects is not assured, the 
maintenance, further development, and use of military power become integral to US 
grand strategy.185 These interpretations are in line with Münkler’s masterful 
definition of empires as “more than large states” that “regard themselves as creators 
and guarantors of an order which ultimately depends upon them” and are legitimised 
by an imperial mission that may require force for its maintenance.186 This ideational 
interpretation resonates closely with the government papers surveyed above. 
This long-standing, ideational grand strategic consensus is a powerful but not 
a sufficient explanation for the durability of US grand strategy and posture. In line 
with the literature surveyed above, it operates in tandem with the defence economic 
and political structures which together generate incentives that actors then pursue 
within the policy network. The defence establishment in the USA, like most systems, 
is not structured to encourage dissenting or fundamentally self-scrutinising activities. 
If anything, it is geared towards fine-tuning and ‘improving’ the running defence 
political machinery and benefiting from the stable revenue streams and employment 
opportunities that it generates, but not towards questioning its basic premises. This 
extends even to the highest levels of government. 
Cathy Downes, viewing the above from the perspective of its 
institutionalisation within government structures, summarises it as unintentional 
militarisation. While the military over the course of the Cold War became “the most 
available, mission-capable, and well-funded [instrument] of US national power”, 
civilian agencies lack funds, staff, and appropriate institutional capacities and 
structures to cope with challenges. This is self-perpetuating in that when a crisis 
arises the reflex will be the “disproportionate reliance … upon the military instrument 
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as a one-size-fits-all preventive, pre-emptive tool of diplomacy”.187 There is much 
evidence to support this observation of the reciprocal relationship between defence 
political structures and agency. The following highlights how these structures 
generate incentives for individuals to support the maintenance, further development, 
and use of the military instrument of power. It examines governmental advisory 
bodies, security debates in Washington, D.C., and formal advisory contracts for 
private contractors. They all highlight that the government largely sets the tone and 
rules, so that strategy and posture are likely to persist until a significant part of the 
government establishment alters its fundamental assumptions. 
Within the confines of government, Defense Science Board (DSB) and Defense 
Business Board (DBB) studies are powerful illustrations of the incentive and in fact 
the responsibility to maintain and improve the existing structures and systems.188 
Their charters are illustrative of the fundamental assumptions and concerns of the 
governmental defence leaderships, i.e. what is viewed as given, and stand for the 
direction in which a given President, Secretary of Defense, and/or various Under 
Secretaries of Defense (USD) – usually that of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(AT&L) – (wish to) see defence capabilities evolving. A recent example is a DSB study 
that was ordered following the release of the 2012 Defense Guidance. The DSB was 
“requested to conduct a study of emerging technologies that will enable the next 
generation of dominant military capabilities to be in development or fielded by 
2030.”189 In other words, it is tasked with identifying technologies which fulfil the 
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guidance's title and goal of “sustaining US global leadership”. The Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) in 1995 had similarly departed from 
the basic assumption of the superiority of the US armed forces at the time, the 
widening variety of missions the US will conduct in the future, the growing 
importance of new technologies and weapons systems for success in those missions, 
and that all of the above must be accomplished with limited defence budgets. Its 
findings suggested a reorganisation of roles and missions and extensive 
contractorisation,190 while by extension the unquestioned goal remained the 
maintenance of superiority and full-spectrum dominance. Numerous other examples 
discussed in later chapters provide further support for the assumption that inward-
looking scrutiny is aimed at improving the performance of the defence enterprise 
under fiscal pressures. It does not aim to question the basic premises upon which it 
operates and which generate the high expenses in the first place. 
Beyond government, given the huge number of participants in ‘Beltway-
chatter’,191 it is typically not possible to credit one individual expert or publication 
with having had a major impact on policy. What each of these however may 
contribute is the support or opposition to political views and/or policy proposals 
which may, in masses, tilt the scales in one direction or the other. Since processes of 
change often take a decade or more,192 Beltway-chatter must be maintained over 
extended periods of time if it is to have an impact and contribute to the desired 
outcome. 
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Think tanks, for instance, are a salient feature of the Beltway. Daniel Gouré, a 
vice president at the Lexington Institute observes that “a lot of the way the DOD 
community – OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the [Armed] Services, even the 
intelligence leadership – access think tanks is based upon the politics of the issue.”193 
Even though think tanks are rarely entirely non-partisan, they are commonly not 
formally associated with a political party; Heritage (Republican Party) and the Center 
for a New American Security (CNAS, Democrats) are two partial exceptions.194 
Proximity to decision-makers, unsurprisingly, gives any non-governmental actor’s 
report significantly more potential to impact on policy.195 Successful impact on policy 
is particularly likely when their members revolve back and forth between 
government and the private sector in the Beltway, when the tasking has come from 
somebody with decision-making authority, or when it is directly tied to a policy issue 
that is currently hanging in the balance.196 Such a revolving door can create a 
bureaucratic dynamic where DOD employees, cognisant that several serving Under, 
Deputy, or Assistant Secretaries come from certain think tanks, forward a study from 
those organisations to their superiors regardless of the merit of the individual study. 
Similarly, significant policies are routinely rolled out in think tanks. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), for instance, is credited as the main “clearing 
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house” of Western policy in East Asia through the Shangri-La dialogue.197 Access to 
and potential influence at the strategic level are therefore partly skewed in favour of 
particular organisations with long-standing contacts, confirming the value of access to 
decision-makers. 
Importantly, none of these dynamics generate significant opportunities, let 
alone incentives to challenge conventional thinking so as to question the 
fundamentals upon which these organisations operate. This is not least so because 
these public offices, that were shown earlier not to scrutinise the basic premises of 
their operations, set the tone of the debate by floating policies rather than being 
reactive to outside input. Several sources from the US Department of State with 
experience in dealing with other US government departments, the legislature, and 
foreign representatives agreed that while think tanks and similar organisations may 
inform some of the thinking within the department, they are only one of many voices 
being heard. Most of the conversation occurs within the department and with DOD, 
Congress, and US embassies. Outside organisations are much more relevant in 
Congress, where their members testify regularly,198 but Congress no longer has a 
prime presence, certainly not an effective one, on the strategic level of national 
security policy-making.199 Thus, with Congress more susceptible to outsiders but 
relatively irrelevant, and the executive determining the framework for outside input, 
external organisations’ potential lobbying efforts for significant realignments of 
strategy or posture would be unlikely to succeed. 
While the above mostly concerns the macro-level of defence discourses 
within the Beltway, private sector organisations are also directly contracted to 
provide strategic advice to decision-makers. Although such studies are of course not 
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the only basis for decision-making of the respective government agencies, the 
strategic use of specific organisations for such purposes should nonetheless be kept 
in mind as a potential avenue for affecting policy. The fact that such ‘contracting for 
ideas’ occurs through the same channels as contracting for military services is 
indicative of two key points that this paragraph seeks to underscore: the general 
openness of government to outside advice, and the fact that government sets the 
baselines and fundamental objectives for outside consultancy. Two examples shall 
illustrate this point. First, the U.S. Army feared that the “pivot” to Asia, the closer focus 
on AirSea Battle, and the fiscal climate would reduce its role and size. It issued a 
tender for a study that shall identify how this strategy may lead to “strategic shock” in 
order to advocate government to rethink.200 Secondly, the Office of the USD for Policy 
and Readiness ordered a study on US overseas basing demanding the development of 
a toolbox to assess the impact of realignment.201 One of its authors was Gene Porter, 
the deputy director of the CORM. While clearly intended to inform strategy, the 
fundamental premise – overseas presence as part of US grand strategy – was set by 
DOD. 
Such studies are tendered based on the contracting organisations’ interests, 
and these are inherently about self-preservation within the larger policy domain. 
Analysts in think tanks and consultancies such as the RAND Corporation have become 
considerably circumscribed in their academic freedoms since the end of the Cold War. 
Their academic work is managed in commercial manners. As a result there remains 
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little ability to act beyond the structures set by the field of study that is dominated by 
DOD. In the case of RAND, but also more generally, their activities are directly related 
to the vehicles of the international projection of US power.202 The durability of the 
current posture should therefore not be expected to be substantially challenged 
through this avenue either. 
It should be noted that the service contractors to be examined in later 
chapters are not those primarily involved in the cases above. More generally, 
interested actors whose core business is not strategic debate are mostly reactive to 
government’s decisions and hence remain in their niche. Therefore, even lobby 
groups whose members depend on high levels of defence spending generally refrain 
from participating in such debates. This is not least because there are enough think 
tanks, writers, and strategic practitioners (partly business-friendly and industry-
funded) who work to steer the debate in such a way that argues for a maintenance of 
the expansive posture that is a key source of revenue for industry and thus 
contracting. As long as a debated strategic switch is not seen to pose an existential 
threat to industry it would therefore be an unnecessary reputational risk for industry 
to overtly argue for policies that generate profits for themselves and their members. 
The President and CEO of the largest government contractor trade group PSC 
(Professional Services Council) and the general counsel of the main acquisition and 
good government NGO POGO (Project on Government Oversight) confirm as much. 
POGO does not question the strategic rationale which led to contracting-related 
problems but rather the technical practice of contracting and oversight while the PSC 
argues that contractors or others from the private sector would not be involved in 
high-strategic decision-making even if they wanted to.203 
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This line however remains fine as later chapters reiterate – the strategic level 
is not entirely out of bounds. The PSC has disagreed with officials over policy 
decisions that the PSC believes would “impact the mission.” One example is the case of 
commercial items acquisition about which Soloway said that “I cannot swear what the 
impact on direct overseas missions is, but in terms of DOD’s mission writ large, we 
think that would have a huge impact on it.”204 Also, the decision on whether or not to 
intervene, for instance, would not involve contractors or other interest groups, but it 
may well be informed in terms of what can be accomplished.205 It is evidently difficult 
to separate an operation from the consideration of its doability. Nonetheless, their 
direct impact should be small compared to those whose core competency is strategic 
debate and advice. In fact, given the size and scope of the defence enterprise and 
strategic debate, even top-level government representatives remain within their 
niche. Jacques S. Gansler, while serving as USD (AT&L), had no substantial say on 
defence strategy as such but rather on how defence-industrial and acquisition policies 
and practices related to it.206 Even on that senior level strategy is broadly taken as a 
given by those not directly tasked with formulating it. 
And yet, industry has an immeasurable indirect impact by keeping business 
interests in decision-makers’ minds and by basing their business advocacy on a 
continuation of the strategic trajectory. By suggesting that ‘the economy’ is operating 
on the assumption of continuity, strategic realignments may acquire high political 
costs for decision-makers. The aftermath of the withdrawal from Iraq is a case in 
point. By pointing to Africa as a new market, industry and its advocates reinforce a 
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surging view that Africa requires sustained political and military attention.207 The 
networked nature of the domain means that even service contractors have indirect 
channels to affect such thinking. The PSC, for instance, represents services 
contractors on the one hand, and closely interacts with a number of think tanks, 
especially the renowned Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). CSIS’s 
senior vice president David Berteau among others directs the Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group, is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, a director of the 
Procurement Round Table, and has served in DOD under four separate Secretaries of 
Defense.208 PSC thereby contributes to the entrenchment of the governing strategic 
and economic practices which, as was repeatedly noted, are closely intertwined in 
driving outsourcing. At the same time, the strategic rationale represents a 
fundamental driver of military outsourcing while the belief in the merit of core 
competency, best business practices, and managerialism further accelerate it as the 
next chapter shows. They thus indirectly feed back into strategic deliberations by 
communicating support for and the feasibility of realising the expansive strategy and 
posture as posited by the government. In line with the “technologisation” and de-
politicisation of defence, this occurs without overt input on high policy, but rather by 
advising on acquisition, technology, and capability. 
 
In summary, neither severe budgetary constraints nor the strategically often 
disappointing performance in recent wars led the US defence political establishment 
to rethink the expansive posture and the concomitant military requirements. When 
faced with budgetary pressures, the reduction of global defence posture and 
                                                             
207 See Lawrence Delevingne (2008), “Defense Contractors' Growing African Business,” in 
Bloomberg Business Week (23 October 2008), accessed 20 April 2014, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-10-23/defense-contractors-growing-african-
businessbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
 This was also confirmed in the personal interview with Stan Soloway. 
208 See Center for Strategic and International Studies, “David J. Berteau,” in Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, accessed 12 December 2013, available at 
http://csis.org/expert/david-j-berteau. 
85 
reappraisal of military commitments were never on the official agenda. This was the 
case throughout, be it the CORM, the “Pivot to the Pacific”, or the broader role of 
various research or advocacy organisations. Regarding the pivot, for instance, rather 
than see an opportunity to reduce defence spending after the withdrawal from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, policy-makers saw resources freeing up that could be spent on the 
pivot to face an increasingly assertive China.209 The expansive strategy and posture 
are thus structural, systemic features of the defence policy process and as such are 
geared toward reproducing, not challenging the system. Only a “shock” could unsettle 
this deeply enmeshed, networked dynamic that produced and reproduces them. 
II. 2. iii. The Scope, Mainstays, and Durability of UK Grand Strategy 
and Defence Posture 
The UK displays both similarities and differences in comparison to the USA 
regarding its grand strategy and posture. Much like the USA, the UK pursues several 
activist and internationalist security objectives besides homeland defence. These 
include “[shaping] a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting 
the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and 
influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source.”210 
Moreover, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) acknowledges the 
uncertainty of international security. Not unlike the United States' respective 
documents, it states that the UK should assume a more preventive attitude to 
conflicts, maintain capabilities across a wide spectrum, and be able to project them 
globally.211 While this suggests a forward-leaning posture and grand strategy, their 
history since the end of World War II displays one significant difference to the USA: 
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acceptance to downscale the global presence and commitments in response to 
resource pressures, and to more closely engage with and rely on allies, in particular 
the USA. This has several consequences that are relevant to later chapters. The UK 
focuses much more exclusively on its military than more broadly on the well-being of 
the defence-industrial base. This increases its willingness to outsource for its own 
armed forces but lowers its willingness to spend for the primary benefit of others. 
The most obvious difference is that of scale. Even though the UK interprets 
international security similarly, and envisages a similar role to that of the USA, it can 
only deliver on a much smaller scale. The overall size of the UK defence enterprise – 
budget, reach, and capability – is significantly smaller than that of the US, both in 
absolute and in relative terms. UK defence spending in fiscal year (FY) 2011 
represented 8.7% of central government spending, £45.7 billion (approx. $73 
billion),212 while in the USA for FY2011 the budget was an estimated $718.8 billion, 
representing 18.75% of the federal budget (i.e. more than double the UK ratio) and 
even 60.7% of federal discretionary spending.213 The size of the armed forces differs 
similarly, comprising approximately 176,000 service personnel in the UK and 1.43 
million in the USA as of 2012.214 
Since the USA, with a defence enterprise roughly seven times the size of the 
UK’s in terms of manpower and funding, already regularly finds that its resources are 
stretched thin to sustain its global defence posture, it should not come as a surprise 
that this is much more acute in the UK. The history of British defence policy since the 
end of World War II is one of repeated attempts to do arguably too much with too 
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little, of cyclical crises and defence reviews, and consequently of strategic 
adjustments.215 The following examines the gradual strategic realignment over the 
course of the Cold War and after. 
According to Hartley, to some observers “the failure of the Suez invasion … 
confirmed the end of any illusions about Britain’s real international status”.216 As a 
result, the UK adopted a “short war” doctrine that focused on nuclear capabilities at 
the expense of conventional forces, and planned to maintain most bases in or near the 
UK and sending backup via sea lanes. Moreover, it aligned more closely with the USA 
by establishing the “special relationship”, eventually becoming dependent on the USA 
for its nuclear capability.217 Nonetheless, there still remained a gap between this new 
orientation and the available resources because the reduction in conventional 
capabilities occurred without a parallel reduction in military commitments of equal 
scope. The withdrawal from East of Suez that was decided in the late 1960s was yet 
another attempt to align military capacities and commitments.218 
The proximity to the USA and the incremental downscaling of UK posture and 
capabilities are permanent characteristics of this process. Desiring a great power role, 
the UK is not oblivious to the limitations of its capacities and accepted to limit its 
overseas military presence and the size of its armed forces. It sought economies of 
scale not only in procurement but also by increasingly relying on allies. The 2010 
SDSR accordingly announced that the UK would pursue an “overarching approach 
which ... strengthens the mutual dependence with key allies and partners who are 
willing and able to act”.219 Doctrine similarly acknowledges these fundamentals.220 
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Atlanticism maintained its primacy in UK foreign policy ever since, with the UK 
remaining the closest US military ally in Europe.221 In fact, “effective interoperability 
with the Americans [has been] the first principle of British defence policy.”222 While 
critics charge that this alignment with the USA is representative of a dearth of 
independent UK strategy, the question remains whether the country possesses the 
resources to assume such a global posture and “globe-girdling commitments.”223 With 
the lack of resources much more acute in the UK than in the USA, the UK by necessity 
concentrated much more narrowly on its armed forces than on closely shaping and 
affecting those of other countries. This stance also extended to the defence industry, 
as the UK government, when in doubt, decided in favour of its immediate military 
needs than for those of industry or other states, which later chapters show in more 
detail is hugely relevant for this study. 
Unlike the USA, dissident voices that critically questioned the UK’s high 
reliance on military force or at least the capability to project force beyond the Central 
Front and eastern Atlantic were present in particular within the left wing of the 
Labour Party and within parts of Parliament and the Treasury.224 While no UK 
government entirely abandoned aspirations that would require it to “punch above its 
weight”, the wider range of critical views may have partly enabled the UK’s gradual 
downscaling of its strategic posture in response to resource pressures which 
remained wanting in the USA. However, members of Parliament, much like their US 
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counterparts, are mostly disinterested in the details of foreign and defence policy.225 
The legislature is considerably more disadvantaged in the UK regarding war powers 
than the already relatively powerless US Congress.226 Apart from exceptionally high-
profile cases, such as spending on the nuclear deterrent or the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, defence political decisions rarely attract widespread attention,227 and even if 
they did, Parliament unlike the US Congress has no means of blocking individual line 
items.228 Moreover, the UK policy process is famously marked by an “obsession with 
secrecy”,229 while the civil service has a strong ethos that remains relatively 
inaccessible to outside input.230 The opposing voices therefore must not be discarded 
entirely. Their presence may have had the effect that in the UK a withdrawal from 
global commitments remained “thinkable” unlike in the USA, yet they did not bring 
about radical change. 
Similarly to the USA therefore, the UK defence policy process offers few 
opportunities, let alone incentives, to access the leadership and suggest significant 
strategic realignments. Whereas both governments are extremely receptive to private 
sector input regarding how to conduct their acquisition and other defence economic 
and industrial policies,231 they display a similar mix of avenues to inform government 
thinking on the strategic level. UK industry is highly proactive in seeking to inform 
and affect government’s thinking about acquisition issues. It will comment indirectly 
on strategy insofar as it directly affects business outlooks, albeit ostensibly from a 
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technical, apolitical perspective. In essence, the separation is said to be between the 
“should” and the “could” of foreign and defence political courses of action.232 As 
Gordon Lane, former Managing Director Defence and Director Land at UK trade group 
Aerospace, Defence & Security (ADS) put it regarding consultations such as the SDSR: 
“Our focus is very much about ‘what is the impact on industry?’ So our response and 
our engagement in any consultation will be about that, not about the broader political 
aspects which are very much the preserve of the Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI) and other think tanks.”233 Numerous other sources in the MOD and industry 
concur that the “should” decision at high strategic levels does not and should not 
involve industry, whereas immediately thereafter on similarly high levels it should be 
common practice to include contractors when assessing required and available 
capabilities.234 The line is therefore similarly blurry as in the USA, as decisions about a 
military action and the ability to conduct it are not entirely separate. 
Yet, within MOD, senior officials rarely meet with strategic thinkers and 
practitioners, and never with anybody from non-mainstream organisations that 
question the basic premises of defence policy, strategy, and posture. MOD ministers 
and senior staff members meet almost exclusively with industry and selected military 
charities, and very rarely with think tanks or unions. Meetings with industry, 
consultants, and trade groups between 2010 and 2013 averaged 72% for ministers 
and 92% for other senior members of staff (permanent secretaries, Chief of Defence 
Staff, and several others), while visits from members of think tanks with very few 
exceptions were from RUSI (situated next door to the MOD and sharing its heating 
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system), which is a highly renowned, mainstream research organisation. These visits 
averaged at a maximum of one per month, with many quarters passing without a 
single recorded visit.235 Thus, be it think tanks like RUSI, Chatham House, or IISS, all of 
which enjoy privileged access to decision-makers who are routinely hosted by those 
institutions – sometimes to engage on ongoing defence reviews that were not 
otherwise discussed in public –236 or interest groups, government ultimately holds on 
to the privilege of making strategy with only limited outside input.237 It is government 
that sets the parameters and solicits input within them, making fundamentally 
unorthodox input that calls for substantial strategic realignment unlikely. 
Overall, then, there exist similar informal channels of broader defence 
strategic debates and input as in the USA, but they appear to remain indirect and 
certainly not dominant in the day-to-day operations and deliberations within the 
MOD. The fundamentals of defence strategy and posture, predicated on a global role, 
proximity to the USA, and an activist agenda – more multilateral than the USA but still 
willing to ‘go it alone’ if necessary – are not challenged in the UK either. 
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II. 3.  Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter established the defence-strategic context of defence policy-
making that directly affects and is closely intertwined with the economic, industrial, 
technological, and manpower-related context discussed in the next chapter. The 
chapter first briefly outlined the trajectory of how the security environment evolved 
since the end of World War II. Until 1990 it was marked by bipolarity and certainty as 
to the predominant threats and required military capabilities, and responded to with 
a global, forward-leaning defence posture. The disappearance of the Soviet Union 
represented an external shock that led the USA and the UK (and their NATO 
partners), in search of new missions and justifications to maintain large standing 
peacetime armies, to focus on ill-defined risks of global scope. Their nature, location, 
and emergence being uncertain, the USA in particular further expanded its global 
presence in order to better be able to globally intervene, (in its view) maintain order, 
peace, and security, and prevent the rise of a new peer-competitor. The UK, 
conversely, while desiring a global role and influence based on similar premises as 
the USA, over the course of the Cold War learned the hard way that its considerably 
more limited resources required a reduction of commitments and global defence 
objectives. This also led to a much stronger willingness to rely on partners and 
multilateral defence arrangements; as the next chapters illustrate, this willingness 
extends directly into the defence-industrial domain with significant consequences for 
UK outsourcing practices. 
These varying reactions are illustrative of the commonalities and deeper 
differences between the USA and the UK that recur throughout this study. While both 
follow a grand strategy of global economic openness, it is arguably only “imperial” (to 
borrow Bacevich’s classification) in the case of the USA because of its willingness to 
be present and intervene globally to safeguard economic openness. Moreover, when 
faced with budgetary and other pressures that threatened to challenge the 
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maintenance and global application of the expansive military instrument of power, 
the UK proved more willing to downscale its grand strategy and posture and to rely 
more on allies and non-military instruments of foreign policy. To the USA, on the 
other hand, the sky appears to be the limit in terms of what the country aspires to 
achieve in world politics and security. Therefore, when faced with the choice between 
superiority and downscaling, the USA repeatedly opted for the former, preferring to 
follow paths where it speculated that savings could be found (‘doing more with less’) 
rather than truly scale back its global commitments. 
This chapter thus established the dynamic and potentially changeable 
character of defence strategy and posture (as contextual factors as per PNT) that had 
been taken as givens in the literature so far. The fact that they were shown to be 
remarkably constant does not mean that postures are necessarily as expansive as 
they are, but rather that they are resilient in the face of external challenges and 
constantly reproduced rather than fundamentally altered. Moreover, in identifying 
the internal sources of this longevity, this chapter identified the potential future 
sources of change. Without the continuously expansive scope of grand strategy and 
posture there may have been a significantly lower demand for manpower, equipment, 
and services for the armed forces and thus fewer incentives to outsource capability to 
the market because in-house resources may have sufficed. In reality, however, the 
durability of strategy and posture meant that these pressures remained constantly 
high.238 Both scope and durability were shown to be maintained through the 
participation of contractors and pro-contracting advocates in public security 
discourses that contributes to a selectivity that favours continuity over change. 
More fundamentally, ideationally, we can identify that the belief in a global, 
economic system based on free trade as a deep core belief strongly shapes policy-
making. Regarding defence, this translates into core beliefs that advocate for the 
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protection (UK) or extension and control (USA) of this economic system. The USA and 
the UK slightly part ways regarding their policy preferences, i.e. how to realise these 
objectives because of the differences regarding the scope and operationalisation of 
grand strategy and posture. Additionally, the incentives and opportunities to object to 
mainstream policy and ideas are limited, not least because access to decision-makers 
and high-profile fora is most readily available to a network of industry, think tanks, 
and government officials who work towards reproducing, not challenging or changing 
the status quo. As a result, all other things being equal, the logic of practicality is more 
likely to lead to military courses of action in the USA than the UK. 
The next chapter picks up from here to explicate the economic dimensions 
and ramifications of the durable, expansive defence postures. It examines how these 
strategic fundamentals affected the supply of the armed forces since the early days of 
the Cold War, in particular the required levels of manpower, equipment, technology, 
and services. All of them, combined with a deeply held belief in the necessity of 
military-technological superiority, are essential parts of the drivers, politics, process, 
and future of military services contracting. 
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III.  The Economic, Technological, and Organisational Context of 
Defence Policy-Making: Supplying Strategy and Posture 
This chapter builds on the preceding one to establish the remaining context 
and historical background to contemporary defence policy-making. The previous 
chapter identified key ideational and political factors that underpin defence policy-
making, namely the scope and durability of US and UK grand strategy and posture 
and their trajectories throughout the Cold War to the present. This chapter picks up 
from there to discuss their defence economic, technological, and manpower-related 
implications for the implementation and sustainment of defence policy. After all, a 
state may aspire to a given posture or claim global leadership, but without the 
resources and capabilities to supply and sustain them the state’s policy and strategy 
are not credible. The supply of armed force is thus essential. It is concerned with the 
means and arrangements on which strategy and tactics depend, and thereby 
determines the size and type of the military force that can be deployed to an 
operational theatre, how long it will take for the deployment to happen, the scale of 
the force that can be sustained, and the tempo of potential military operations – i.e. 
the ability to realise strategic goals and live up to one’s assumed posture.239 
This chapter begins with identifying the equipment, services, and 
manpower capabilities required by the USA and the UK for the realisation of their 
defence policies. It then examines the nature of the gap between resources and 
defence political commitments that has been a fixture since the 1950s, and then 
traces the high-policy steps undertaken since the early Cold War to reconcile 
strategy and resources. These measures predominantly applied managerial and 
various commercial ‘best practices’, including the resort to services contracting 
which eventually became a firmly entrenched, integral aspect of defence policy-
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making and implementation. It thereby confirms Taylor’s assumption that rapid 
technological sophistication as well as a more central place of the private sector in 
the delivery of public services drive contractorisation,240 as well as Cusumano’s 
hypothesis that constraints on the state’s ability to extract resources from society 
affect the propensity to outsource military responsibilities.241 Moreover, it 
challenges the view that locates the sources of the current wave of contractorisation 
in the military drawdown and the Revolution of Military Affairs after the Cold War 
rather than in the decades-old tension between resources and commitments.242 
This chapter thus completes the identification of the relevant contextual 
factors that form the backdrop to defence policy-making by identifying the 
remaining structures, agents, and resources that undergird and define the 
contemporary defence policy process. Most importantly, it identifies how the 
closely linked deep internalisation of private sector ideas and practices, high 
technological demands, and a close proximity of government to industry turned 
outsourcing from an optional to an indispensable practice. Based thereon, this study 
can then turn to contemporary defence services acquisition policy-making 
(chapter IV), the outsourcing of foreign military assistance (chapter V), and both the 
outsourcing of military logistics overseas and the future of military outsourcing 
more generally (chapter VI). 
III. 1.  The Gap between Capability Requirements and Resources 
The tension between resources and commitments has been a similarly stable 
feature of US and UK defence policy since the 1950s as both states’ strategies and 
postures. In fact, as Croft et al. point out, much of the historiography of British defence 
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policy since the end of World War II has been all but subsumed under the heading of 
economic and financial decline.243 The following examines the tension between 
demands for superiority and limited financial and manpower resources and then 
traces how it was addressed throughout the Cold War and to the present. 
III. 1. i. High Capability Requirements 
US Secretary of Defense William Cohen put it bluntly in the 1997 QDR when 
he wrote that the USA, once in combat, did “not want a fair fight … but capabilities 
that will give [them] a decisive advantage.”244 Both the 1997 QDR and the 2012 
Strategic Guidance were published against a backdrop of severe budgetary pressures, 
yet both documents (like many others cited in this chapter) argued decidedly in 
favour of continued US military dominance and global leadership. In the USA, military 
dominance and global leadership are non-negotiable baselines in attempts to reduce 
spending. The aforementioned DSB task force that was formed following the 2012 
Guidance underscores the force of this policy principle, having been created to 
identify “emerging technologies that will enable the next generation of dominant 
military capabilities to be in development or fielded by 2030”.245 
The US military’s primary missions and consequently the required 
capabilities have therefore remained extremely broad. According to the 2012 
guidance (although one could cite virtually any other government review or report) 
they comprise counterterrorism and irregular warfare, conventional and nuclear 
deterrence, projecting power regardless of access or area denial challenges, 
countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, operations in cyber and outer 
space, homeland defence, providing a stabilising presence, and conducting stability, 
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counterinsurgency, humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.246 And despite 
no longer planning for large-scale, prolonged operations such as in Afghanistan or 
Iraq, the unforeseeable nature of the security environment led the government to 
order that the US armed forces “maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities 
that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of [primary] missions” to 
sustain “US global leadership.”247 
Similarly, the UK Army in 2020, even after massive downsizing, is intended to 
provide “a contingent capability for deterrence and defence, overseas engagement 
and capacity building, [and] UK engagement and military aid to homeland resilience 
as a UK-based Army.”248 It intends to remain “capable of competing decisively with 
the full spectrum of potential adversaries, as one of the most effective and capable 
armies in the world.”249 
The prioritisation of technological and full-spectrum dominance, based on 
beliefs “in the virtue of technology as a solution for myriad tactical and strategic 
problems”, has a long pedigree, especially in the USA.250 Daniel Lake traces the 
preference for technological solutions back to strategic challenges in the 19th and 
20th centuries. He found that the mobilisation of overwhelmingly large forces for 
both World Wars from risk-averse populations, the raising of a large standing peace-
time army throughout the Cold War, and the focus of every strategy since the end of 
conscription were based on the use or greater development of advanced weapon 
systems.251 Lake thus identifies a “cultural bias” in the US military towards 
technological problem-solving that leads it to view technology as something of a 
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panacea and therefore requires the USA to remain at the cutting edge of military 
technology.252 Gray calls this “the RAND school of strategic analysis” and its 
“engineering approach to security.”253 Jacques Gansler, former USD (AT&L), even 
argues that all US grand strategy since World War II was built around technological 
superiority.254 
Two organizations demonstrate the institutionalization of the notion that 
technological superiority is paramount to US grand strategy, that technology and 
technical solutions take precedence over potential veto-players’ concerns, and that 
leadership is key in this dynamic. The Defense Technology Security Administration 
(DTSA) in DOD is tasked with ensuring the maintenance of the USA’s technological 
superiority, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was 
founded to research technologies the military did not pursue internally – either 
because of cultural resistance such as in the case of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
which were seen to threaten the jobs of airmen, or because they looked significantly 
further into the future, beyond immediate defence requirements.255 
The UK government similarly recognises the centrality of technology to its 
national security capabilities.256 When faced with spending crises, the UK opted for 
equipment rather than sizeable armed forces, indicating a similar preference – when 
forced to choose – for hi-tech equipment over troops.257 
Adding to the breadth of these requirements is the requested ability to project 
them across the globe. Military professionals find that “[overseas] projection 
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capability is a critical element of … post-Cold War military strategy”.258 While the 
increasing complexity of the technologies used by the armed forces creates huge 
training requirements for soldiers on the use (and sometimes the maintenance) of 
new systems, the requirements to meet global power projection capabilities while 
fielding the newest technologies are a key driver behind the growth of the military 
“tail” and the subsequently low “tooth-to-tail ratio.”259 Together, they signify both an 
increased, long-term need for a large defence workforce on the one hand, and a 
gradual reduction of the size-wise stagnant forces’ relative firepower on the other. 
This created force structure problems to the US Army especially from the 1970s 
onwards,260 and as noted above when forced to choose between technology and 
uniformed manpower, both countries opted for the former. 
III. 1. ii. Problems of Supplying Capability 
The sources of these capabilities are the defence-industrial base and the 
professional military force. The former, as noted, is central to US superpower/global 
power status, while the UK government also maintains key technologies in the 
country but is otherwise more open to international suppliers.261 The capability and 
capacity to supply war is not only important in wartime; to ensure the uninterrupted 
ability to meet requirements, maintaining military logistical capacities is imperative 
also in peacetime. George Thorpe highlighted the importance of peace-time logistics 
as early as 1917. In his time this mostly meant factory preparedness;262 today this 
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includes the service industry. As Boezer et al. put it more recently, in order to 
maintain “an adequate or ‘warm’ defense technology and industrial base, the United 
States needs to be producing, year in and year out, sufficient modern weapon systems 
and sustaining components to allow [the USA] to maintain technological superiority”, 
even in the face of unstable customer demand.263 The UK’s policy has also been 
centred on the market, harnessing the civilian industry’s innovation and products as 
far as possible.264 The private defence-industrial base has thus long been the main 
supplier of defence products – and later also services – to the armed forces in both 
war and peacetime. 
The relationship between equipment and force structures came under heavy 
resource pressures soon after World War II. As equipment unit prices rose at about 
10% annually in real terms since the 1950s, British defence procurement policy 
evolved from one of broad-based national self-sufficiency and comprehensive 
platforms capabilities, to one that increasingly emphasised international 
collaboration and domestic industry consolidation.265 The process was accelerated in 
the late 1950s because, as Edmonds argues, the false “ten-year-rule” resulted in 
delayed organisational reform and defence procurement, and reduced research and 
development.266 As a consequence Britain not only lost the edge it held at the end of 
the war, but developed a gap in technology that became all but impossible to bridge. 
British procurement and defence-industrial policy were thus only based on self-
sufficiency and broad-based domestic design and production capacities until about 
1960. Soaring research, development, and unit costs made governmental support for 
numerous domestic companies untenable, prompting the UK to consolidate its 
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domestic industry and realign its policy towards more international collaboration and 
imports.267 Under Thatcher, the policy of “buying British” unmistakably ended.268 As 
Taylor suggested, an accelerating rate of technological change and growing 
sophistication placed pressure on the systems that delivered defence capability.269 
These dynamics were shocks to the British defence enterprise that prompted 
significant realignments in the way in which the UK supplied its military. Although the 
outsourcing of services provision overseas was not contemplated at the time, the 
noted budgetary and technological pressures persisted, and ultimately enabled 
contractorisation as is discussed later. 
In the USA, despite attempted savings and manpower reductions of 600,000 
in the mid-1950s under President Eisenhower, the US defence budget climbed by 
20% from 1954 to 1959 following the acquisition of new air and missile systems that 
formed part of nuclear and general deterrence strategy. As in the UK, the very high 
rate of technological change made weapons systems obsolete within very short time 
spans. New systems were procured within short time intervals and personnel had to 
acquire high expertise, was thus expensive, and required costly “on-the-job training 
to keep abreast of trends.”270 Additionally, the expanding “tail” of the force increased 
the number of required personnel. The dynamics of costly technological development, 
production, training, specialised personnel, and maintenance are thus by no means 
new as the discussions around the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) and Military 
Logistics (RML) sometimes imply, but have a long history which probably spans the 
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industrialisation of war.271 This historical background, not recent policy, set the 
precedent for how the gap has been addressed since the 1990s. 
These developments accelerated in both states with the abolition of 
conscription and again with the end of the Cold War. Unlike in states such as 
Germany, for instance, where conscripts receive relatively comprehensive military 
training,272 conscripts in the USA and the UK were also used for support functions. 
The turn (or return) to an all-volunteer force (AVF) between 1960 and 1963 in the UK 
and after the end of the Vietnam War in the USA in 1973 thus created additional 
challenges for military planners. Military personnel in general became more 
expensive while support functions were moved to the Reserves especially in the USA. 
Now, not only had there to be active recruitment, but the previous low pay for 
draftees could not be upheld for a professional force. Recruits had to be offered well-
paid and attractive “jobs” to both sign up to and remain in the Army.273 Even without 
these requirements, the US Army was facing the problem of requiring ever more 
technicians and support staff to keep a declining number of combat troops 
supplied,274 so that recruitment made a difficult situation worse. Moreover, for 
political and financial reasons – ensuring the military cannot again go to war without 
drawing on Reserves as in Vietnam, and lowering peacetime defence spending, 
respectively – the US Army shifted most of its support to the Reserves with the 
release of a new “Total Force Concept” in 1970. By 1990, the Army's force structure 
was thus that only 30% of combat service support personnel were regular members 
of the Army, with 44% being Army Reserves and the rest Army National Guards. By 
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contrast, only 8% of combat troops were from the Army Reserves.275 Therefore, a key 
argument for outsourcing – it is uneconomical to train soldiers for ‘military’ tasks but 
then have them fulfil ‘non-military’ support functions – was already evident in the 
early 1970s, and put most pressure on the support end when deployments occurred. 
And even though contractorisation had not yet become standard practice after the 
introduction of the AVF, mostly because the Army sought to “care for its own”,276 as 
early as 1977 Moskos observed the growing role and dependence of the military on 
private contractors in the technological field.277 
With the end of the Cold War, deterrence – which had relied little on 
deployability – was replaced by a more expansive and interventionist posture. The 
increased number of global, short-notice deployments and demands for a highly 
mobile, instantly deployable force following the end of the Cold War coincided with a 
renewed wave of modernisation demands that emerged in the 1980s with the onset 
of the RMA and the overall pressures to generate a “peace dividend” following the fall 
of the Soviet Union. However, the rapidly growing number of military deployments 
generated more demand for well-equipped troops on a global scale despite their 
being downsized at the same time. As a result, a “reduced logistic force [had to] 
support increased power projection requirements.”278  
Even though the gap was a constant feature, even repeated massive 
budgetary pressures, most recently in the wake of the ending wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and the simultaneous economic and fiscal crises, did not lead to a 
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narrowing of either the strategic commitments or the technological requirements, as 
the next section shows. 
III. 2.  Reconciling Resources and Commitments  
Politicians had three policy options to respond to the growing imbalance. 
Major commitments could be reduced or eliminated, or a gradual reduction of 
defence outputs and operational efficiency be accepted. Neither was realistic because 
the strategic, technological, and ideational baselines remained unchanged: missions 
must still be successfully implemented anywhere in the world, with recourse to the 
most advanced equipment and best-trained troops, even where and if access is 
heavily contested. Therefore, a third option remained: improving efficiency across the 
enterprise.279 As the next sections demonstrate, this option was based on the 
adoption of several ideas tied to the virtues of private enterprise. First, it focused on 
streamlining military force structure and introducing “managerialism” into defence 
organisation and management. Later it expanded to include the wholesale adaptation 
and adoption of ‘best business’ or ‘best commercial practices’ for the entire defence 
enterprise. From 1980 onwards this led to the significant increase in the outsourcing 
of military services which rapidly came to be viewed as indispensable. 
III. 2. i. Force Structure Changes and Peacetime Budgeting 
The abolition of conscription signalled the entry of the armed forces into the 
labour market, forcing them to compete for ‘employees’ like any other employer.280 
Resonating with Cusumano’s hypothesis,281 the state from then on faced considerably 
higher hurdles to extract societal resources – manpower. Given the need to offer 
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attractive jobs to new recruits, the U.S. Army – in the run-up to the introduction of the 
AVF – lobbied for funds to be able to assign menial tasks to new civilian employees 
rather than uniformed soldiers.282 As noted, the rationale and challenges for 
introducing an AVF thus unwittingly contained at their core several key assumptions 
of outsourcing advocates: core competency and relatedly that it is uneconomical to 
train soldiers for combat but employ them for not inherently governmental, core 
military tasks. 
Another hugely relevant but neglected fact is that the AVFs in the USA and the 
UK are intimately tied to the notion of separating peacetime from wartime budgeting. 
Both states’ policies imply that peacetime – understood as the absence of military 
operations – is the norm. When the US Congress or the UK Parliament debate defence 
budgets, they focus on the base budget. Wars and other overseas contingencies are 
funded out of additional defence funds in the USA and by the Treasury in the UK.283 
This stands in sharp contrast to the past when wars tended to be financed through 
war taxes which more acutely and directly sensitise the taxpayer to the costs of 
war.284 It also opens the door to budgeting ploys by shifting expenses into the ‘war 
budget’ to reduce pressures on the base budget, as was contemplated in the most 
recent budget crisis in the USA.285 
The reduction of the active-duty military by shifting support functions to the 
less costly Reserves represented the first application of this peacetime-budgeting 
logic but was not accompanied by a reduction of the ‘mission’. The subsequent 
gradual outsourcing especially of manpower-intensive support tasks was its logical 
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conclusion. It was intended to (theoretically) cut the peacetime cost entirely rather 
than maintaining sizeable Reserves. In the event of a contingency operation – a name 
that falsely suggests they rarely occur – the governments would have to draw on the 
market for surge capabilities. As chapter VI shows, the frequent occurrence of 
‘contingencies’ ultimately resulted in the incremental blending of public and private 
workforces rather than the reappraisal of the initial rationale. The latter would have 
involved owning up to the actual scale and frequency of military commitments and 
operations and thus required a surge of regular troops and capabilities. 
III. 2. ii. Centralising Defence Management 
In addition to manpower and budgeting-related policies, the USA and the UK 
undertook gradual, in their totality sweeping reforms across the defence enterprise. 
Organisationally, the armed services lost much of their autonomy to civilians in the 
central government. The latter sought not only to increase civilian control over the 
military in general, but also to increase the efficiency of activities that spanned the 
individual Services, the most costly of them being acquisition. 
The centralisation of defence management occurred in several waves and 
resulted in the creation of single ministries of defence. These ministries became the 
focal points of policy formulation and execution, and were tightly linked to the central 
government, the military, and the defence-industrial base.286 At the heart of the 
relevant disputes were the autonomy of the individual armed services that 
incrementally lost prerogatives in force structure and acquisition policy. In the USA, 
President Eisenhower in 1958 created a directorate that empowered the Secretary of 
Defense over the Service Chiefs and oversaw all military research and development 
(R&D) programmes, severely reducing the individual Services’ control over these 
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efforts.287 This was one of the first steps towards the bundling of resources and 
manpower across the armed services. The Kennedy administration further 
centralised procurement activities in 1961 by partly bundling them in the Defense 
Supply Agency (now the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)).288 
The UK increasingly centralised its defence management since 1964. Over 
time, the service ministries were nominally downgraded and the unified MOD 
absorbed all three service departments.289 The UK increasingly removed prerogatives 
from the single service chiefs at the benefit of the Permanent Secretaries and the Chief 
of Defence Staff throughout the 1980s, and formally introduced “jointery” into 
defence management in 1998.290  
Through centralisation, the military lost some of its ability to act as a powerful 
veto-player, especially in acquisition-related decisions. This could explain why 
opposition to outsourcing declined from the 1980s onwards, only a decade after the 
U.S. Army had refused to outsource welfare and other services having viewed self-
sufficiency as a necessity for success of the AVF. 
III. 2. iii. Emulating the Private Sector: the Gradual Entrenchment of 
Privatisation and Military Services Contracting 
The most significant and sweeping changes were the incremental reform of 
the defence enterprise in the mould of the private sector. Beginning with internal 
changes that saw the influx of managerial practices and technicalised problem-
solving, the development led to the contemporary status quo in which most non-
combat responsibilities are at least partly – often almost entirely – contracted out. 
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Managerialism – Running Defence like a Business 
The beginning is generally seen to have been made under Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, who represents the beginning of the era of the “whiz 
kids”. McNamara’s policies fell on fertile ground prepared over a decade before when 
the second Hoover Commission advocated for the introduction of private sector 
methods in defence.291 He himself had saved the Ford Motor Company after World 
War II, served as its president, and had been an assistant professor at Harvard 
Business School. The changes he introduced to the organization and processes of DOD 
thus unsurprisingly drew on “the latest management techniques and computer 
systems”, intended to reduce overlap and increase efficiency.292 In addition to 
centralisation, he introduced a technical approach to problem-solving that led to the 
gradual separation of the armed forces by function rather than Service, and the 
subsequent unification of functions (e.g. in the Defense Supply Agency).293  
His economistic and functionalist approach to cutting defence spending 
entailed the designation of ‘defence’ “as the output of policy-making”, thereby making 
it “susceptible to standard economic analysis.”294 This is exactly the way that 
outsourcing would conceptualise defence, without regard for service mentalities or 
other non-material considerations.295 His reforms, however, did not immediately lead 
to the wholesale outsourcing of overseas services provision we see today; DOD at the 
time maintained all organisational and functional units in-house. While DOD did 
pursue increased competition in procurement as well as lower operating costs, the 
budgetary pressures led DOD to draw on the market only in an ad hoc manner. It did 
not decide to formally outsource the provision of services (especially overseas) for 
the long term but sought savings from the marketplace, especially in equipment 
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procurement.296 This was understandable given the rapid rise of real unit costs while 
conscripts kept services affordable. Nonetheless, the ideational basis of services 
contracting had entered DOD and became institutionalised from the 1980s onwards. 
The UK under Macmillan and his Chief of Defence Staff Mountbatten, 
impressed by the “whiz kids”, followed suit in 1964. They introduced the “Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)” which significantly defined bureaucratic 
defence decision-making, and forcefully pushed for a functionalisation of defence 
organisation (i.e. by task rather than armed service) which took until the mid-1980s 
to become the undisputed norm.297 Government contracting and oversight were 
formalised in the Fulton Report of 1968 with the creation of the Review Board for 
Government Contracts.298 The report epitomises the introduction of private sector 
methods into defence management. Among others, it recommended two-way 
transfers of personnel between the public and private sectors.299 Although a formal 
revolving door was not implemented by the civil service at the time, such a 
recommendation in and of itself, and the economistic discourse and methods 
introduced at the same time, emphasise the status, hopes, and weight assigned to the 
defence-industrial base in Britain. For example, consultations with the Joint Review 
Board Advisory Committee and the major trade associations of the manufacturing 
industries became common practice in the late 1960s. These consultations were 
organised by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), staffed with representatives 
of major contractors and trade associations, and negotiated contracting terms with 
government acquisition departments.300 The following decades witnessed the 
entrenchment of these ideational foundations and managerial practices, particularly 
through the reiteration of the belief in entrepreneurial superiority. In 1992, former 
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Chief of Defence Procurement Malcolm McIntosh underscored the value attached to 
industry's beliefs and interests as well as their direct access, input, and integration 
into government procurement policy, saying that he “was encouraged in a recent 
discussion with the CBI experts on partnership to learn that” the MOD’s Procurement 
Executive often applies, as appropriate, “many of the techniques they advocate.”301 
Establishing a Corporate Culture in Defence 
Over time, the ideational foundations of managerialism and entrepreneurial 
superiority became unquestioned and expanded to encompass military services 
provision. This happened most forcefully from 1979 onwards when the governments 
of both the UK and the USA pursued procurement reform by no longer focusing only 
on equipment but also on military services both at home and overseas. The Thatcher 
administration in the UK addressed the reduction of equipment costs by privatising a 
number of state-owned enterprises and placing them in competition, shunning cost-
plus for fixed-price contracts, increasing “prime” contracting, handing the industry 
more leeway for reaching targets of equipment capabilities, and increasing exports to 
achieve economies of scale and stabilise demand beyond UK government 
procurement.302 The end of public ownership in the UK can be read as a strong vote of 
confidence in the superiority of private over state enterprise. Thatcher and her 
successors’ governments undertook additional reorganisations within MOD which 
mandated the further adoption of managerial and business practices in the ministry 
and echoed the 1968 Fulton Report’s hope of a revolving door. They introduced 
among others the Management Information System for Ministers (MINIS), 
implemented the New Management Strategy (NMS), began publicly advertising 
contract tenders rather than buying from trusted sellers, and devolved budgetary 
responsibilities to the ‘consumers’ in the MOD through the Defence Agency 
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programme. These reforms were the foundation for making the outsourcing of 
support services a normal procedure and thus heralded the growing role of the 
private sector in providing military services.303 
As Matthew Uttley observes, this “broad program of UK defense management 
reforms since the 1980s appears to have created structures, a ‘corporate culture’ and 
organizational incentives for MOD officials at all levels to evaluate the scope for 
private sector involvement across the defense support sector.”304 McIntosh confirmed 
as much when he wrote “that many of the commercial approaches and efficiencies we 
are seeking from industry, we are requiring from ourselves. For some parts of the 
organisation … we have set up discrete commercial-style operations”.305 Attempts to 
maintain a competitive in-house capacity against which to measure the private 
sector’s offers declined over the years, making the private sector integral to the 
running and structure of Britain’s military. Incrementally, contractors’ 
responsibilities reached the frontline, exemplified by heavy equipment transport 
contracts with the company Fasttrax.306 By 2001 “Value for Money,” the relevance of 
“Best Practice,” “Smart Acquisition,” and “Teamwork with Industry” had become the 
cornerstones of British defence acquisition policy, transforming the government from 
an owner into a customer and hopefully a “smart buyer” who micromanages less and 
allows industry leeway in reaching targets.307 
While the USA had always drawn on contractors for some of the support for 
its military, it was not until the 1980s that a first step was undertaken to outsource 
overseas support services systematically and formally rather than ad hoc. The 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, one of the largest and the longest-running 
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contract vehicles of the US military, was created through legislation in 1985.308 The 
Army’s “Total Quality Management” and “Total Army Quality” programmes that 
sought to institute a customer mindset in the U.S. Army in the context of cuts in the 
logistics domain from the late 1980s onwards are especially representative of the 
sweep of corporate culture in the US military.309 The USA to this day experiences 
sustained efforts by pro-contracting advocates to follow the path of the UK, aim to 
become a smart buyer, and generally become closely intertwined with its private 
service providers. Organisations like Business Executives for National Security 
(BENS), but also virtually every trade association and departmental leader routinely 
stress these points in order to further entrench them.310 They do so in particular by 
facilitating access for member organisations and individuals to military and political 
leaders.311 But the consensus on the value of applying best business practices to 
defence extends beyond interest groups. A book on new tools for defence decision-
making published by the mostly government-funded RAND Corporation examines 
precisely such a conceptual transfer.312 The state actors in the network are thus in 
close contact with those who set the best commercial practice-discourse and place a 
growing premium on their employees’ business credentials. 
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Like the UK, the US government thus truly internalised and formalised 
managerialism. Within DOD, for instance, a 2011 Defense Business Board task group 
was formed to examine how DOD could implement a “culture of savings” through 
behavioural change in the department,313 while in the Congress contracting advocates 
scored a key victory with the inclusion of several “smart acquisition” mandates in the 
2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).314 
Watershed – Reiterating and Expanding old Beliefs and Practices in the 1990s 
The status quo in which managerialism and far-reaching contractorisation are 
all but unquestioned in the USA and the UK may be based on foundations that were 
laid from the 1960s to the late 1980s; these foundations however were often more 
ideational than realised on the ground, tentative, and highly disputed. It was therefore 
only in the 1990s, when governments led by the previous opposition parties 
confirmed and accelerated the previous policy trajectory, that the current status quo 
became firmly established. Only then was the remoulding of defence in the shape of 
business turned from an idea into an institution. Several factors supported this 
development, chief among them the wholesale investment in the core competency 
model (i.e. a ‘best business practice’) in response to the ongoing problems with the 
tooth-to-tail ratio, the gradually developing mutual dependence between industry 
and government that made potential reversals more difficult by the day, and finally –
 especially in the USA – concerns for the domestic defence-industrial base. In other 
words, while the stage had been set over the past decades, the most recent 
developments after the Cold War were not an historical necessity but resulted from 
deliberate decisions to continue on a trajectory that entailed further investment in the 
belief that business could produce and service more efficiently and flexibly than 
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government, even though no systematic evidence had been available at the time, and 
even though applying business logics to the military is not without risks.315 As Cross 
wrote, “[the military’s] business is operations, and the implications of coming second 
on the battlefield are in a significant different league”.316 
In the context of the peace dividend, and with encouragement from the US 
government, the US defence industry in the 1990s consolidated from several dozen to 
five main companies. Additionally, their products also became increasingly 
‘militarised’, meaning that their production lines did or could barely produce for the 
civilian market.317 As a result, a small number of huge companies became existentially 
dependent on declining US defence spending.318 Even though the basic dynamic also 
existed in the UK, the USA assigns its domestic industry a much more central and 
direct role in its national security and national defence architecture.319 Challenges to 
its industry are thus perceived as national security challenges, not least because the 
military can no longer support or sustain its operations or surge by drawing on in-
house capacities and capabilities. This prompts the US government to invest more 
effort into ensuring industry’s survival and sustaining its business.320 In the 1990s, 
efforts to shore up the defence industry among others took the form of dramatically 
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increased and expanded outsourcing and knowledge transfer, as the next paragraphs 
explain. 
Since, as noted earlier, fewer troops had to operate in more places, on shorter 
notice, maintain more sophisticated equipment, and accomplish all of that with lower 
funding, the tooth-to-tail ratio further decreased.321 What is more, throughout the 
1980s, pay increases in the UK armed forces had become necessary in order to stem 
the drain of qualified personnel into the private sector. However, when in the 1990s 
the military opted to concentrate its funds on combat forces and their equipment, it 
ironically accelerated the outsourcing of the tail, i.e. the shift of technological tasks 
and personnel to industry.322 In the 1990s, the UK pushed hard for Public-Private 
Partnerships in defence,323 aiming to increase the relative firepower of the military by 
reducing the number of uniformed personnel conducting non-combat tasks which are 
in principle available in the commercial sector.324 The UK military thereby rapidly 
increased its reliance on private service providers. This trend is most clearly 
epitomised in the dictum “Front Line First.” The eponymous study was released in 
1994 and clearly institutionalised the view of the military as a core competency force. 
Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind demanded that every pound spent 
should go toward combat power, and that efficiency in spending was to be of 
paramount concern. As cuts to combat forces in such a scenario would have been 
illogical (besides being more expensive in political capital) the supply services end 
was slashed.325 These and other measures, such as the Private Finance Initiative, 
sought to bridge the funding gap by lowering investment costs in R&D and 
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construction expenses by drawing on private funds. Manpower was seemingly 
available through hiring and firing, and the force structure was less threatened as 
those responsibilities that remained in uniform were ostensibly more attractive. 
Events in the USA followed a similar pattern and logic that demonstrate the 
close links between force structure, the quest for technological superiority and global 
dominance, knowledge transfer, and outsourcing. Core competency somewhat ties 
these five factors together. The deliberate decision to increasingly rely on contractors, 
in particular during the 1991 Iraq War, toppled the aforementioned force structure 
designs that had been put in place after the Vietnam War.326 Created through the 
1994 NDAA, the year of “Front Line First” in the UK, the Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces took up its work. It was set up to help reform DOD to 
become more innovative, competitive, and efficient. Like most previous efforts 
surveyed above, it recommended the reduction of “the cost of the support 
infrastructure through increased outsourcing and better management”.327 Camm –
 who is generally favourable towards outsourcing non-core functions to the private 
sector, and who participated in the wider CORM process – notes critically that the 
CORM was not very amenable to asking whether or not outsourcing was a good 
decision per se, but appeared to have received the “marching orders—outsource!” 
This was unfortunate because the process used to outsource, the OMB (Office of 
Management and Budget) Circular A-76, at the time did not consider the high costs of 
overseeing government outsourcing.328 
The CORM's strong support for outsourcing support functions appears to be 
both a result and a reinforcement of the notion of a core-competency military. Its final 
report explicitly urges DOD to “concentrate service efforts on military core 
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competencies”.329 Subsequent high-policy documents picked up and formalised this 
interpretation of the organisation of the armed forces. Secretary of Defense Cohen 
noted in the 1997 QDR that in order “[to] preserve combat capability and readiness, 
the Services have targeted the reductions by streamlining infrastructure and 
outsourcing non-military-essential functions.”330 Today, even though the military 
supply chain is no longer even remotely self-sufficient, force structure problems have 
remained. The 2010 QDR noted that DOD continues its efforts to maintain an 
adequate workforce that consists of a mix of “military/civilian/contractor” personnel 
“with the right competencies.”331 Contractors have thus become integral and 
seemingly equal parts of the military force structure because of the concentration on 
combat units in line with the core competency model. What ensued was the 
contemporary dependence on the private sector’s production and maintenance 
capabilities, knowhow, and manpower, as is discussed next. 
The unwavering demands for technological superiority and global military 
dominance are the ideational-functional underpinning of the developments above. 
Otherwise, could the military have done with less sophisticated equipment or a less 
expansive posture, it may not have been compelled to go down the route of core 
competency, transferring knowledge out of the military, investing heavily in the RMA 
and RML, and concomitantly increasing outsourcing. Camm recounts how after the 
end of the Cold War, facing lower procurement budgets, “original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) were looking for new lines of work … They promoted the idea 
that they should maintain the systems that they had designed and built.”332 Lockheed 
Martin, for example, set up “Aircraft & Logistics Centers” in its aerospace division that 
“[pursued] a strategy to support the U.S. government’s transition to contracted 
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logistics support and commercialization. This strategy includes winning modification, 
maintenance, and logistics contracts for as many as possible of the aircraft Lockheed 
Martin originally produced.”333 In their first year, the logistics centres captured 
contracts at a value of $1.25 billion.334 The company more broadly sought to become 
“the partner of choice” in the government’s anticipated turn towards “private sector 
partners for solutions to national and global challenges.”335 
The OEMs generally succeeded in convincing DOD to get on board, as this was 
a simple way to reduce the cost of new systems to DOD while it downsized its budget. 
As Camm notes, the underestimated caveat was that manufacturers retained “the 
technical data required to support the new systems. That way they did not even have 
to compete for the new work; no one else could do it without the tech data.”336 The 
federal government, although buying into the notion of core competency, failed to 
notice that these companies’ core competencies did not always include the 
maintenance of these systems, but rather their design and production. It was thus 
content with having increased outsourcing and decreased the public workforce and 
in-house knowhow; the corollary dependency on the private sector was not only 
accepted at the time, but may have been a specific government objective in the 
context of the 1990s where the US government sought to reinvent itself under the 
dominant privatisation paradigm.337 
In the same context, an oft-cited DSB report in 1996 “was chartered to 
develop recommendations on ways DOD could use outsourcing as an important tool 
to free up substantial funds to support defense modernization needs”.338 The task 
force's chairman Philip A. Odeen summarised its position as “all DoD support 
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functions should be contracted out to private vendors except those functions which 
are inherently governmental, are directly involved in warfighting, or for which no 
adequate private sector capability exists or can be expected to be established.”339 The 
taskforce was composed mostly of industry representatives. Mr Odeen was chairman 
of the industry trade group Professional Services Council (PSC) in the past and in 
2007 received the PSC’s Krueger medal. He has served on the boards of defence 
company Northrop Grumman, consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton, and numerous other 
companies, a well as in several positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 
the National Security Council.340  Other task force members included Mr Berteau, 
mentioned in chapter II, now at the CSIS think tank and then at the company SAIC, 
numerous other members of private companies from Boeing, UPS, General Electric, 
Bechtel, MPRI, and Dr Jacques Gansler as DSB reviewer.341 
These and more similar studies adequately reflect not only the discourse of 
the key advisory task forces and commissions in DOD since the early 1990s, but also 
the trajectory of the Army’s sweeping outsourcing of support services, the direction in 
which the government decided to go,342 as well as the advocacy of industry and its 
supporters.343 The defence modernisation needs mentioned by the DSB report were 
inseparable from both militaries’ decision to buy into the RMA and RML, discussed in 
more detail in chapter VI. Suffice it to point out here that these acquisitions, 
representing the growing flow of products, techniques, and processes from the 
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private sector into the military, necessarily came with personnel ‘attached’. With the 
military lacking in-house knowhow and capacities, the vendors gained increasing 
business by not only researching, developing, and producing capability, but also by 
installing systems, training the military in their use, maintaining and updating them 
throughout their life-cycle, and taking them out of service. As later chapters discuss in 
more detail, such life-cycle arrangements – called “through-life capability 
management” in the UK – have become the norm in the USA and the UK, even legally 
mandated in the USA. They underscore the ever closer intertwining of public and 
private workforces and both governments’ growing dependency on private sector 
knowledge. The UK MOD, for example, now purchases an asset’s capability rather 
than the actual asset itself, meaning the military often no longer owns the asset in the 
classical sense. This leads not only to increased revenue for industry,344 but also to the 
tighter integration of public and private workforces. The USA, while usually owning 
its assets, similarly draws on “performance-based logistics” (PBL) and “contractor 
logistics support” arrangements for the operation and maintenance of various 
weapon systems both at home and in active theatres of operation overseas.345 
III. 3.  Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the establishment of the context and historical 
background of contemporary defence policy-making that represent the first part of 
the policy process as per PNT. The preceding analyses identified the structures and 
agents, and the shocks and gradual processes that led to the present status quo which 
represents the backdrop against which defence policy is made today, and explains the 
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contemporary valuation and distribution of resources that are relevant to the 
remainder of the policy process which is examined in subsequent chapters.. 
III. 3. i. Key Findings 
First, the above reveals the ideational force exerted by the self-assigned global 
military and political role, and the belief in the virtue of technology and the ability to 
solve political problems with technical means. More so in the USA than the UK, cuts to 
defence are viewed as direct attacks on national security and the country’s role in the 
world.346 Defence in the USA thus enjoys particularly high system integration and 
sectoralisation,347 which are both strong but relatively more limited in the UK. 
‘Technologisation’ also led to the depoliticisation of force structure policy. The 
strong belief in the opportunities offered by new technologies meant that there was 
no longer a perceived need for military self-sufficiency. Debates about contracting are 
routinely depoliticised and reduced to economic, functional, and technological terms, 
and eschew questions about public participation and support for defence policy that 
the use of reservists rather than contractors, for instance, would necessitate. 
The internalisation of managerial and business ideas and practices is 
epitomised in the turn towards core competency, the lowering of overheads by 
planning for peacetime regardless of the tempo and frequency of military operations, 
the transfer of knowledge out of the government and military, and the belief in the 
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action/house/274159-house-passes-sequester-replacement-boehners-tax-plan-is-next,  
 Tim Mak (2012), “Defense industry cautiously upbeat on sequester,” in Politico (20 
November 2012), accessed 25 November 2012, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84056.html, and  
 Korb et al., “Gunpoint Stimulus”. 
 The 2015 budget proposal cuts military manpower while focusing on acquisition. Dan 
Lamothe (2014), “Pentagon Chooses Machinery Over Manpower in Budget Battle,” in Foreign 
Policy (04 March 2014), accessed 22 April 2014, available at 
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/04/pentagon_chooses_machinery_over_m
anpower_in_budget_battle. 
347 See section I.2.iii for definitions of these PNT concepts. 
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virtues of technology. The adoption of managerial and business practices underscores 
the point made by Taylor and Krahmann that buying into the notion of the private 
provision of public services is a key enabler of contracting.348 The inculcation of 
managerialism and business practices and ideas demonstrates that these kinds of 
knowhow are the most highly valued in the policy process. It is of particular note here 
that the USD (AT&L), who leads the department’s $350 billion strong acquisition 
efforts, must have private sector experience to be eligible for the post.349 Given the 
personal background as well as the awareness that it is a key prerequisite for the 
post, the USD (AT&L) likely focuses their attention and sensitivity on industry and its 
needs at the expense of potential veto players. Later examinations of DBB and DSB 
task forces, which are mostly sponsored by the USD (AT&L), underscore this 
contention.350 
The turn to an AVF furthermore reduced the levels of military knowhow 
among civilian officials, raising its value among those who hold this resource. The AVF 
also meant that money is relatively less concentrated among military and government 
agencies but increasingly held by contractors and industry who take on more 
responsibilities. Coupled with the relative loss of autonomy in acquisition, the 
military gradually lost some of its ability to veto government policy. 
At the same time, the resulting interdependence between government and 
industry further strengthened the role assigned to “democracy’s arsenal” in the USA 
and the centrality of private enterprise to the UK military. This assumption is 
                                                             
348 See Taylor, “Contractors on Operations, Equipment Support”, pp. 185–186, and Krahmann, 
States, Citizens, p. 51. 
349 This requirement was mentioned in passing separately in several personal interviews with 
anonymous. senior US sources (2012). POGO’s Scott Amey criticises this requirement, stating 
that many other experts have expert knowledge of the industry, implying that they would not 
be as biased towards the private sector, see personal interview with Scott Amey. 
350 Ashton Carter, who served as USD (AT&L) under President Obama and worked 
exceptionally closely with industry, was regarded by some senior individuals as not fulfilling 
this requirement because he had allegedly only served on the board of and advised private 
sector organisations, but not actually worked in private business. He was deemed as not 
holding sufficient resources from his experience in and with the private sector. This was noted 
by an anonymous interviewee with the author. Personal interviews with anonymous. 
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underscored by the undisputed nature of government-industry interdependence 
which is openly acknowledged, even appreciated, by both governments. Concern for 
the health of the defence-industrial base is a standard talking point in the defence 
leadership and illustrates that both governments perceive ‘more of the same’ as their 
best option to meet their security responsibilities: private sector involvement and 
tighter public-private integration. A relationship of such dependence and proximity 
requires functioning communication channels and access. Seeking advice on how to 
improve communication with the defence-industrial base, the DBB, in 2009, proposed 
an “Industry Strategic Communications Plan” which called for closer, less 
confrontational, more formalised and regularised communication, meetings, and an 
acknowledgement that both sides will win if they acknowledge that they share 
interests. Such meetings would not only help solve contracting-related problems, but 
would also provide the industry with even closer and more direct input to the highest 
tier of the Pentagon up to the Secretary of Defense.351 In the UK, the issue of 
government-industry relations and channels of communication gained greater 
urgency in the wake of the rapid expansion of outsourcing in the 1980s and 1990s 
and the subsequent rapid growth of the public-private relationship. In a 1992 speech 
to RUSI, McIntosh said that that the MOD “recognises an obligation to keep industry 
as well acquainted as possible with [its] future requirements, to enable industry to 
make informed decisions about the direction of its business. Ministers have made 
clear their commitment to this policy.” Government was to be responsive to the needs 
of industry.352 As discussed in chapter VI, further strides have been undertaken since 
with the creation of the public-private “Total Support Force”. 
                                                             
351 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Business Board (2009), Task Group on an Outreach 
Plan to Improve Communications between the Department of Defense and the Defense Industrial 
Base: Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY09-7 (Washington, D.C.) 
352 McIntosh, “Defence Procurement Policy”, p. 74. He went on to say regarding individual 
projects that “in practice, most companies know as much as there is to know about the status 
of projects in which they have an interest through informal contacts with staffs in the 
procurement executive and in operational requirements.” 
125 
The above also underscores the dominance of the executive – especially its 
leadership –, the rapidly growing importance of contractors, and the diminishing 
importance of the legislature and parts of the military. All initiatives above were 
results of top-down efforts. Most overarching was Vice President Al Gore’s initiative 
to reinvent government, which centred on the emulation of the private sector. But 
also the various more limited reviews and initiatives underscore the relevance of 
leaderships. The chairman of the CORM John P. White, for instance, went on to 
become Deputy Secretary of Defense shortly before the publication of the 
commission’s report. The administration could thus ensure that its recommendations 
of core competency and outsourcing were implemented.353 Similarly, Stan Soloway 
served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform in the late 
1990s. When he came into office he oversaw ongoing DSB studies that sought closer 
civil-military commercial integration to bring commercial technology to bear in 
defence.354 He later became President and CEO of PSC, the national trade association 
for government services contractors, and continues to advocate public-private 
partnerships and closer integration of government and its service providers. Jacques 
S. Gansler, finally, who served as USD (AT&L), now sits on several companies’ boards, 
and is widely regarded as a leading expert on these matters, also remains vocal in 
advocating the broader, smarter, and more long-term and partnership-oriented use of 
the private sector in defence. A senior source from the MOD confirmed that guidance 
from the executive leadership directly affects lower-level implementation, 
underscoring the high relevance of reviews and initiatives such as the 
                                                             
353 See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 
(1995), “Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” 25 August 1995, Press 
Release No. 470-85, accessed 12 January 2013, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=603, 
 and U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 
(1995), “DoD News Briefing: Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White,” 25 August 1995, 
accessed 12 January 2013, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=167. 
354 Personal interview with Stan Soloway. 
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aforementioned ones. Moreover, the source notes that “there is a momentum point” 
in this process; once a certain practice such as commercialising activities has become 
common, “you probably tend to do it more and more because you are more 
comfortable with the very idea” that a few years ago would have been unthinkable.355 
In other words, the repeated use of contractors affects the policy network’s selectivity 
in such a way that outsourcing becomes more likely in the future,356 and a potential 
reversal increasingly unlikely. 
The empowerment of the executive and the private sector came partly at the 
expense of the legislature and was more generally accompanied by the reduction of 
potential veto-points, i.e. points at which policies may be opposed. The move towards 
an AVF was intended to ensure that the government could not go to war without 
calling up reservists in the USA. Yet, the move to use contractors, most symbolically in 
the 1991 Iraq War, removed this civilian element of control on the use of force. 
Additionally, the legislature shows little interest, ability, or resources to control 
contract spending by the government. While the UK parliament generally participates 
little in policy-making as opposed to policy-review,357 the US Congress statutorily 
must authorise contract spending in excess of $50 million. Yet, it is not known to 
control contracts other than large foreign military sales or if the contract has 
generated considerable controversy. The vast majority of day-to-day contract 
spending and contractor operations thus occur free from legislative controls or media 
scrutiny,358 while the recommendations of inspectors-general go unimplemented too 
often.359 As the following chapters show, this is representative of a much wider 
                                                             
355 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources. 
356 This corresponds with Kruck’s argument about the gradual “norm-alisation” of outsourcing 
through repeated reiteration. See Kruck, “Theorising Use of PMSCs”, pp. 21–25. 
357 Peter Dorey (2005), Policy Making in Britain: an Introduction (London: SAGE Publications), 
p. 162. 
358 See Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace for a detailed discussion of these and other 
oversight-related problems with contracting. 
359 Eric Yoder (2013), “Too many IG recommendations not implemented, report says,” in 
Washington Post (05 March 2013), accessed 9 March 2013, available at 
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characteristic of the policy process, namely the severe dearth of potential veto players 
who hold even remotely comparable resources and clout as the private sector. 
Finally, regarding the drivers of military outsourcing, the above underscores 
that the current wave of contractorisation stretches back far beyond the end of the 
Cold War. It is therefore reasonable to challenge the established view in the literature 
and stress that the logic and pressures behind private security contracting originate 
decades before the end of the Cold War.360 It particularly stands to argue that security 
contracting on deployed operations may not have been accepted by governments had 
they not gathered decades of experience of services contracting beforehand, gradually 
shrinking the defined “core” of military responsibilities, and thus paving the way for 
the willingness to outsource security. 
III. 3. ii. Ramifications for Policy Networks 
In conclusion, and to lead over to the next chapters, this chapter deduces four 
hypotheses from the above. How will the above drivers and policies affect, as 
independent variables, the networks and policies examined in the following chapters? 
First, ideas, as noted, are the slowest to change. Therefore, as long as the present 
interpretation of the security environment, posture, commitments, and the resource 
gap persist (as general contextual factors as per PNT),361 both nations’ militaries will 
interpret inherently governmental functions (increasingly) narrowly and close the 
resource-strategy gap by drawing on the private sector. In other words, the ‘core’ will 
shrink further. 
Secondly, the contemporary constellation of strategy, requirements, and 
suppliers of defence capability creates considerable incentives for industry to pursue 
the constant flow of resources that DOD and MOD offer, to warn against any 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/03/05/too-many-ig-
recommendations-not-implemented-report-says/, 
360 Cf. Singer, Corporate Warriors and Avant, Market for Force. 
361 See footnote 99. 
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reductions, and to form pro-contracting advocacy coalitions in support of these 
goals.362 At the same time, there are no comparably immediate incentives to oppose 
this status quo and no immediate veto-points for stakeholders in the process. It 
furthermore provides incentives for group formation into advocacy coalitions to 
multiply the effect of individual actors and to better channel their efforts and access 
to decision-makers. Not least due to the government’s dependency on the 
beneficiaries of this coalition, industry and its advocates should hold more resources 
than other non-governmental, potentially industry-critical actors, including money, 
(access to) decision-makers, and leadership. This would also be in line with economic 
studies which suggests that democratic governments tend to favour producers over 
consumers, mostly because the former have more resources, means, and knowledge 
in order to participate in the process than the general public.363 It would also support 
Jacobs and Page’s findings that high foreign policy is most strongly influenced by 
business interests, and that this in turn is most pronounced regarding defence.364  
Thirdly, the networks should be biased to admitting and promoting those 
actors and policy proposals that share the beliefs about global leadership and 
technological superiority, and who consider the private sector a desirable force 
multiplier in the creation of defence outcomes. Their selectivity should advantage 
agendas that reinforce rather than challenge these convictions. The networks are thus 
unlikely to comprise significant sources of internal change. 
                                                             
362 Answering “why would anyone want to operate in, or invest in, such a peculiar, 
unpredictable sector” as defence, Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute answers that 
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environment-drives-shift-in-company-strategies. 
363 Hartley, Economics of Defence Policy, pp. 88–89. 
364 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page (2005), “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” in 
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Fourth, presuming that veto players strongly affect the likelihood and degree 
of policy reorientation, and given the noted selectivity and low prospects for 
unorthodox agenda-setters,365 this study assumes that there will be no fundamental 
rethink of threat perceptions and resulting strategies and postures as long as there 
occurs no big shock resulting from military failure or financial default, and as long as 
the private sector can meet the responsibilities it is assigned by the military, even if 
this comes at a high cost in other policy domains (for instance through higher cuts in 
non-defence budgets). 
Having established the context and background to contemporary defence 
policy-making, and provided hypotheses as to the shape and outcomes of the 
remainder of the policy process, this study now turns to testing these assumptions in 
three environments: high defence services acquisition policy-making, the outsourcing 
of foreign military assistance, and the outsourcing of military logistics. 
                                                             
365 The military leadership is unlikely to rise beyond Colonel if it does not buy into the 
politically-led outsourcing drive, with pressures being particularly strong on logisticians 
because the military, as shown, prioritises hi-tech equipment over technical in-house staffs. 
Michael Brower who “worked as a program analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), Resource Analysis and Business Practices 
Directorate” in the late 1990s found that “those above the rank of colonel and GS–14 and 
political appointees are almost wholly in favor of outsourcing and privatization” while the 
lower ranks by necessity have to conform (or leave the military for the private sector). Brower, 
“Vogue of DOD Outsourcing”, p. 388. 
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IV.  The High Politics of Military Services Contracting: the US and 
UK “Defence Services Acquisition Policy Networks” 
The two preceding chapters focused predominantly on the first research 
question of ‘why’ states outsource military services, i.e. the drivers, and thus on the 
first part of the policy process in line with PNT. Tracing the historical trajectory, they 
explained how the status quo came about and explicated the structural context of 
contemporary defence policy-making in the USA and the UK. The status quo is 
principally defined by several cross-hatched political, economic, technological, 
organisational, and ideational factors. First, there are their global defence postures 
and the ongoing tension between the resulting military commitments and the 
resources available for their realisation. Secondly, this tension is exacerbated by the 
demand that these goals be met employing the most advanced, sophisticated 
weapons systems and the most highly trained professional military forces. Both 
demands were shown to be met primarily with recourse to and the internalisation of 
managerial and business ideas, discourses, and practices. Outsourcing is among the 
most significant and salient among them. 
Building on this context, the study now enters the next ‘sequence’ and 
examines contemporary defence policy-making and implementation, i.e. the second 
and third parts of the policy process. To fully answer the research questions, the 
remainder of this study addresses a series of questions in the three domains of high 
policy, foreign military assistance, and overseas military logistics: What are the 
domain-specific drivers of outsourcing, and do they confirm the previous analyses? 
How and why do outsourcing and contractors figure in politics and decision-making? 
How is outsourcing conducted on the ground? Which key concerns emerge? What are 
contractorisation’s long term effects on the defence enterprise, policy process, and 
network selectivity? And thus: what is the likely future of outsourcing? 
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The remainder of this study tests and finds support for the assumptions put 
forward at the end of chapter III: in a nutshell, governments will increasingly reduce 
their interpretation of ‘inherently governmental’ and ‘core competencies’ if the 
commitments-resources gap persists. The structures in place create considerable 
incentives for industry group formation and the pursuit of revenue streams, as well as 
result in privileged access and input to decision-makers and decision-making, while 
not incentivising other veto-players or creating significant veto-points. The policy 
network exhibits a bias towards those actors (executive leaderships, managers, 
contractors, and advisors) and policy options that reinforce rather than challenge the 
system in place, limiting fundamental introspection. Finally, veto-players are 
marginalised, further strengthening network selectivity. Contractorisation thus 
becomes normalised and standard practice through its reiteration over several policy 
cycles, while the potential reversal or significant change becomes less likely. 
This chapter maps the ‘Defence Services Acquisition Policy Networks’ 
(DSAPNs) in the USA and the UK by surveying key policy disputes and examining 
venues of personal and informational interaction and exchange. It thereby identifies 
the network’s main actors and advocacy coalitions, their beliefs and interests, and the 
mobilisation of their resources in pursuit of these interests.366 It thereby also gives 
indications as to the likely shape of policy implementation – the last part of the policy 
process – that is examined in the two remaining chapters. The observations and maps 
confirm not only the existence of a “bias towards business” and the “structural power 
of business”,367 but also highlight a central element of the defence policy process: 
informality. 
                                                             
366 These disputes’ being of central relevance to contracting ensures that the observations 
capture the most relevant actors who focus their limited resources on high-profile, high-stakes 
issues. 
367 Cf. Bell, “Structural Power of Business”. 
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IV. 1.  Membership in the Defence Services Acquisition Policy 
Network 
The preceding chapters pointed to several groups of actors and institutions of 
the defence policy process: the government executive, advisory boards, lobbies, think 
tanks, and the legislature. The following refines this list through the examination of 
three venues and channels for personal and informational exchange which represent 
the ideational, functional/technological, organisational, and economic dimensions 
identified earlier. They are departmental advisory boards, technical and technological 
consultancy, and interest group politics and lobbyism. The goal is to identify the 
actors involved, their arguments, and who ‘won’ a particular policy dispute. The next 
section can then identify coalitions of actors and their interests, ideas, beliefs, and 
resources in order to evaluate the distribution of power and thus determine the 
structure of the networks. We can then deduce who ‘makes’ defence services 
acquisition policy, and why. 
IV. 1. i. The USA: Advising, Informing, and Lobbying on Defence 
Services Acquisition Policy 
DOD Advisory Boards 
Advisory boards in the USA reveal that mainstream think tanks and the 
defence industry have priority input into decision-making. Industry and selected 
think tanks are proactively sought out as interviewees, task group members, and 
chairs, while labour unions and various critics of defence economic and defence-
industrial practice are typically not represented. As noted, these boards are hugely 
important: they epitomise and unite the noted ideational, technological, functional, 
and political factors that to a high extent determine military outsourcing, illustrate 
the directions in which the government wishes defence and security to develop in the 
future, initiate new trends, and show what is considered out-of-the-box thinking in 
government circles. 
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As noted earlier, soon after the CORM Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
John Goodman sponsored a DSB study on outsourcing and privatisation in DOD. It 
aimed at “[reducing] the cost of the support infrastructure while simultaneously 
enhancing support effectiveness” and recommended the wholesale outsourcing of all 
non-inherently governmental support functions.368 Of the 28 task force participants, 
20 were industry representatives, one was from the Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC) the Center for Naval Analyses, four were DOD 
representatives, two were members of the task force's staff, and one was the DOD 
sponsor John Goodman. In an organisational diagram, they are grouped as “Defense 
Industry Executives”, “DoD/Service Representatives”, and “Private Sector Experts”. 
The task force included no representatives of labour, even though the report directly 
recommended the outsourcing of jobs of unionised workers or other potential 
opponents.369 
Similarly, a 2011 DBB report analysed the opportunities to harness corporate 
downsizing applications to reduce overhead and increase efficiencies in DOD. 
Although the report mentions that key constituents, such as trade groups and labour 
unions, must be supportive for such measures to work, none of the 20 plus interviews 
appear to have been conducted with representatives of labour. In other words, when 
DOD sought to emulate successful business practices, the task group sought advice 
from the consultancy, financial, and manufacturing industries, as well as current and 
former defence officials. However, even during an administration considered 
excessively left-wing by many critics, the task group did not consult anybody from the 
employee side which bears a lot of the burden of corporate downsizing. This is 
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369 Ibid, pp. 4–5. 
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particularly telling given that recommendation number five states that “reducing 
people costs is critical” and that “it is vital that reductions begin immediately”.370 
The above underlines what Jacques Gansler (former USD (AT&L)) and Stan 
Soloway (former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, now 
President and CEO of the industry group PSC), both of whom have sponsored such 
studies, said: DOD leadership and advisory boards cannot talk to everyone, there is 
both a political element and time pressures in the design and composition of these 
boards. As Soloway put it, “I guess to some extent there would have to be a political 
element to it. ... We did not have the time to talk to everybody on the planet, so we 
selected people from a variety of stakeholder groups who we thought would provide 
us the best quality of diverse opinion.” As a result, not “everybody gets a shot, it is not 
like a public hearing, it is not like a congressional hearing. There is some winnowing, 
nobody has the time, so you want to go where the substance is.”371 By extension, the 
above also confirms Scott Amey of the Project on Government Oversight who 
criticised this state of affairs, arguing that there are people outside the industry who 
can provide input to the acquisition process in DOD.372 
A study by watchdog “Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington” 
(CREW) sheds some light on the dynamics of advising and informing government in 
tune with Amey’s concerns. It found that “70 percent (or 76) of the 108 three-and-
four star generals and admirals who retired between 2009 and 2011 took jobs with 
defense contractors or consultants. In at least a few cases, the retirees have continued 
to advise the Department of Defense while on the payroll of defense contractors, 
suggesting the Pentagon may not always be receiving unbiased counsel.”373 Advisory 
                                                             
370 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Business Board (2011), Corporate Downsizing 
Applications for DoD: Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11-08 (Washington, D.C.), 
pp. 1, 3, 4; quote on p. 4. 
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boards are thus criticised by some on the grounds that they have “vested interests” in 
overestimating the savings to be made from outsourcing, among others because such 
studies are conducted by stakeholders rather than objective analysts.374 
CREW’s study problematises an issue that is simultaneously easy to observe 
but whose effects are exceedingly difficult to measure: the linkage between public and 
private sectors as personified in those walking through the “revolving door”, and the 
question of the objectivity of advisers and decision-makers against this backdrop. The 
majority of lobbyists for major defence companies have backgrounds in public 
service. CREW found that at least 68% of registered in-house lobbyists working for 
the five largest defence contractors had prior public sector experience, mostly in 
Congress and federal agencies.375 The study thus highlights a broader issue of 
interest, namely the ease with which individuals from the private sector may enter 
inner policy-making circles, and the fact that they are even deliberately sought out by 
government to consult decision-makers. Put differently, what is interesting here is not 
the potentials for misconduct but rather the general bias that exists in the regular 
conduct of the formal, day-to-day, routineised public-private interactions in the policy 
network. The prerequisite for the USD (AT&L) to have a background in the private 
sector is a particularly telling illustration thereof. The same holds true for a quote by 
Mr Soloway saying that the PSC, “whenever there is a relevant study or research 
project being done” is “almost always asked to come in, provide a briefing and a 
discussion” which may turn into a serial engagement with the team. Asked whether 
the boards proactively approach PSC, he replied: “Almost always, if it relates to 
acquisition, technology, services...”376 
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Technical and Technological Advice: Informality and the Case of RAND 
An exemplary examination of RAND sheds further light on the role of outside 
advice to DOD that takes the baselines for granted and works to operationalise the 
ideational, technological, and political guidelines that are set by government. RAND is 
one of the most renowned research organisations and has closely worked with the US 
military and defence communities for decades. RAND and similar organisations’ 
advice and information procedures are distinguished here from overtly interest-
based politics and organisations because of their institutional non-partisanship 
(explored below). The following establishes the channels of communication and 
forms of cooperation between RAND and the military, and highlights an under-
appreciated yet persistent theme in the study of defence policy and contractorisation: 
informality, i.e. non-memorialised or non-public interaction. 
RAND has three so-called Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centres that work with the Army, Air Force, and the intelligence community.377 RAND 
negotiates its work annually with senior boards from those offices, comprising 2-4 
star generals. This process is ongoing, following five-year contracts with both armed 
services that define the terms under which this occurs.378 
Camm notes that RAND then has “very good access to people on that board.” 
RAND has long had close working relationships with individual parts of the Army and 
Air Force in particular, going back several decades. They are particularly close and 
long-lasting with the logistics communities and the Army personnel policy 
community. In those cases RAND has had significant influence. “We have basically 
transformed the logistics systems of the Army and the Air Force over the course of 40 
years,” Camm notes referring to the changes that are discussed in chapters III and VI, 
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137 
in particular the shift to distribution-based logistics.379 “If you look at how those 
activities are run: they reflect what we told them to do, which is kind of cool.”380 
However, whereas RAND has long been able to influence US military policies 
and processes on a largely technical level such as regarding the management of 
inventory, Camm notes that RAND has not had much direct influence on the use of 
contractors.381 However, the changes in the logistic systems advocated by RAND 
possibly had as an unintended consequence the increase of contractorisation because 
the underlying logic is based on business best practices and technologies which the 
military does not organically own or operate.382 
In addition to these rather technical consultancies, RAND also works on a 
contract basis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), especially with OSD 
(AT&L). As OSD’s job is a policy job, the main difference regards the perspective taken 
to analyse an issue. OSD focuses on cost and controls the budget, whereas the military 
services control the quality of the service. Underscoring the difference between 
politics and seemingly more technical issues, Camm notes that RAND’s relationship 
with OSD varies depending on the people involved, meaning that RAND’s influence 
fluctuates more, and that generally there is much less continuity there. On the one 
hand this is because of the higher turnaround of staff members, on the other hand 
because each cooperation is a one-off effort. In Camm’s experience this makes the 
maintenance of longer-term relationships very difficult, not least because projects are 
very limited in time especially when compared to projects such as the transformation 
of the Army and Air Force logistics systems.383 
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RAND’s relationship with DOD also provides further evidence for the political 
element that is inherent in DOD advisory boards as noted above,384 and the view that 
the issues it advises on are ostensibly technical, not political. As RAND is precluded 
from taking an overtly political stand, it is not invited to participate in DSB or DBB 
studies “because this gets into politics.” This is despite its significant subject-matter 
expertise and the often ostensibly technical nature of these studies. At the same time, 
RAND employees regularly serve on and support the Army and Air Force’s Scientific 
Advisory Boards (SABs) which RAND is “comfortable doing … because the focus of the 
SABs tends to be more technical and less about implementing an administration’s 
political goals.”385 The same applies to testimony to Congress, where someone from 
RAND’s staff testifies “probably every week”, according to Camm; “we are not allowed 
to lobby, though.”386 
 
In addition to the impact of technical and technological consultancies on DOD 
processes, including the manpower and cost-intensive logistics domain, the RAND 
case also highlights another critical aspect of the examination of diverse influences on 
the policy process. The assessment of influence – be it internally or of external actors 
from advisors to lobbyists, think tanks, or media reports – is tremendously 
complicated because it mostly operates informally and indirectly. According to Camm, 
most contacts between RAND and the Congress or DOD are informal, “with staff just 
sharing ideas.” Generally, “there is a lot of day-to-day contact ... in the Pentagon. There 
is a reason we are located here [across the street from the Pentagon] (laughs) –
 someone can call and you can be there in 20 minutes.”387 
The same applies to RAND’s in-house programmes in which it interacts with 
various DOD offices and individuals. Informal conversation is “very common” and 
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“about whatever they want.” For example, in 2011, Camm conducted a project for the 
Inspector General (IG) of the Air Force. The IG had a council of approximately 20 
Colonels to help him with redesigning the inspection system. They met first weekly, 
for three months, and then monthly for another year, on the fourth floor of the RAND 
offices in Arlington (where this author’s interview with Mr Camm was also held). 
“When they wanted formal input from us I would reach out to people at RAND who 
knew the topics”. Most importantly, for Camm, he has been able “to improve people’s 
understanding of the issues” on which policy-makers eventually take decisions. 
Venues such as the fourth floor are not only common, but “absolutely critical. This is 
where the real work gets done.”388 
While DOD has similar contracts with other FFRDCs and research 
organisations, there is no reason to believe that their cases would be significantly 
different from RAND in their overall operation, given the regulations in place for such 
contracts. The above should thus be of fairly general validity for this kind of input into 
government that works to operationalise and ultimately institutionalise the technical, 
ostensibly apolitical objectives. 
Interest Group Politics, Lobbying, and Advocacy about Contracting in the USA 
Some of the main fault lines in outsourcing-related policy battles are the 
rejection or endorsement of public-private competition or partnership, the costs or 
lack of government oversight and industry regulation, and the potentially resulting 
responsibilities or dangers for the defence-industrial base. The debates are mostly 
conducted in a highly adversarial manner – not surprising given the high financial 
stakes – and involve several recurring key individuals and organisations. The 
                                                             
388 Ibid, emphasis added. 
 Mr Soloway similarly stated that “thematically a lot gets done informally. ... We have 
informal conversations with people all the time, but when there is any significant policy issue 
it is almost always memorialised in writing, so in the end it is becoming a transparent 
process.” Personal interview with Stan Soloway. 
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examples surveyed here serve to further identify key actors and coalitions, and their 
interests and resources. 
Applying and Reforming OMB Circular A-76 
OMB (Office of Management and Budget) Circular A-76, “Performance of 
Commercial Activities”, “defines federal policy for determining whether recurring 
commercial activities should be transferred to performance by the private sector or 
performed by federal government employees.”389 Although it was passed in 1966, 
Frank Camm points out that regarding defence it has predominantly been used, in 
different versions, in three waves: first, under President Ronald Reagan with the aim 
of outsourcing as much as possible because the dominant notion was that 
government should not be competing with its own citizens; secondly under President 
Bill Clinton, ostensibly to reduce cost, not least because A-76 at the time aimed at cost 
reduction; and thirdly since 2003 after it had been revised to take into account both 
cost and value.390 
As was the case during the outsourcing drive of the 1990s, during the revision 
of A-76 in 2003 the congressionally mandated board again failed to accommodate the 
costs of overseeing contractors.391 Also, the inclusion of cost and value “energised the 
government unions.” Camm recounts being condemned by the federal workers’ 
unions as a “lackey of the private-sector contracting community” even though a 
primer that he wrote was more on the unions’ side “than anything in federal sourcing 
policy that existed before or after”.392 Camm wrote the primer in question for the 
CORM in 1996. A third of it addresses concerns to be taken into account regarding 
privatisation, including technical issues, the increased possibility of fraud and abuse, 
and the disruption caused by privatisation and the necessity to constructively address 
                                                             
389 Valerie Bailey Grasso (2005), “Defense Outsourcing: the OMB Circular A-76 Policy,” in 
Congressional Research Service, No. RL30392, at Summary. 
390 Personal interview with Frank Camm. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Personal correspondence with Frank Camm. 
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these issues with stakeholders.393 Against the political background of the CORM this 
primer was certainly much more cautious about outsourcing overall than the 
government at the time that, as Camm noted, may have given the commission the 
“marching orders” to outsource.394 
The Professional Services Council was also involved in the debate. It noted its 
appreciation of the new draft that presumed all government activity as being 
“commercial unless otherwise documented to be inherently governmental.”395 
Business Executives for National Security shared this point of view, as its “basic 
premise has always been: if it is a commercial function, something that is readily 
found in the private sector, the government ought to consider that as their first source 
of supply.”396 BENS had published a study in 2001, addressed to the Secretary of 
Defense, that recommended among others a reform of A-76 not dissimilar to what 
was ultimately implemented soon thereafter.397 
There has since been placed a moratorium on A-76 in DOD, i.e. the 
department cannot legally outsource new services which have so far been provided 
in-house. Government unions, most notably the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE), convinced Congress of their interpretation. The AFGE considers 
the A-76 process to be illegal and can by now point to three laws that prohibit further 
A-76 studies to be conducted.398 Their success indicates that unions retain some 
power in Congress where since the 2000s “union support is going beyond Democrats 
                                                             
393 Frank Camm (1996), Expanding Private Production of Defense Services, Prepared for the 
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), pp. 9-24, 
51-52. 
394 Personal correspondence with Frank Camm. 
395 Stan Soloway (2002), “Circular A-76 Comments”, accessed 17 January 2014, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars/a076/comments/a76-246.pdf, 
p. 2. 
396 Personal interview with Paul Taibl and Susan Maybaumwisniewski. 
397 Business Executives for National Security (2001), Call to Action: Tail to Tooth Commission 
(Washington, D.C.: Business Executives for National Security), p. 15. 
398 This includes Section 325 of the FY2010 NDAA. See their fact sheet American Federation of 
Government Employees, AFL-CIO (2011), “The OMB Circular A-76 Privatization Process: Why 




to Republicans”.399 It is important to note that this influence is limited to home base 
contracting; military services provision overseas rarely touches on potentially 
unionised workers but rather on soldiers who are by definition not unionised.400 
Contractor Costs 
The question of whether contractors in fact cost less than government 
employees is probably as old as outsourcing. On 29 March 2012, the Senate 
Contracting Oversight Subcommittee held a hearing entitled “Contractors: How Much 
Are They Costing the Government?”401 Chairwoman Senator McCaskill invited a 
number of organisations to provide testimony or statements for the record (see left 
column of the referenced website). The proactive selection of these actors is a strong 
indicator that these organisations are considered key actors and commentators on 
this particular issue. They include public bodies such as the Departments of 
Homeland Security and of Health, the Offices of Personnel Management and of 
Management and Budget, two labour unions (the AFGE and the National Treasury 
Employees’ Union), three think tanks (American Enterprise Institute, CSIS, and 
Heritage), POGO, and two trade groups (the PSC and the Coalition for Government 
Procurement CGP). The hearing was called in order “to examine whether and how 
cost information is used by government agencies to make decisions about whether 
work should be performed by federal employees or contractors.”402 
                                                             
399 Personal interview with Frank Camm. Camm estimates that Congress is the last place 
where unions hold such considerable power. 
400 This point was confirmed in a personal interview with Stan Soloway. The Commission on 
Wartime Contracting also testifies to this fact as the unions had no noticeable presence in that 
context which examined only overseas contracting. 
401 See the accompanying website that provides a video recording and copies of statements for 
the record, letters, and transcripts at Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Contracting 
Oversight Subcommittee (2012), “Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the Government?”, 





It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the issue of contractor costs 
itself,403 but two points are of note here: the panel aimed at improving government 
contracting practices, in particular accounting for costs in decisions on using a 
contract source. This is remarkable because the efforts of Chairwoman McCaskill, who 
championed congressional efforts to curb contracting waste, fraud, and abuse in 
particular through the Commission on Wartime Contracting, were considered to be 
on the edge of the political mainstream, and certainly not viewed favourably among 
                                                             
403 This study will deliberately not enter the cost discussion in more detail, other than to make 
a few points: it is unclear whether contracting saves money or not – especially whether it does 
so across the board – because studies have delivered opposite results, see e.g. U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1997), Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable but Defense Science 
Board's Projections are Overstated, GAO/NSIAD-98-48 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting 
Office), p. 4. The report confirmed other reports that had found “that the Defense Science 
Board’s estimated annual savings of $6 billion is overstated by about $4 billion because of 
errors in estimates, overly optimistic savings assumptions, and legal and cultural 
impediments.” The DSB had identified the latter and called for overcoming them by leadership 
from the top (ibid.). 
 Attempts are under way to develop valid cost comparison models that all stakeholders can 
agree to, see e.g. Jacques S. Gansler, William Lucyshyn, and John Rigilano (2011), Toward a 
Valid Comparison of Contractor and Government Costs, (College Park, MD). 
 Also, it is questionable whether contracting in long-term operations saves money, whether 
contractors hire and fire highly qualified staff, and whether there is the will and support for 
widespread insourcing. Finally, as the examination of A-76 showed, an exclusive focus on cost 
efficiency risks neglecting considerations of effectiveness. Cf. a quote from then-Air Vice 
Marshal Palin who argued that monetary efficiency does not necessarily translate into military 
“effectiveness” – the relation of output and national defence. Croft et al., Britain and Defence 
1945-2000, pp. 97–98. 
 Regarding the hire-and-fire argument of outsourcing, Charles M. Smith, who worked as a 
civilian for the U.S. Army for over thirty years in the logistics and support area and whose 
extensive testimony is discussed in chapter VI, gave the following highly insightful example: 
“That is the logic that drives the outsourcing: ‘contractors can ramp up and ramp down much 
better than government, civilian or military...’ In practice I found that this is not always true 
and I saw it more on the facilities I had for the war reserves stock. I had a facility down in 
South Carolina for the war reserves stock we kept on shipboard. There is a maintenance 
facility there, the ship comes, all the equipment is taken off the ship, the ship goes up to some 
port where it is in high dock and refitted, meanwhile the contractor does all the maintenance 
on the equipment; it goes back on the ship when the ship comes back and goes back out for a 
year. And some people in government thought that the contractor will only hire the people to 
do that when the ship is in and then he will ramp down, and we found ‘no’ – you do not get 
them if you do not keep them. And so we had to go out and find other work to be done at that 
base to keep the workforce there and involved. The contractor is not really in the position to 
ramp up and down, especially when it is something technical like maintenance.” Telephone 
interview with Charles M. Smith. Former Contracting Officer and Manager, U.S. Army (25 April 
2013). 
 Finally, some of the cost savings are possibly results of a redistribution of several costs 
across society, for instance contractors’ health costs being covered by the general health 
budget rather than the military budget, but ultimately still out of taxpayers’ funds, for instance 
through the National Health Service. 
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pro-industry voices.404 Not only did this hearing aim at improving costing practices in 
outsourcing rather than curbing outsourcing per se; the AFGE’s testimony noted as a 
success the passing of several laws, one of which requires “that any work last 
performed by federal employees be subjected to formal cost comparisons which 
determine that conversions to contractor performance can at least be guesstimated to 
benefit taxpayers before such conversions may take place”.405 The AFGE, in other 
words, regards as a success the mandate to conduct “guesstimates” before jobs of its 
members could be transferred to the private sector. This indicates an 
acknowledgement that outsourcing cannot entirely be objected to in the political 
process even by those most opposed to it. 
It is furthermore of note that these particular actors can be confirmed as 
central actors, after the full range of interviews in and around Washington, D.C. had 
already indicated as much. POGO’s 2011 report Bad Business, for instance, was cited 
favourably not only by the AFGE in its testimony406 but also by Senator McCaskill in 
her opening statement.407 
A Short-Lived Insourcing Drive 
Finally, in recognition of the Pentagon's over-dependence on contractors, only 
four years after the first inclusion of contractors in the Total Force, the 2010 QDR 
outlined that part of developing a balanced “total defense workforce” (which was still 
defined as comprising “military, government civilian, and contractor personnel”) 
would be to “[improve] the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce” and “to reduce the 
                                                             
404 Personal interviews with anonymous. 
405 John Gage (2012), “Statement for the Record by John Gage, National President, [AFGE], 
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee 
on Contracting Oversight, on Contractors: How Much Are They Costing the Government?”, 
(Washington, D.C.), accessed 19 January 2014, available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/afge-statement-for-the-record. Emphasis added. 
406 Ibid, p. 7. 
407 Claire McCaskill (2012), “Contractors: How much are they costing the Government? 
Opening Statement”, accessed 19 January 2014, available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/mccaskills-opening-statement-sco-03-29-2012, p. 2. 
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number of support service contractors”.408 This issue is particularly relevant for our 
purposes as success of an insourcing initiative could have severely unsettled the 
status quo from within by suggesting that outsourcing is no longer as necessary or as 
promising as before, while its defeat could further entrench contractorisation by 
reducing the already limited veto-points. 
According to DOD Directive 3000.05, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 
(CEW) is “a subset of the DoD civilian workforce to be ‘organized, trained, cleared, 
equipped, and ready to deploy in support of combat operations by the military; 
contingencies; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug 
interdiction; and stability operations’”. It is intended to provide IT managers and 
“intelligence specialists providing technical and IT support to intelligence personnel 
on U.S. bases in theater”.409 The CEW and the in-sourcing initiative410 were the only 
two initiatives explicated under the heading of developing the total force. This 
indicates that the CEW and the insourcing initiative introduced with the FY2010 
budget were either planned together or two separate results of a mild backlash 
against the contracting out of military support services.411 The insourcing initiative 
was stopped after only a year for not having created the intended savings,412 although 
it may be doubtful that it was realistic to expect such savings to materialise within 
one year as such reforms require initial investment. The AFGE argues that the 
                                                             
408 US DOD, 2010 QDR, pp. xiii, 55-56. 
409 Quoted in Molly Dunigan (2012), Considerations for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce: 
Preparing to Operate Amidst Private Security Contractors (Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; 
Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation), pp. 1, 3. 
410 See the memo by the then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (2009), “In-Sourcing Contracted Services – Implementation Guidance,” 28 




411 It is not possible to ascertain whether the temporal overlap is a coincidence or indicative of 
a trend at that time. Personal correspondence with Dr Molly Dunigan. Political Scientist at the 
RAND Corporation (10 October 2012). 
412 Robert Brodsky (2010), “Pentagon abandons Insourcing Effort,” in Government Executive 
(10 August 2010), accessed 5 March 2013, available at 
http://www.govexec.com/defense/2010/08/pentagon-abandons-insourcing-effort/32111/. 
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Secretary’s comments about the lack of savings were misrepresented by contractors. 
Gates had noted that overall contract spending, especially in logistics, had increased 
despite insourcing. The AFGE concluded that “Secretary Gates’ remarks actually damn 
the ever-escalating costs of services contracting.”413 
As with other outsourcing-related policy clashes, the insourcing initiative 
witnessed the same range of actors on the political battlefield. Jacques S. Gansler and 
William Lucyshyn critically evaluated the government's insourcing drive. They 
argued for government to withdraw from providing non-inherently governmental 
goods and services to managing their provision by private providers (or public 
providers if they won a competition against the private sector).414 For Gansler this 
issue ties in with what he considers a non-workable definition of inherently-
governmental functions.415 The wider debate about the US government’s reliance on 
contractors also involved an open letter sent by 26 Democratic senators to Secretary 
Panetta expressing concern about cutbacks in civilian personnel without parallel 
reductions in the contractor workforce. POGO’s Scott Amey, the PSC’s Mr Soloway’s, 
and another trade group also weighed into the debate in the media, whereas public 
sector unions were absent.416 
The issue has not died down since; DOD is still working on insourcing some 
functions but rather than focus explicitly on insourcing it is now concerned with 
                                                             
413 American Federation of Government Employees (2011), “Insourcing Backgrounder”, 
accessed 14 July 2013, available at 
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414 See Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn (2010), “The Dangers of Over Insourcing: 
Finding Higher Performance at Lower Cost,” in Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol. 
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the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Defense Science 
Board (2011), “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services 
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416 See Charles S. Clark (2012), “Lawmakers Challenge the Pentagon's Reliance on Service 
Contractors,” in Government Executive (26 April 2012), and  
 Stan Soloway (2010), “Letter to The Honorable Scott Brown, United States Senate,” 08 
October 2010 (Arlington, VA), accessed 3 March 2013, available at 
www.pscouncil.org/PolicyIssues/Insourcing/InsourcingIssues/Letter_to_Sen_Brown_.aspx. 
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continuing the “Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Initiative”, i.e. take an 
ostensibly apolitical and business practice-like approach. This is applauded by the 
PSC which hopes that DOD will cease insourcing non-critical tasks,417 by implication 
leaving them to the market. The insourcing initiative thus did not substantially 
question the highly pervasive role played by industry in the US defence enterprise. 
 
The public debates above were led by a limited range of “thought leaders”. 
The list of policy issues could be expanded at will to cover numerous other related 
examples, for instance the evergreen issue of the “50-50 Rule” in US law that states 
that no more than half of depot maintenance funds may be expended on private 
sector work.418 The surveyed examples however suffice. They touched on issues 
which directly and critically affect the government’s longer-term practice of acquiring 
contracted services and products by affecting whether to outsource, on which basis to 
make this decision, as well as key aspects of ongoing outsourcing policy and practice. 
By activating key actors and stakeholders, their arguments, and beliefs, we can map 
the network and thus draw several conclusions in section IV.2. 
                                                             
417 See the memo U.S. Department of Defense, Offices of the Under Secretaries of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and of the Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer (2011), 
“Continuation of Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Initiative,” 15 March 2011 
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IV. 1. ii. The UK: Advising, Informing, and Lobbying on Defence 
Services Acquisition Policy 
The processes of advising, informing, and lobbying the UK government on 
defence services acquisition policy are remarkably less public, salient, and 
transparent than they are in the USA. Even FOI requests on non-security related 
outsourcing practices and examples are responded to reluctantly if at all.419 While UK 
foreign and defence policy-making are renowned for their secrecy, seclusion, and 
informality as it was,420 its recent outsourcing policies, practices, and plans were 
practically invisible to the public and conducted mostly on an ad hoc, by-invitation-
only basis as the following sections demonstrate. This may be either a cause or 
consequence of the lack of critical scrutiny into the sweeping outsourcing of defence 
in the UK that Uttley observed in 2005, a lack that is especially obvious when 
compared to the USA.421 At the heart of this variance is the different role, salience, and 
level of activism of the UK Parliament which cannot control specific policy issues 
whereas Congress can block individual “line items” in both individual acquisition bills 
or larger authorisations such as the NDAA. The different roles and prerogatives of the 
legislatures are in fact a central explanatory factor for the variance that exists 
between the USA and the UK. In sum, as the below testifies, the strong tendency to 
informality, coupled with a near-absence of salient public bodies, debate, or venues of 
public-private interaction (“private” here not being limited to industry but covering 
the entire non-state domain) is a defining element of the defence policy process in the 
UK and subsequently of research into it. 
                                                             
419 See below for several citations of unanswered or incompletely answered FOI requests. 
420 See for instance the former Assistant Under Secretary of State for Policy Hopkinson, Making 
British Defence, p. 22, or former Chief of Defence Procurement McIntosh, Managing Britain's 
Defence, p. 62. 
421 Uttley, Contractors on Deployed Military Operations, p. 1. 
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MOD Advisory Boards 
“Expertism”, as McIntosh calls the propensity for seeking expert advice by 
civil servants and government ministries, is a defining feature of UK policy-making. In 
defence policy in particular, given the technological sophistication of weapon systems 
and the mostly humanistic background of civil servants, advice and counsel are 
sought to make sound acquisition decisions.422 Unlike in the USA, however, there 
appears to exist only one standing advisory board in the UK MOD: the Defence 
Scientific Advisory Council (DSAC).423 DSAC provides primarily scientific input with 
an eye for the development of future capability in the UK, in the context of R&D 
spending and the funding or defunding of specific production lines.424 According to its 
website, its reports are intended to make an impact; the only report that was 
available online (as of 1 March 2013 through a Google search, not the council’s 
website which does not list any publications) was a joint report published with the 
DSB in the USA on the DSB’s website.425 As the board and its members must “be 
accountable to Parliament and the public more generally for its activities and for the 
standard of advice it provides”,426 the absence of publicly available reports strongly 
indicates that the board’s main addressees sit primarily in the MOD. Nonetheless, its 
membership indicates that the advice of DSAC is predominantly academic since most 
members are scholars and only one or two at any one time have relevant industry 
experience. 
                                                             
422 McIntosh, Managing Britain's Defence, p. 67. 
423 UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Scientific Advisory Council, “Membership,” accessed 25 
January 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-
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Technical Advice and Public Consultations 
Technical advice and input into government and MOD deliberations occur 
mostly on an ad hoc basis and are not public, typically by invitation only, and 
conducted at the interface of government, trade groups, and industry. In other words, 
the kind of formal, regularised, and continuous work that RAND conducts in the USA –
 which already relies heavily on informality – is one further step removed from the 
public eye in the UK as it is not government policy to publicise working groups. Public 
consultations, on the other hand, are open to comment from all sides. As the below 
shows, such consultations however rarely feature credible and prominent input from 
actors outside industry. This is at least in part so because almost nobody outside the 
defence industry has the relevant experience of interacting with the official parts of 
the defence enterprise, let alone in the regularity that industry enjoys. In total, across 
the hierarchy and throughout the process cooperation and conversations are the 
closest and most continuous between government and generally pro-contracting 
advocates. The evidence presented here focuses on broader acquisition issues, while 
chapter VI examines logistics-related consultancy more specifically. 
To begin with, contractors provide technical input to the military in 
operational theatres where they provide services, as well as at the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ) where employees working under the Contractors on Deployed 
Operations policy (CONDO) and large logistics contracts such as Operational Support 
Capability Contract (OSCC; currently held by KBR, formerly Contractor Logistics 
(CONLOG)), are embedded.427 PJHQ occupies a central space between on-the-ground 
services provision on the one hand and top-level policy-making regarding the supply 
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of military operations on the other.428 A request filed under FOIA, asking for “logs and 
transcripts (if recorded) of the visits by Supreme Group UK, KBR, Serco, and DHL at 
the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Logistics Operations (ACDS (LogOps)), DE&S, 
and PJHQ for the years 2001-2013” was refused on the grounds that it would exceed 
the permissible cost of dealing with FOI requests, as it would take an estimated 60 
work hours to retrieve the requested information.429 While the statistics may not be 
known at this time, Mr Gordon Lane, former Managing Director Defence and Director 
Land at ADS called the relationship with ACDS (LogOps) and PJHQ “one of the best 
examples of close industry-MOD cooperation,”430 suggesting that the FOI request 
would have produced a long list of entries. 
Given CONDO’s wide remit, its own management and further development 
are logical targets of industry and a locus of government-industry cooperation. Mr 
Richard Hamber, when interviewed for this study, served as Deputy Head of Defence 
Logistics Strategy and Policy at the MOD and worked under the ACDS (LogOps). In 
this function he was central to editing CONDO policy.431 That process underscores the 
centrality of private sector input and the role of industry trade groups. According to 
Hamber, the day-to-day working relationship between ACDS and contractors is very 
collegial. Regarding CONDO policy, the main point of contact is through the trade 
association Aerospace, Defence, and Security (ADS). “Only today, for instance, [ADS’s] 
                                                             
428 Its logistics division is responsible for the logistic aspects of planning, sustaining, and 
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Deployed Operations (CONDO) Processes and Requirements, p. 1. 
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431 Telephone interview with Richard Hamber. 
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man was on our floor” discussing various CONDO policy issues, with ADS’s role being 
to bring its members’ interests to bear.432 
ADS and individual companies are also central to the design, development, 
and implementation of other large-scale policy changes. An open day in 2012 on the 
Total Support Force (TSF) – discussed in detail in chapter VI – featured ADS, some of 
its member companies, OEMs, and various service providers. “There is no closed door 
to any provider. Industry will take every opportunity to try and influence those 
decisions to deliver for industry a better outcome.”433 This author personally 
observed a similar event in late 2012 that was organised by an academic institution 
and aimed at bringing together private practitioners and government to discuss and 
move forward with the TSF.434 By that time, the TSF had become so broadly accepted 
that the agenda was concerned with its improvement and public-private integration, 
with little discussion about its viability or basic tenets. 
The same process and observations apply to more specific issues of defence 
services acquisition that are smaller in scope and significance than CONDO or the TSF. 
Logistics company DHL, for instance, is routinely and proactively approached by the 
MOD to provide input to working groups and projects by virtue of being the world’s 
largest logistics company that manages and maintains its own fleet of trucks, planes, 
and ships, and transports gigantic volumes of cargo around the world.435 While it is 
not approached specifically about whether or not to outsource, the MOD seeks input 
based on other government contracts DHL holds, specifically with the National Health 
Service. As with the industry days mentioned earlier, such consultancies are not 
permanent, generally informal, and often facilitated by ADS. Moreover, as Mr Paul 
Glanville, a Vice President for Major Projects at DHL Supply Chain put it, “we go to all 
                                                             
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 As I attended this event on short notice, I could not obtain explicit approval by all 
participants to provide more identifiable details about the event or the participants. 
435 Telephone interview with Paul Glanville. Vice President for Major Projects at DHL Supply 
Chain (21 November 2012). 
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of the usual conferences and other events. ... I have been approached directly by 
individuals within the MOD whether we would support them and provide them with 
information and our opinion.”436 
But it is not only government that is proactive in seeking advice from 
industry; industry and its advocates are just as proactive in reiterating to holders of 
public office what the private sector can do, and this is typically much more than it is 
currently providing the government.437 Some companies’ business development 
divisions develop contracting vehicles similar to CONLOG and pitch them to PJHQ, 
DE&S, or ACDS (LogOps) depending on who the most appropriate addressee is. 
Others use their opportunities of engaging with the MOD to “shape their thinking 
about what they want or need” in such a way that advantages their employer in a 
potential future contract competition.438 It is reasonable to assume that advice on 
business practices, especially from successful and large companies, is highly likely to 
lead government to opt for a business source (if that decision had not already been 
taken) regardless of whether that advice was given in a formal or informal setting and 
whether it concerns a specific service or business practices more generally. As 
Hamber points out, industry attempts to gain access and provide input at all levels, 
however, “there is no set venue whereby we open the doors to the market. It is almost 
an uncoordinated approach in terms of the proactive suggestions.”439 Moreover, many 
defence services and equipment firms employ retired military officers who provide 
advice to ministers. Given their intimate knowledge of ongoing government 
deliberations, they often approach ministers and others in government and, “based 
on their experience, say ‘this is what we think you will be doing next – let us help you 
                                                             
436 Ibid. 
437 This point was made by numerous interviewees, most clearly perhaps in a telephone 
interview with Richard Hamber. 
438 Personal interviews with anonymous. Senior and Mid-Level UK Industry Sources (2013). 
439 Telephone interview with Richard Hamber. 
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plan and proceed.’”440 Industry’s proactive input is thus broadly informed by earlier 
declarations of government, and typically serves to reinforce and enable 
government’s views while steering them in an industry-friendly direction. 
On this relatively policy-specific level, there are no NGOs or other actors 
interested in government oversight; the UK has no equivalent to POGO that 
scrutinises MOD decision-making. Hamber’s explanation underscores the 
technicalisation and relative depoliticisation of this kind of acquisition decisions. “It is 
not politicised, not out in the open. The formal conclusion is technical, about 
contractual discourse, and eventually closing a contract through a process of 
competition.”441 Other experts concur, with former ACDS (LogOps) Maj. Gen. (ret) 
David Shouesmith saying that “overall there are rather few who are sufficiently 
knowledgeable and credible” regarding defence acquisition policy other than the 
National Audit Office or the think tank RUSI.442 Much like advisory boards in the USA, 
therefore, this process in the UK is defined by informality, a greater lack of salience 
and accessibility to outsiders, and a common-sense targeting of industry 
representatives for expert knowledge. While the absence of potential veto-players 
and the highly technical nature of the process may be unsurprising at this level, the 
following evidence shows that the same is also the case in public consultations and 
strategic defence review processes. 
While the above concerned relatively policy-specific issues, the same 
observations apply to the higher strategic level of defence services acquisition policy 
in the UK. First, MOD regularly publishes Green Papers and invites comments from 
the public before the papers are revised and published as White Papers. A good 
                                                             
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Personal interview (2013) with David Shouesmith. The point was confirmed in a personal 
interview with Maj. Gen. (ret) Jeff Mason and Col. (ret) David Wiggins. respectively Former 
ACDS (LogOps), now Commercial Director Europe and Commonwealth at Supreme Group UK, 
and Business Development Manager, Supreme Group Europe. Supreme Group UK Offices, 
London (16 July 2013). 
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example is the MOD’s White Paper on “National Security through Technology” from 
2012,443 that was preceded by a consultation paper.444 The White Paper repeatedly 
stresses the importance of technology in the “support to current defence and security 
operations”, and establishes and reaffirms policies that are centred on the market and 
that target civilian industry’s innovation and products.445 The accompanying 
consultation paper notes that “[as] might be expected, the largest grouping amongst 
those responding was associated in some way with the supply of defence security 
products and services.”446 Moreover, confirming the above, industry’s “responses 
overwhelmingly argued that the private sector could play a greater role in providing 
defence support across all lines of development.”447 The summary of consultation 
events and the list of stakeholders involved affirms the close contact between 
government departments, companies, and trade associations, while labour, for 
instance, is not mentioned once.448 While some of the events listed were publicised on 
the Defence Consultations website and invitations were extended to members of the 
public who had demonstrated their interest in the consultation,449 many other similar 
consultation events would not be advertised publicly. 
It may not be surprising that industry is very present and active in 
consultation papers on topics such as technology in national security. This is a domain 
in which industry is heavily involved in research, development, production, and the 
supply of the armed forces. The same however also applies to comprehensive 
consultations and government reviews such as the 2010 Strategic Defence and 
Security Review. A House of Commons Defence Committee Report noted one month 
                                                             
443 See UK MOD, Technology White Paper. 
444 See UK Ministry of Defence (2012), Equipment, Support, and Technology for UK Defence and 
Security: a Consultation Paper, Cm 8277 (London: The Stationery Office). 
445 UK MOD, Technology White Paper, pp. 16, 20. 
446 UK MOD, Equipment, Support, and Technology Consultation Paper, p. 5. 
447 Ibid, p. 11. 
448 Ibid, p. 6. 
449 Ibid. 
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before the SDSR’s publication that “[there] has been limited consultation this time.”450 
Underscoring RUSI’s place in UK defence strategic discourse, then-Secretary of 
Defence Liam Fox gave a speech at the think tank on 14 June 2010 on the ongoing 
SDSR process,451 while it was not undergoing significant debate elsewhere. The few 
elaborate comments that were made during the consultation period were made by 
industry, underscoring that even when given the opportunity, civil society 
organisations and even most think tanks do not engage in defence policy with 
remotely the same insistence as on policy issues where the population is the more 
obvious and direct “consumer”, such as education or health policy. More pressingly, 
there is no way to ascertain if any potentially valuable comments made online by 
individual interested members of the public would be able to have any noticeable 
effect on top-level defence strategy.452 This is especially obvious when compared to 
the potential impact of dedicated consultation workshops and conferences. As Mr 
Hamber pointed out, the government explicitly sought industry’s input into its 
deliberations; the government’s decision to open up the MOD to contractorisation of 
support responsibilities, announced in the 2010 SDSR, was thus informed by industry 
in a broader sense. The government is being very forward leaning, asking industry to 
suggest areas in which it can take over responsibilities from the military453 and to 
consult government “on the art of the possible, which was then reflected in the White 
Paper.”454 As noted earlier, industry’s insights into the daily concerns of government 
are very detailed, as Mr Lane confirms: “if we do not recognise what appears in a 
Green Paper and it is the first time we have seen those issues or those points raised, 
                                                             
450 UK House, Defence Committee, SDSR, First Report, p. 6. 
451 Fox, “Speech: SDSR”. 
452 Cf. the SDSR’s online consultation: UK Ministry of Defence, “Adaptability and Partnership: 
Issues for the Strategic Defence Review,” accessed 29 January 2014, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100905104116/http://www.defenceconsultati
ons.org.uk/. 
453 Personal interview with Gordon Lane. 
454 Telephone interview with Richard Hamber. 
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then I think we would feel something has gone wrong.”455 A Green Paper, it should be 
noted, is merely the basis of the subsequent debate, not the final, policy-setting 
report. Industry is thus intimately informed and generally involved in the process that 
frames the fundamentals of the debate. 
With veto-points barely existing, potential veto-players are again broadly 
absent from these deliberations, especially as the oft-noted military resistance to 
change and contractorisation has dissipated in light of the experiences of Iraq and 
Afghanistan where the UK military would have been unable to operate without 
private sector services.456 It is thus the knowhow, information, workforce, and access 
to decision-makers that makes industry the pre-eminent actor besides the 
government executive in informing defence services acquisition policy, 
corresponding to the technological, ideational, and economic drivers of outsourcing 
more generally. The continuous conversation between, for instance, ADS and the 
MOD testifies to this fact. The following data underscores that access to decision-
makers is a privilege of exactly those actors holding the most highly valued resources, 
much like in the USA. It is therefore their input that is potentially most influential in 
shaping and informing those with the singular, politically most relevant resource: 
formal decision-making power, especially the defence leadership whose decisions 
were shown to have tremendous direct influence on the entire defence enterprise 
down to the lowest levels. 
Interest Group Politics, Lobbying, and Access to the Defence Leadership 
As noted, the leadership of the government executive is of central importance 
to this enquiry because of their formal decision-making power and because longer-
term trends are decided and/or formalised there. While there are some forms of non-
                                                             
455 Personal interview with Gordon Lane. 
456 Afghanistan and Iraq had a tremendous effect in breaking the military’s resistance to 
reorganisation and contractorisation of the military force structure and the competencies it 
retained in-house. Personal interview with Jeff Mason and telephone interview with Richard 
Hamber.  
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enforceable self-regulation, in particular codes of conduct, lobbying in the UK is not 
subject to external regulation.457 Data on lobbying, in particular spending, is therefore 
severely limited in the UK.458 Beginning in 2010, the government however started 
publishing lists of external visits to ministers and senior MOD officials that 
underscore industry’s privileged nature of access to the defence leadership.459 
Despite its limitations this data provides significant support to the findings presented 
above. Data on visits to ministers and to senior staff is visualised below; the following 
first discusses the findings. 
First, the ministers whose external visitors are listed are mostly the Defence 
Secretary, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the Minister of Defence 
Equipment, Support, and Technology, the Minister for International Security Strategy 
(the latter three listed as Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State in 2010), and the 
Minister for Defence Personnel, Welfare, and Veterans (whose number of external 
visits significantly increased over time). For the first months, many were 
“introductory meetings”, understandable as the government had just taken office. 
Over time, several companies’ “purpose of meeting” became “routine call”, among 
them BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, KBR, General Dynamics, EADS, Raytheon, and ADS. 
Secondly, most visits with organisations which are non-profit or not primarily 
for-profit were held by the Minister for Defence Personnel, Welfare, and Veterans, 
and usually involved veterans’ associations or other defence-related charities, while 
most media meetings were held by the Defence Secretary. These meetings’ share 
increased considerably in 2013, quite possibly as a result of the winding down of 
operations in Afghanistan and the growing concern for the future of military welfare 
                                                             
457 UK House of Commons, Public Administration Select Committee (2009), Lobbying: Access 
and Influence in Whitehall, First Report of Session 2008-09, HC 36-1, Vol. I (London: The 
Stationery Office), pp. 16–17. 
458 It should be noted that in the USA, although much more data is available, lobbying 
disclosure forms only give minimum details on the issues discussed during lobby visits, such 
as “contracting-related issues in NDAA draft resolution” rather than the specific interest or 
objective a given lobbyist is tasked with convincing their public sector counterpart of. 
459 Gov.uk, “Ministers' Meetings”, and Gov.uk, “Senior Staff Meetings”. 
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and other veterans’ issues in the face of steep defence budget cuts. Union meetings, if 
they occurred at all, were usually held with the Minister for Defence Equipment, 
Support, and Technology. 
Finally, except for the very few meetings with trade unions, no other societal 
or other veto players of relevance to defence policy, acquisition, or outsourcing are 
listed as having met the top ranks of the MOD. 
Meetings with members of the private sector represent the vast majority, 
averaging at 72.4% for ministers and 91.6% for senior staff (in particular permanent 
secretaries, the Chief of Defence Materiel, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and 
several other “3* and 4*” civilians and military officers), in the latter case however 
excluding media interviews and meetings. The defence leadership, it follows, is 
overwhelmingly closely in touch with its equipment and services providers on the top 
leadership levels of the MOD, while the middle levels were shown earlier to routinely 
seek advice from and consult with private sector organisations in the daily running 
and reforming of the MOD. The data below provides further support for the argument 
that the defence enterprise increasingly displays a structural “bias towards business.” 
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Type of External 
Organisation  
















May-July 2010 1 8 23 32 71.9 
Aug.-Sept. 2010 1 3 18 22 81.8 
Oct.-Dec. 2010 1 2 34 37 91.9 
Jan.-Mar. 2011 1 13 39 53 73.6 
Apr.-June 2011 0 13 40 53 75.5 
July-Sep. 2011 0 11 23 34 67.7 
Oct.-Dec. 2011 2 9 24 35 68.6 
Jan.-Mar. 2012 1 21 37 59 62.7 
April-June 2012 1 7 28 36 77.8 
July-Sep. 2012 0 7 29 36 80.6 
Oct.-Dec. 2012 3 8 25 36 69.4 
Jan-Mar. 2013 0 19 35 54 64.8 
Apr.-June 2013 0 25 30 55 54.5 
Table 4.1: Ministerial Meetings (MOD) with External Organisations and Individuals. The 
division into unions, charities et al, and industry et al was done by the author. 
 
Data source: UK Ministry of Defence.460 
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of visits by external organisations and individuals to MOD 
ministers and defence secretary. Columns are total numbers, line is in percent. 
                                                             
460 Gov.uk, “Ministers' Gifts, Hospitality, Travel and Meetings: Transparency Data,” accessed 15 
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Type of External 
Organisation  
















Oct.-Dec. 2010 0 1 10 11 90.9 
Jan.-Mar. 2011 0 4 23 27 85.2 
Apr.-June 2011 0 0 10 10 100 
July-Sep. 2011 0 0 10 10 100 
Oct.-Dec. 2011 0 1 13 14 92.9 
Jan.-Mar. 2012 0 0 35 35 100 
April-June 2012 0 8 48 56 85.7 
July-Sep. 2012 0 18 87 105 82.9 
Oct.-Dec. 2012 0 4 77 81 95.1 
Jan-Mar. 2013 0 10 55 65 84.6 
Apr.-June 2013 0 11 107 118 90.7 
Table 4.2: Senior Staff Meetings (MOD) with External Organisations and Individuals. The 
division into unions, charities et al, and industry et al was done by the author. 
 




Figure 4.2: Distribution of visits by external organisations and individuals to MOD senior 
staff. Columns are total numbers, line is in percent. 
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IV. 2.  The Structure of the Defence Services Acquisition Policy 
Networks in the USA and the UK 
Based on the observations above, this chapter now turns to mapping the US 
and UK defence services acquisition policy networks (visualised at the end of this 
section), and then to deducing the networks’ structure, sectoralisation, and system 
integration. Internally, the networks’ structures are defined by the advocacy 
coalitions and their relative distribution of power, while on their margins the 
networks are defined by their ‘place’ in the wider context of government policy, 
especially their autonomy from or penetrability to external forces. Collectively, these 
dimensions heavily determine the future trajectory of defence policy-making as they 
delineate the internal and external avenues of continuity and change. As the next 
sections show, both networks display a “bias towards business” that is manifested in 
the admission, the composition, and the likely trajectories of the networks. The high 
end of defence services acquisition policy is thus unlikely to experience significant 
change in the foreseeable future. 
IV. 2. i. Advocacy Coalitions and the Distribution of Resources 
The defence services acquisition policy networks each comprise two relevant 
advocacy coalitions; first, a group that advocates a profitable, healthy, and sizeable 
defence-industrial base, a core competency military and government, and 
comprehensive contractorisation of non-inherently governmental functions; and 
secondly one that is critical of defence services acquisition and spending practices, 
that argues for tighter oversight and good governance, but that – except for some 
labour unions – does not take a principled stand against contracting as such. 
Notable through their relative absence in either of the coalitions are political 
parties as collective organisations, as well as civil society actors as outlets for public 
opinion. Neither appears to have a tangible effect on the continuous, day-to-day 
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workings and realignments of defence, or even on the general course of foreign and 
defence policy.462 The coalition resource ‘public opinion’ can therefore rightly be 
dismissed for being insignificant; the negligible number of non-mainstream 
comments on Green Papers in the UK or on government studies in the USA testifies to 
this assessment, and will receive further support by the evidence presented in later 
chapters. 
Moreover, the military has been shown to be of significantly reduced 
relevance in acquisition decisions. As Gholz and Sapolsky showed, the military’s 
relative loss of expertise was accompanied by the growth of knowhow of the private 
sector and industry’s resulting significant influence on acquisition.463 At the same 
time, the military’s resistance to change and contractorisation more specifically was 
shown to have been broken by the experience of relying on contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
These observations are critical to the wider issue of an apparent lack of 
credible and powerful potential veto-players. 
The Pro-Contracting Coalition 
The first coalition, as noted, aims for a profitable, healthy, sizeable, and ideally 
expanding defence-industrial base, and simultaneously advocates for the 
entrepreneurial ideals that drove the evolution of the US and UK defence enterprises 
since the 1960s: managerialism, best business practices, and technological 
superiority that lead to core competency and sweeping contractorisation. Regarding 
                                                             
462 In foreign and defence policy, probably more so than in every other policy domain, states 
and governments go to great lengths to stress traditions and continuity. In sharp contrast to 
social policies such education, health, or infrastructure, even weighty issues such as the “pivot” 
to the Pacific which is seen by many as heralding a new Cold War between the USA and China 
have not elicited social or even parliamentary protest of any significance. On disinterest see 
e.g. Rothkopf, Running the World, pp. 3–5, Self, British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945, 
pp. 255–259, or Hopkinson, Making British Defence, pp. 92–94. 
 On the favouring of producers over consumers by democratic governments, see Hartley, 
Economics of Defence Policy, pp. 88–89. 
463 Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky (1999/2000), “Restructuring the U.S. 
Defense Industry,” in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 5–51, at p. 16. 
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ideas and beliefs, this coalition is generally biased towards industry and against 
government as service providers, with the ill-defined border of ‘inherently 
governmental’ being the only limit. Among its fundamental beliefs are the conviction 
that business is generally more efficient and effective at providing services, and that 
government should generally avoid competing with citizens for work. It was shown to 
be exceptionally successful in the policy fights that it participates in. 
This coalition’s membership – besides the defence industry itself – comprises 
industry groups such as the National Defense Industrial Association and the PSC in 
the USA or ADS in the UK, specialised best business advocates such as BENS, and 
selected think tanks such as the Lexington Institute,464 or CSIS (to a lesser degree).465 
It also comprises individuals such as Jacques Gansler who served in government, 
industry, and now academia and is widely acknowledged as a leading expert on 
acquisition matters.466 Advisory boards in the USA and the various task groups in the 
UK also generally fall into this camp as they have been shown to display an 
institutional bias towards applying business solutions; this is in fact the formal 
function of the DBB. Finally, this coalition includes the vast number of consultancies 
who – more often than not staffed with former members of Congress, the government 
bureaucracy, or their staffers – specifically target defence acquisition policies. They 
                                                             
464 Lexington’s Vice President, Dr Daniel Gouré, argued that industry does not have a voice 
among think tanks in Washington, D.C. when it comes to acquisition, logistics, and services. 
Therefore, “we are its voice.” Personal interview with Daniel Gouré. 
465 While other think tanks or institutions may also participate in acquisition and contracting-
related debates, the leadership is mostly composed of the named actors. For instance, the 
Lexington Institute’s Daniel Gouré and Loren Thompson, and the PSC’s Stan Soloway are 
quoted almost on a daily basis by specialist and political publications in Washington, D.C. such 
as Politico, The Hill, Government Executive, and numerous others. 
466 Gansler’s membership in this coalition is illustrated for instance in his assertion in 2009 
that there was a “global war on contractors”. Cf. Elizabeth Newell Jochum (2009), “Former 
Defense Acquisition Chief Warns against 'Global War on Contractors',” in Government 




advertise their employees’ personal experience and connection to the various 
institutions of government and centres of power.467 
Those who work full-time towards furthering the goals of their coalition are 
particularly noteworthy. Lobbyists in the USA, for instance, are not only numerous, 
but they participate intimately in the drafting of legislation. They leverage their 
knowledge of and deep links into congressional networks of staffers and lawmakers 
with whom they view themselves as forming one policy-making community. Politico 
quotes a defence lobbyist as saying that “I'm working so hard on [the NDAA], but 
                                                             
467 Cf. CREW, Revolving Door. 
 The Pentagon in 1996 stopped keeping records and statistics about former civilian and 
military officials who were hired by private contractors, which had previously been a legal 
requirement. See Dina Rasor and Robert Bauman (2007), Betraying Our Troops: the Destructive 
Results of Privatizing War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 171. The repeal of this law 
coincided with the rapid acceleration of military contractorisation. Researchers therefore have 
to rely on NGOs such as CREW (cited above) or, for instance, Open Secrets. 
 A search on the revolving door database at Open Secrets demonstrates how a vast number 
of former government employees move in and out of the private sector. When following up on 
a random sample of consultancies mentioned there, without exception these consultancies 
praise the combined experience of their staff “on the Hill” as operating as door-openers to 
government and agencies for their prospective clients. Access to decision-makers, as was 
argued in chapter I, therefore clearly functions as its own resource in this network, not only 
the membership of government individuals who can take binding decisions. See Open Secrets, 
“Top Agencies,” accessed 30 January 2014, available at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=G for individuals by department; 
and Open Secrets, “Top Lobbying Firms,” accessed 30 January 2014, available at 
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=F for the lobbying firms and 
consultancies with the highest number of former government employees. 
 This applies to five of the largest such firms which were selected here randomly and which 
work on national security issues: Akin Gump et al, Cassidy and Associates, Van Scoyoc 
Associates, Covington and Burling, and The Spectrum Group. Their pitches read “Our Access 
begins with our members – true leaders in their fields, who have served at the highest levels of 
the military, government and industry” (Spectrum Group, “About Us,” accessed 30 January 
2014, available at http://www.spectrumgrp.com/about-us), “Members of our team have years 
of senior U.S. government experience: Members of Congress who served on the House 
Appropriations and Armed Services and Senate Foreign Relations committees, Chief of Staff to 
the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Director, 
National Security Council” (Akin Gump, “Experience: National Security,” accessed 30 January 
2014, available at http://www.akingump.com/en/experience/industries/national-
security/index.html), “Our team includes hands on experts with substantial experience in 
national security and the intricate procedures related to Congress and the Executive Branch” 
(Cassidy, “National Security and Defense,” accessed 30 January 2014, available at 
http://www.cassidy.com/industries/30/), “We have over 150 years of combined national 
security experience in the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government and private 
industry” (Van Scoyoc, “Practice Areas: Defense,” accessed 30 January 2014, available at 
http://www.vsadc.com/practices/defense/), or “Many of our senior lawyers and 
professionals have served in key homeland and national security positions, including former 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff” (Covington and Burling, “Practices, 
Industries & Regions: Defense, Homeland & National Security,” accessed 30 January 2014, 
available at http://www.cov.com/industry/defense_homeland_and_national_security/). 
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every time I lift my head up, it's another report on Benghazi or Petraeus. I'm still 
laser-focused on NDAA. There's a consensus among staff and members that there will 
be a bill done. I think it is still in a good place.”468 Yet closer to policy formulation, Akin 
Gump points out that “[many] members of our team have Top Secret security 
clearances to handle even the highest-level transactions.”469 The quotes above about 
the constant conversation of ADS with the UK government, and its certainty to know 
the contents even of Green Papers before they are published, indicate that principally 
the same – albeit on a smaller scale – is also the case in the UK.470 As quoted earlier, 
McIntosh, the former chief of defence procurement pointed out in 1992 that the MOD 
“recognises an obligation to keep industry as well acquainted as possible with [its] 
future requirements, to enable industry to make informed decisions about the 
direction of its business. Ministers have made clear their commitment to this 
policy”471 which meant that the government had to be responsive to the needs of 
industry. In 1991, regarding individual projects, “most companies [knew] as much as 
there [was] to know about the status of projects in which they [had] an interest 
through informal contacts with staffs in the procurement executive and in operational 
requirements.”472 
This coalition was shown to hold substantial amounts of all resources that are 
relevant to the drivers of military outsourcing: it has access to the industry’s vast 
financial resources; it owns or represents the technical, technological, and best 
business information, knowhow, and technologies that were shown to be valued most 
                                                             
468 Mak, “Defense industry cautiously upbeat”. Advocating particular sections of the NDAA is 
common practice; see above on commercial items and the descriptions of measuring success 
(small parts of legislation getting passed or blocked), and below in chapter VI on performance-
based logistics in the 2013 NDAA. 
 He is referring to the simultaneous public attention to an attack on the U.S. consulate in 
Benghazi, Libya, and Gen. (ret.) David Petraeus’ extramarital affair. 
469 Akin Gump, “Experience”. The sample companies in footnote 467 also advertise to 
prospective clients such successes and participations in policy formulation and introducing 
client products, concerns, and input to government. 
470 Cf. personal interview with Gordon Lane. 
471 McIntosh, “Defence Procurement Policy”, p. 74. 
472 Ibid. 
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in the network, and has the means to circulate them widely; it comprises or is in 
regular close contact with individuals and organisations that hold formal decision-
making authority; and it has highly effective leaderships and the necessary manpower 
resources to cover the entire political spectrum from leaderships to staffers and those 
implementing policy on the ground. This is reinforced by the high turnover of 
individuals rotating between private sector and government jobs.473 Interviewees in 
both countries routinely relayed stories of incidents in which government officials 
refer to private sector employees as “Sir” because they had previously been their 
commanding officer.474 
By means of illustration, it is worth relaying the case of Mr Soloway to grasp 
the scope of the phenomenon of imbalanced access. Not only is the PSC routinely 
invited to participate in advisory board studies by DOD as noted earlier; Mr Soloway 
also noted that he personally has discussions at higher levels, with the Deputy Chiefs 
at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior Army leaders (especially at Army Materiel 
Command), and that he has worked closely with the inspectors general, the oversight 
community, the Government Accountability Office, and “certain think tanks, 
particularly the CSIS who had a number of programmes on post-conflict resolution 
that Rick Barton led, he is now Assistance Secretary of State.”475 Mr Soloway 
moreover had a personal relationship with the then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
“and that was true also of his predecessor.” Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash 
Carter had been to the PSC twice to speak to the group’s members, had conducted a 
roundtable together with his USD (AT&L) shortly before our interview, and had also 
participated in meetings that included the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, the USD 
                                                             
473 For some of the more noteworthy cases of how Pentagon contractors strategically hire 
former members and advisers of government, which can lead to contractors effectively taking 
over a portfolio from a federal agency, see Isenberg, Shadow Force, pp. 63–66. 
 Contractors in the UK also highlight their acquisition of military expertise by hiring retired 
officers. See e.g. Supreme Group, “Client Sectors: Supreme UK,” accessed 30 January 2014, 
available at http://www.supreme-group.net/client-sectors/supreme-uk. 
474 See e.g. telephone interview with Paul Glanville. 
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(AT&L), the PSC, and other actors – “about thirty altogether.”476 Given the noted time 
pressures in the executive leadership, and the necessity of “going where the 
substance is”, Soloway assumes that these top-level interactions occur because the 
defence leadership wants it known to PSC-members as well as the public that it is 
concerned with the effects of defence budget cuts “because there are other forces out 
there.”477 As chapter VI shows, the same is also fundamentally true in the UK, where 
ADS, for instance, is engaged not only in continuous conversation as was outlined 
above, but also engages in task groups on specific policy implementation.478 
The PSC and other organisations’ approach is very strategic. PSC targets the 
thought leadership – that it belongs to itself – to eventually “impact policy”. This 
operates for instance by collaborating with think tanks, the media, or senior executive 
and legislative officials. The organisation’s leaders Mr Soloway and Mr Chvotkin also 
published, for instance, a well-argued chapter on federal contracting in a much-cited 
edited volume published by Harvard University Press.479 The PSC also focuses on 
“direct policy impact”, which goes beyond the informal exchanges and may involve 
publishing and circulating White Papers to lawmakers and their staffers, and 
discussing them and emerging related issues repeatedly in order to shape the 
discourse about and perceptions of these issues.480 The PSC was also, for instance, the 
                                                             
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid. 
478 See personal interview with Gordon Lane. 
479 Stan Soloway and Alan Chvotkin (2009), “Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives It, 
How to Improve It,” in Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy, eds Jody 
Freeman and Martha Minow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 192–240.  
 They argue that recent government outsourcing was not driven by political ideology but 
rather by a “fundamental shift in the role and ownership of technology, nearly revolutionary 
change in the management of businesses and institutions of all kinds, and difficulties on the 
part of the government in recruiting and retaining the talent necessary for technologically 
driven service delivery.” Ibid, p. 192. 
 On the micro-level, their argument thus partly resonates with the one developed here, but 
lacks the broader analysis which accounts for the contextuality of these drivers which are not 
neutral or historical necessities but rather the result of a confluence of historically contingent 
factors and developments, including ideology. On the role of ideology in outsourcing, see the 
definitive work by Krahmann, States, Citizens. 
480 Mr Soloway confirmed that “thematically a lot gets done informally. ... We have informal 
conversations with people all the time, but when there is any significant policy issue it is 
169 
only private sector organisation that was invited by the Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to participate in all sessions devoted to “lessons learned”, 
and also co-chaired a similar review with the Commanding General of Army Material 
Command.481 Similarly, BENS publishes studies whose task forces often include 
former senior officials who should be well-connected in government. BENS regards 
itself as a “do tank” which combines advocacy (but not formal lobbying), studies, and 
networking482 in order to further their vision of a business-like government which 
generally draws on the market for non-core functions. A particularly telling example 
thereof is a mentoring project in which BENS gained privileged access to and 
critiqued papers written at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,483 a senior 
military college, to add a “private sector perspective” to the students’ strategy 
papers.484 
Finally, the role played by these and similar organisations multiplies these 
effects: PSC, ADS, BENS, and others not only have privileged direct access to decision-
makers, but they also facilitate such contact for their members, for instance at a 
luncheon series at PSC that routinely features senior government officials,485 and 
similar events at ADS’s offices in London.486 By extending their own outstanding 
access to partners and clients, they represent key nodes in their coalitions and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
almost always memorialised in writing, so in the end it is becoming a transparent process.” 
Personal interview with Stan Soloway. 
481 Ibid. See also Professional Services Council (2012), “Statement for the Record of the 
Professional Services Council, S. 2139 'The Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform 
Act of 2012', before the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, 17 April 2012”, accessed 31 January 2014, 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/professional-services-council-
statement-for-the-record, p. 2. 
482 Susan Maybaumwisniewski in a personal interview with Paul Taibl and Susan 
Maybaumwisniewski. Both interviewees state that BENS does not lobby but that it does 
routinely sign on to other lobbies’ efforts or letters together with other organisation to lend its 
name in support of policy issues. 
483 See Business Executives for National Security (2011), Annual Report 2011 (Washington, 
D.C.: Business Executives for National Security), pp. 14–15. 
484 Paul Taibl in a personal interview with Paul Taibl and Susan Maybaumwisniewski. 
485 Personal interview with Stan Soloway. 
486 Mr Taibl from BENS put it this way: “Our members are given access to some fairly high-
level, senior government officials … that they would not otherwise have”, and vice versa. 
Personal interview with Paul Taibl and Susan Maybaumwisniewski. 
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overall network as their activities and input operate throughout the formal and 
informal processes and across the hierarchy of the policy network. 
The Good Government and Critical Oversight Coalition 
The contrast between the pro-contracting coalition and its opponents is stark. 
The most forceful opponent of the pro-contracting coalition in the USA are the 
government worker’s unions, whose prime interest is the social and economic well-
being of the federal government’s workforce. They are well-funded and have strong 
connections to Congress. They however suffer from a comparative shortage of the 
most valued resources that their opponents hold en masse – intellectual property 
rights to high-tech equipment, entrepreneurial experience, contacts to the 
government executive, and access to advisory channels. Moreover, unions are 
virtually irrelevant regarding overseas contracting.487 
Therefore, the most relevant coalition critical of overseas contracting was one 
that broadly conceives of itself as championing good government and oversight. Their 
key concern is the way government spends money. They therefore advocate a more 
transparent, arms-length relationship between government and its suppliers, hoping 
that this would reduce bad spending practices, waste, fraud, and abuse.488 Given their 
call for a less “cosy” relationship between government and contractors, this coalition 
generally views arrangements critically that emphasise the shared nature of the 
government and industry’s interests rather than enforce competition both between 
the government and the market and between companies. Even though this coalition is 
not opposed to business or contracting in principle, POGO, for instance, is seen to 
have an entirely separate philosophical worldview than the PSC.489 POGO is possibly 
the most salient in the USA but not the only one. It often joins forces in its lobbying 
efforts with other organisations such as Taxpayers for Common Sense, CREW, and 
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selected members of Congress such as Senators Claire McCaskill and John McCain. In 
the UK, there apparently does not exist a single comparable NGO or advocacy group 
that compares to POGO, meaning that in both states those in this coalition, who work 
full-time for their convictions, either do not exist or certainly do not compare in the 
least with the likes of the PSC, ADS, and others.490 
While the members of this coalition are chronically under-funded, many of 
them enjoy very skilful leadership, are very savvy in the use of the media, well-
connected to journalists, and have limited access to members of the legislature. As a 
result, POGO’s work for instance regularly features favourably in the news, such as its 
Bad Business report both in the media and the noted congressional hearing.491 Their 
manpower and financial resources however are too limited to enable long-term, deep 
informal engagement; it lacks close access to the government executive that the pro-
contracting coalition enjoys and that was shown to be of central relevance in the 
policy deliberation and development process. And it does not bring the credentials 
and use the buzzwords that the entire mainstream discourse and government 
processes reward with funding and access: best business practices, a core 
competency government, and the emulation of the private sector in the production of 
public goods and services. Finally, importantly, while many contracting advocates 
have direct stakes in the industry, this coalition does not have comparatively direct 
and high stakes in overseas contracting because unions and the military (who could 
act as self-interested veto-players) are out of the picture. It thus cannot create 
comparatively salient veto-points as the pro-contracting coalition. 
                                                             
490 Regarding the absence of comparable groups in the UK, all interviewees without exception 
– from industry and government – agreed that no actor is devoted to policy change that 
directly targets contracting. The National Audit Office is one example that is seen as potentially 
critical, yet its remit is limited and depends on the individual will of its members at any point 
in time to examine government spending. See e.g. personal interview (2013) with David 
Shouesmith, personal interview with Jeff Mason and David Wiggins, and personal interview 
with Gordon Lane. 
491 See Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, 
“Contractor Cost Hearing”. 
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To illustrate, Mr Amey from POGO offered a quote that stands out in sharp 
contrast to the list of close personal and professional contacts of the PSC’s Mr 
Soloway. Asked whether POGO had access to DOD, for example the Office of the USD 
(AT&L) which is one of the main spenders and actors within DOD shaping the very 
policies POGO spends most time scrutinising, Mr Amey replied “we may send them a 
letter”.492 He also succinctly illustrated the comparative lack of resources, especially 
access: 
POGO is not in business to make money. ... Are we as well connected ...? 
Probably not. Do we have former admirals and generals on our staff that can 
get us inside the Pentagon and get information leaked to us before it gets out 
and give us a heads up? Do we have a former congressman who works at 
POGO? No, I do not even have any on our board. ... People do not retire and 
think they want to retire from senior government service and go work at 
POGO.493 
In contrast, already in the 1950s businesses hired former officers because of 
their prestige, skills, and expertise in various non-military technical fields and dealing 
with DOD. The National Security Industrial Association was founded in 1944 to 
ensure a lasting proximity between industry and the armed services, which had not 
been maintained after World War I. Thus, already in the 1950s thousands were 
leaving the military to work in the private for-profit sector,494 a trend that continues 
unabated. Amey thus concludes that “we are in an uphill battle.”495 To illustrate 
further, a Google-search on 09 March 2013 for “‘Project on Government Oversight’ 
site:defense.gov” brought up 39 results only, all of which were either re-postings of 
POGO publications by the PR division of the DOD website, or were reports mentioning 
or citing POGO in some other context. There was only one instance of direct 
communication in which a POGO-member asked somebody a question at a 
                                                             
492 Personal interview with Scott Amey. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Samuel P. Huntington (1957), The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), pp. 364–366. 
495 Personal interview with Scott Amey. 
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roundtable. A search on the same day for “‘Professional Services Council’ 
site:defense.gov” delivered 118 results, several of which were transcripts of speeches 
held by DOD officials at PSC-organised events, and DSB or DBB reports. Thus, not only 
is access very limited, but overall the actors from the first group, mostly working for-
profit, vastly outweigh their issue-based veto-players both in numbers and resources. 
Actors with “Formal Decision-Making Power” 
Actors holding the differentiating resource of “formal decision-making 
authority” are found in both coalitions, but much more commonly in the pro-
contracting coalition. Government leaders and others from the executive branch were 
however shown to take contracting as a given and are working towards improving its 
practice, not questioning whether it is the right policy. It was in fact the executive 
leadership in particular that brought about expansive outsourcing since the 1980s, 
and the defence enterprise offers no incentives to anybody, especially in the 
leadership, to oppose the outsourcing drive. According to a former programme 
analyst in the US Army, senior defence officials only have a limited future in 
government and thus need not worry about being victims of outsourcing. The same 
applies to most senior military officers beyond the rank of colonel, whose numbers 
increased while those of lower level officials – likely opponents – were cut by up to 50 
percent.496 Overall, the executive is under considerable influence from industry 
throughout the policy process; in other words, its autonomy is limited, and much 
more so in the USA than in the UK given industry’s higher presence in top-level 
strategic deliberations. 
Lawmakers, on the other hand, while not entirely absent from these decisions, 
are of secondary relevance at best. In the USA, members of Congress and their staffers 
are focal points of budgetary questions, including those on the broad lines of defence 
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spending.497 They are not defined by leadership, money, or technical knowhow, but 
their own legally binding decision-making authority and their access across the 
political arena which make them cherished members of any advocacy coalition. Their 
membership in advocacy coalitions is particularly issue-based, as their mandate is not 
limited to a particular agenda or issue area unlike most of the actors identified above. 
Overall, some exceptions notwithstanding, the overall thrust in both the Congress and 
the UK Parliament supports defence spending as essential to the economy in general, 
and to jobs creation (in their districts) in particular.498 
Moreover, members of both Parliaments, the US Congress in particular, do not 
make use of the limited prerogatives they have to influence oversight of defence 
spending in general and contractorisation more generally. As a senior UK government 
source with experience in both the UK and US defence enterprises pointed out, British 
defence policy is not circumscribed by many laws. As a result, significant decisions 
such as base closures can be decided and implemented with very limited influence 
from Parliament; this pales in comparison to the Congressional fights in the 1990s 
about base closures in the USA.499 This is at heart a constitutional matter, as the 
British Parliament essentially reviews policy after being decided,500 whereas the US 
Congress has powers to micromanage the activities of the DOD by controlling “line 
items” in individual bills. The UK Parliament could only use a “sort of nuclear option” 
if it was displeased with a particular practice, namely bringing down the entire 
government, but it cannot force the government to change an individual practice.501 
Nonetheless, Congress shows huge disinterest in and a lack of awareness for defence 
services contracting,502 and thus does not exert nearly the influence that it could to 
                                                             
497 Interviewees stated that they would begin targeting members of staff of particular 
members of Congress depending on the issue. 
498 See e.g. Croft et al., Britain and Defence 1945-2000, p. 110. 
499 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources. 
500 Dorey, Policy Making in Britain, p. 162. 
501 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources 
502 See e.g. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace, pp. 8–9. 
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check the executive’s conduct of defence services acquisition policy. Both the policy 
trajectory and its reaffirmation which were identified in the preceding three chapters 
are therefore mostly undisturbed by the legislature which is currently not a likely 
source of change. 
 
While the list of specific names of actors and organisations above is certainly 
not complete, the typology of actors is nonetheless representative. On the one hand, 
corresponding to the method of reputational research, many interviewees and 
organisations proactively and independently from one another identified the others – 
be it as allies or adversaries – who were named and partly interviewed above as key 
actors. This is reinforced by the fact that with very few exceptions the method of 
interviewee identification and recruitment was not “snowballing”, where such mutual 
referencing would be likely, but rather primary and secondary research. Various 
sources, from newspaper reports to Congressional hearings support the assertion 
that the identified actors are an accurate, representative sample. As they furthermore 
act in coalition, not naming for instance a smaller good government NGO than POGO 
is not a real problem since the larger, identified actors above routinely lend their 
name to efforts by smaller actors, and conversely invite “sign-ons” by other, like-
minded advocates. 
Drawing all of the above together, the DSAPNs in the USA and the UK broadly 
resemble the illustration below. It contains both advocacy coalitions as well as 
specific groups of actors who were shown to ‘stand on their own feet’ in the process 
and take on a specific function that is worth pointing out without collectively 





Figure 4.3: The US Defence Services Acquisition Policy Network by coalitions, types of 
actors, and branch of government; their relationships, and the degrees of input, access, 
and personnel exchange are indicated by the arrows (the thicker the arrow, the more 
intensive they are; the directions of the arrows indicate the direction of input). The UK 
network lacks “good government / oversight” and “federal labour”. 
 
IV. 2. ii. Sectoralisation, System Integration, and Selectivity 
To recapitulate, sectoralisation describes the degree to which the network is 
isolated from other policy domains, and regulates “spill-overs” of problems and 
processes from elsewhere. System integration describes the extent to which a policy 
domain is ideologically and institutionally affiliated with broader state components. 
Selectivity, finally, concerns how the network’s structure affects what alternatives to 
the status quo are thinkable and which policy trajectories therefore likely.503 
Sectoralisation and System Integration 
The analyses above and in the two preceding chapters strongly suggest that 
defence policy-making in the USA and the UK, particularly acquisition, are most 
susceptible to three partly related external forces: fiscal health and policies, 
technological developments, and the security environment. When economists began 
                                                             



















to turn their eye toward reforming the public sector along rationalist lines in the 
1950s,504 the defence sector followed suit shortly thereafter in the 1960s. The 
outsourcing drive was furthermore shown to have occurred under the influence of 
the growing gap between grand strategic objectives, military commitments, and 
technological demands on the one hand, and the limited resources available to supply 
them on the other, which was exacerbated by the peace dividend following the 
“shock” to the security environment at the end of the Cold War. That shock however 
worked to reaffirm and accelerate contractorisation and pursue ‘more of the same’, 
not to provoke critical introspection. 
At the same time, however, defence is considerably more hedged against 
external influences, in particular budgetary pressures, than virtually any other 
domain. Its direct association with national security means that assaults on defence in 
general and – in the case of the USA where the industry is central to its national 
security architecture – on defence spending in particular are interpreted by the 
mainstream as assaults on the wider political system. In the 1980s, when the 
wholesale reorganisation of government and the role of the state in providing public 
services gained traction, defence was overall spared from the cuts to public spending; 
defence spending in fact increased in the 1980s.505 And while the defence budget cuts 
– more severe in the UK than the USA – following the fiscal and economic crisis that 
began in 2008 may suggest that defence’s sectoralisation and system integration are 
more limited than is claimed here, two observations should be noted. First, the fact 
that the cuts are more severe in the UK strongly supports the contention that the UK’s 
defence industry is of much reduced centrality to UK national security than is the case 
in the USA, and that the UK’s defence budget does not have any reserves that would 
                                                             
504 Richard C. Box (1999), “Running Government Like a Business: Implications for Public 
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enable it to go on with only minor changes, as was argued earlier. Secondly, and more 
importantly, in both states the degree to which other public spending accounts are 
questioned in public and ultimately reduced severely outweighs the same regarding 
defence. In the USA, the discussions about the “sequester” – i.e. across the board cuts 
in all federal spending – focused almost exclusively on its impact on defence. In fact, 
the possibility of excluding defence from the cuts by increasing cuts in entitlement 
and other social spending was widely discussed, with some polls suggesting that even 
the public may favour such an exemption.506 DOD used apocalyptic language during 
much of the debate about sequestration, directly tying the cuts to threats to national 
security.507 The British defence secretary similarly suggested cutting social spending 
further rather than cutting defence any more.508 Some public outrage against social 
spending cuts notwithstanding, neither political party, let alone governing 
administration, voiced noteworthy opposition to this general view that places defence 
at the top of the hierarchy of public spending.509 Together, this supports the assertion 
of both the relatively strong sectoralisation and the definitely strong system 
integration of defence in general and, especially in the USA, of defence acquisition in 
particular. 
Selectivity 
In terms of the network’s selectivity, the above strongly suggests that the 
networks, their outcomes, and their feedback effects set defence policy-making on a 
path towards ‘more of the same’. This follows from the observation that gradual, 
internal change is unlikely, and would only change in the event of external strategic or 
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fiscal ‘shocks’ that truly unsettle the status quo, the lines of funding available, the 
incentives for advocates to coalesce, and the access of various actors. The above 
enables understanding the mechanisms underlying these observations, most crucially 
the sequenced, iterated interplay between structure and process. On the one hand, 
the structural forces exerted by the strategic posture and the modes of generating 
military capability through recourse to private enterprise affect which policy 
alternatives are ‘thinkable’. They also affect which position in the network actors 
perceive to be most likely to yield success. This, in essence, circumscribes the status 
quo ante to today’s decision-making processes. On the other hand, these very 
processes affect the next cycle of decisions, most notably by reaffirming the ostensible 
possibility of generating the capabilities required rather than attempt to overcome 
the gap by reducing commitments. As noted, the absence of shocks that would have 
resulted in failure of either of these domains further reinforces the view that the 
current path is viable, feasible, and overall sustainable. 
More specifically, the long ideational history of managerialism and the 
resulting organisational remoulding of government along private sector ideals, 
substantially raised the value of the resources and skills associated therewith. This 
dynamic was further reinforced through the simultaneous devaluation of the 
resources held by traditional veto-players who see value, for instance, in the non-
profit motivation of civil servants and the checks placed on budget expenditure 
through the legislature. At the same time, the growing revenue stream that is 
principally available to industry encouraged it to coalesce and pursue proximity to 
government.510 Moreover, the ‘technicalisation’ of problem-solving that turns the 
solving of political problems into a series of seemingly apolitical steps or 
                                                             
510 Asked “why would anyone want to operate in, or invest in, such a peculiar, unpredictable 
sector” as defence, Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute answers that “[the] answer is 
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company that becomes a trusted supplier to the Pentagon potentially can tap into a vast 
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technicalities, and the strategic relevance attached to globally superior military 
technology further removed or weakened veto-points and trumped potential veto-
players’ concerns, in particular the military. 
As a result, access to the DSAPNs is considerably facilitated – and often 
proactively extended – to those actors who hold those resources that are intimately 
tied to the drivers of military outsourcing and are therefore most valued. They 
include technological knowhow, experience in private enterprise (most notably the 
eligibility requirements for the USD (AT&L)), intellectual property rights to the 
technologies the government no longer owns but depends on, the workforces who 
provide services to the military that it no longer wants or is able to perform itself, and 
access to those who hold these resources. Access to decision-makers is therefore both 
required and granted. The “revolving door” between government and business, for 
instance, is one small wheel in this much larger process that ties these factors 
together.511 In addition to the resources listed above, the huge sums of financial 
resources available to those who conform to these principles and participate in the 
generation of defence capability further increase the relative advantage of their 
advocacy coalition. They offer funds to vastly superior numbers of potential members 
of this coalition, neither of which are matched on the other side. The decisions that a 
network takes that is dominated by pro-contracting advocates unsurprisingly 
reinforce rather than challenge the fundamental dynamics that introduced them to 
the network and enabled them to pursue the constant revenue streams in the first 
place. This is the logic of practicality at work;512 even the unions who vehemently 
oppose outsourcing are now forced to depart from a standpoint that no longer 
                                                             
511 As a British parliamentary report put it, “Part of the appeal of employing former ministers 
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across government.” UK House, PASC, Lobbying, p. 32. 
512 Cf. Pouliot, “Logic of Practicality”, p. 258. 
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questions contractorisation per se but that essentially asks for a fair competition 
between the federal workforce and private companies.513 
Also, while the above generally concerns acquisition decisions more 
specifically, they do also affect the fundamental issue of defence strategy. While most 
actors here do not directly participate in strategy-making, pro-contracting advocates 
operate on the basis of realising their governments’ strategic objectives. The good 
government advocates equally operate from the basic assumption that government 
strategy and foreign policy goals are givens. As was discussed in chapter II, both 
somewhat follow a core-competency approach and formally defer to strategic think 
tanks as the relevant non-state actors in that debate. Both coalitions thus also at least 
indirectly reproduce the strategic fundamentals that are at the roots of outsourcing. 
The pro-contracting coalition in fact eloquently and with political savvy routinely 
invokes the strategic ‘threats’ the state faces in an ‘uncertain world’ that require 
‘swift, technologically sophisticated responses’ to ‘keep the nation safe’.514 They thus 
directly tie their own activities, success, and well-being to the national security 
objectives of the state, and thus aid the further entrenchment and normalisation of 
the very ideas that fundamentally drive military outsourcing – without having to 
openly call for military action. 
Therefore, neither of the fundamental structural forces that ultimately led to 
extensive military services contracting are exposed to significant, potentially 
existential challenges by the routine operation of the DSAPNs. The pro-contracting 
advocacy coalition obviously has no interest in fundamentally changing the basic 
parameters of defence services acquisition policy, while the government is 
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sufficiently content with the status quo and the critics too weak to be able to change 
the rules of the game, as the failed insourcing initiative brought into sharp relief. 
Therefore, gradual change through the process is unlikely, so that (absent external 
shocks to the strategic, fiscal, or defence economic structuring forces of the defence 
policy process) the routine process involving the DSAPNs mapped out above is set to 
maintain its selectivity and reinforce the path dependency towards ‘more of the 
same’. Put differently, this ‘ecosystem’ is unlikely to face significant challenges in the 
foreseeable future. 
IV. 3.  Findings and Conclusions 
In mapping and analysing the defence services acquisition policy networks, 
this chapter identified the sources, operation, and ramifications of the “structural 
power of business” in this policy domain. As in other policy domains, the structural 
power of business here stems (among others) from its relevance to the running of 
public and private services.515 Structurally, business is integral to the ‘ecosystem’ that 
departs from specific strategic, defence technological, and defence economic policies, 
preferences, and practices, and thus occupies a central place in generating capability 
and delivering defence outcomes, and in the USA even as a source of national security. 
Agentially, this chapter showed how this is manifested in the composition and routine 
operation of the networks. By virtue of holding the necessary resources and providing 
what government needs in order to realise its strategic and technological objectives, 
industry is part of the process from start to finish, from top to bottom of the 
hierarchy, and relatively free from sustained opposition of comparable clout, 
connectedness, or resources. Industry’s provision of defence services thus contributes 
to a path dependence that all but ensures that the future will see more of the same. 
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According to PNT, a network’s policy decision more or less strongly 
circumscribes the implementation, i.e. the last part of the policy process. Here, given 
the central importance of the executive leadership and the far-reaching consequences 
of top-level policy-making for lower-level sub-domains, it is reasonable to assume 
that these dynamics very strongly delimit the following case examinations which 
considerably depend on policy set at the highest levels. The following two chapters 
therefore serve both the confirmation of what has been argued so far as well as its 
further refinement. The following identifies in more detail the operation of policy 
networks on the ground, and sheds light on specific outsourcing practices, sales, and 
the entrenchment of military services contracting in specific military domains. It 
thereby identifies – internally – both the avenues for potential structural change 
through agency as well as the mechanisms which reproduce structure through 
agency, and moreover underscores – externally – the constraints exerted by the big 
picture of defence services acquisition policy on policy implementation on the 
ground. 
184 
V.  Outsourcing Foreign Military Assistance 
The two remaining chapters serve two broad purposes. First, by revisiting the 
drivers, politics, processes, and ramifications of contracting out specific capabilities, 
they contribute cumulatively to the knowledge produced so far on the context and 
politics of outsourcing of defence services provision. Secondly, in so doing, the 
chapters test the assumptions developed at the end of chapters III and IV to shore up 
and refine the study’s findings across policy sub-domains, thereby both generalising 
our findings as well as generating knowledge on specific areas of defence.516 Thus, 
whereas the previous chapter focused on the higher end of defence policy-making, 
the remaining chapters mostly examine lower implementing levels throughout the 
defence enterprise. Not only does this ensure that we cover the enterprise’s entire 
hierarchy and arrive at more generally valid conclusions; it also covers the remainder 
of the policy process as conceptualised by PNT. This concerns in particular the 
potential internal sources of change or shocks to the status quo. 
This chapter first introduces the policy domain under study – foreign military 
assistance – and locates it within the wider field of defence policy. Highlighting its 
immediate links to two key drivers of outsourcing, it underscores the strategic nature 
and the role of economic interests in foreign military assistance. It then examines the 
drivers behind its increasing contractorisation in the USA as well as the reasons for its 
near-absence in the UK, both of which lead back to variances in defence posture and 
the willingness to subsidise the domestic defence industry. 
Next, the chapter juxtaposes the ‘textbook’ acquisition process as envisaged 
by the government with the reality on the ground. It identifies significant spaces for 
informality in what appears, at first glance, to be a heavily regulated process, and the 
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partial reversal of a strategic policy into a revenue stream to be harnessed through 
business development mechanisms. 
Drawing on these observations, the chapter then maps out the networks 
involved on the high-political and the lower implementing levels. Broadly speaking, 
the maps confirm the bias towards business in the USA given the prominence of 
industry throughout the policy process from its design and regulations through to its 
implementation and the absence of veto-players or countervailing concerns. In the 
UK, however, this domain displays a very low bias towards business. 
Finally, the chapter revisits the assumptions proposed in chapter III and 
appraises key concerns, especially the questions of the ownership of political 
decisions, the absence or exclusion of potential checks on the process, an increasing 
alignment of the interests of government and its industry suppliers, and the alleged 
militarisation of foreign policy. Especially regarding the USA, the chapter finds 
evidence in their support and concludes that there are no obvious sources of change 
in the foreseeable future. 
V. 1.  The Strategic and Economic Nature of Foreign Military 
Assistance 
Foreign military assistance is of immediate, strategic nature and – in the USA 
in particular – carries significant economic and defence-industrial implications. 
V. 1. i. Military Assistance in National Security Strategy 
Military assistance has long been an instrument of US foreign policy, serving 
as a centrepiece of US strategy during the Cold War according to former US Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates.517 After declining in importance in the 1990s when the focus 
                                                             
517 Robert M. Gates (2010), “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security 
Assistance,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 2–6, at p. 2. 
186 
shifted to economic assistance and democratisation,518 the wars and “operations 
other than war” fought in the wake of 9/11 catapulted military assistance back to the 
fore. This applies especially to the US defence establishment that had shown little 
interest in implementing military assistance before.519 
US foreign assistance follows three key rationales that have remained 
unchanged since the end of the Second World War. National security is the 
predominant theme, ahead of commercial interests and humanitarian concerns.520 
Regarding security, foreign military assistance today follows the general 
understanding that, in the words of former secretary Robert Gates, “the United States 
cannot kill or capture its way to victory” but should rather employ “indirect 
approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and 
their security forces”.521  
Building the military capacities and capabilities of allies and friendly nations 
is also a way to share the burden of the USA’s numerous military activities across the 
globe. Building Partner Capacity, a U.S. Army programme, and its many siblings and 
cousins, partly grew out of the persistent and intermittently growing gap between 
commitments and resources. Sharing some of its origins with contracting it is thus 
unsurprising that the USA outsources much of its foreign military assistance. Given 
the mismatch between commitments and resources – in particular due to the USA’s 
expanding global presence and military engagements (see chapter II) – the USA no 
longer only builds the capacity of formally allied nations but also of states that are 
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perceived to be sufficiently stable, legitimate, and capable of conducting their own 
“stability operations” or aiding the USA in theirs.522 
Partner capacity and capability can turn out to be more important and 
successful than operations conducted by the USA.523 For instance, the emergency 
supplemental request for the “Coalition Support Fund” FY2007 amounted to $1.2 
billion, was justified on the grounds that Pakistan and Jordan conduct major border 
operations along their borders with Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, “achieving 
successes that would be difficult for U.S. Armed Forces to attain” and “having a major 
impact on curbing foreign fighters transiting through Jordan to Iraq”. The request 
conceded that “it is likely that the U.S. would not be able to conduct these operations 
as capably as the indigenous forces.”524 The “impact if not funded” would be 
discouraging Jordan, Pakistan, and other lesser capable countries from participating 
in US operations in the future.525 Building partner states’ capacity is thus central to 
the maintenance of “U.S. global leadership”.526 
Overall, then, and much more than regarding the acquisition of other military 
services, top-level strategy here sets the discourse and more immediately frames the 
design, development, and realisation of specific programmes. Military aid policy is 
planned on the basis of principles set forth in the National Security Strategy that 
drives the development of all DOS and DOD strategies all the way down to “Country 
Plans”. At each of the intermediary levels the national and strategic interests are 
identified and reiterated, so that by the end a specific Country Plan is based on the 
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security role that the USA desires a state to play and the level to which the state is 
capable of fulfilling this role.527  
The UK, as is explained in the course of the next sections, for various reasons 
engages less in such activities. Its limited equivalent activities however resemble the 
USA in that they stretch the globe and are viewed as a way to shape and influence the 
international security environment in a manner favourable to the national interest.528 
Like in the USA, the UK’s 2010 NSS provides the frame for the newly developed 
International Defence Engagement Strategy that covers the security aspects of the 
NSS’s stated objective to use all instruments of national power to build the country’s 
prosperity, extend its global influence, and strengthen its security.529 While the UK’s 
defence engagement has a wide scope that includes “overseas training teams, security 
sector reform, international defence training, … [and] overseas joint exercises” in 
dozens of countries, its depth – measured in terms of the allocated budgets and 
manpower – does not nearly approach that of the USA. The UK therefore, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, does not have large-scale foreign military aid programmes of 
comparable prominence as those Congress appropriates in the USA. The Engagement 
Strategy in fact attempts to improve the value-for-money performance of the UK’s 
international footprint by unifying its efforts in a whole-of-government approach.530 
V. 1. ii. Economic and Defence-Industrial Interests in Military Aid 
Military assistance in the USA is intimately tied not only to the strategic 
objectives but also to the preference for the private provision of public services, the 
centrality of the domestic defence industry in national security, and the resulting 
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deep concerns for its well-being. By extension, its relative absence in the UK appears 
to follow from the reverse logic. The UK, in addition to having a less expansive 
defence posture, focuses more strictly on its own armed forces rather than its 
domestic industry, and is thus more willing to narrow the scope of its defence posture 
and to acquire equipment and services from foreign sources.531 It thus refuses to 
provide a comparable level of support and subsidies to its own industry. The UK does 
not create government-funded military aid programmes or open up its own 
acquisition channels to foreign buyers in the way the USA does, as is discussed next. 
While the available legal and strategic resources on UK defence engagement 
are manageable in scope, the USA’s Foreign Assistance Act extends over hundreds of 
pages, sections, and paragraphs. Whereas the political context of military aid barely 
hints at the role of the private sector, the legislation and specific programmes in the 
USA are designed very closely around industry or even for the main purpose of 
supporting defence sales overseas. Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
authorises the US President “to furnish military assistance, on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international 
organization”. This aid is provided by “acquiring ... and providing (by loan or grant) 
any defense article or defense services”, sending military advisers, or transferring 
funds to assist the recipient.532 Section 516 regulates the President’s “authority to 
transfer excess defense articles”.533 
The programmes that implement these authorities and for which funds are 
appropriated (usually annually) fall into two categories: security assistance (SA) and 
security cooperation (SC). The former is owned by the State Department but mostly 
implemented by the Defense Department through the Defense Security Cooperation 
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Agency (DSCA) and the individual Armed Services’ international policy programme 
offices.534 The latter falls under the purview of DOD, and the number of these 
programmes has been rising.535 They include the so-called “Section 1206” authority to 
train and equip foreign military forces,536 the aforementioned Coalition Support Fund 
that is mainly used to reimburse “key cooperating nations for logistics and military 
support ... to U.S. military operations”,537 the “Combating Terrorism Fellowship 
Program”, the “Global Lift & Sustain” programme, and country-specific programmes 
such as the “Iraq Security Forces Fund” and the “Pakistan Counterinsurgency 
Fund”.538 The proliferation of DOD-led programmes and activities that traditionally 
fell under the purview of DOS is key to the critique of the alleged militarisation of US 
foreign policy, discussed in section V.5. 
The sale of defence articles and services from the USA mostly runs through 
one of two channels: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in which the customer buys 
through the acquisition channels and thus ‘from’ the US government; and Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS), in which the foreign country negotiates directly with US 
industry. The main and longest-running military aid programme of interest here is 
called Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF is the “amount of credit/grant extended 
to a foreign government or international organization in any fiscal year for the 
procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction 
services.”539 In other words, FMF is a source of funding, while FMS and DCS are the 
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channels through which they are spent. In most cases, FMF is offered as non-
repayable grants. It therefore represents the strongest form of military aid, and is 
mostly given to Middle Eastern countries, especially Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.540 
Not only are these programmes centred on industry with the USA spending 
significant resources to support it, including 10,000 employees working on SC and 
stating that “the relationship between SCO personnel and representatives of US 
industry, although unofficial, is important to both sides.”541 FMS, DCS, and FMF are 
significant sources of income for industry. The US government spent $25 billion on 
various foreign military assistance programmes in FY2012,542 and almost all of these 
funds in turn pay for equipment and services furnished by the US defence industry.543 
The same applies to several DOD-led programmes. Most work under Section 1206, 
which cost approximately $400 million in FY2010, is provided by contractors 
according to possibly the best informed source on the programme.544 
Industry thus occupies a central place in US foreign military assistance as a 
key enabler and a vehicle towards building bilateral relations, becoming a central part 
of the bilateral relationship. In the words of then-Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political-Military (PM) Affairs Andrew Shapiro, a foreign country acquiring an 
advanced defence system from a US company acquires not just a piece of hardware, 
but also the requirement to maintain, update, and repair it throughout its often 
decades-long lifespan. Therefore, “the buyer is actually committing to a broader, long-
term relationship with the United States [emphasis added]. The defense trade can 
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therefore help solidify diplomatic ties”.545 Given this centrality of industry as either a 
beneficiary or implementing actor, the remaining sections of this chapter examine 
these programmes in more detail from pre-planning and design through their 
implementation and follow-up. 
As noted, the UK does not maintain foreign military assistance programmes 
or acquisition channels of comparable scope. Aid is mostly provided through 
individual “activities” for which funding has to be secured before a government 
minister is presented with the proposal, mostly out of one of the existing dedicated 
pools of money.546 Two of the main relevant funds are the cross-government “Conflict 
Pool” fund. In FY2011-2012 it was allocated £180 million and operated in 41 
countries, and the MOD’s “Defence Assistance Fund” that – despite running activities 
in 57 countries that year – was only allocated £12 million,547 of which only £2.3 
million were spent on contractors.548 The difference in (budgetary) scope to the USA 
is obvious. 
Moreover, the few programmes the UK runs – the British Peace Support 
Teams (BPST), the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), the British 
Army Training Unit, and the International Military Advisory & Training Team 
(IMATT) in Sierra Leone – are of comparatively very limited size,549 and mostly 
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staffed by regular members of the armed forces.550 Industry has no obvious presence 
in these programmes. As was confirmed by several sources in the MOD, the UK 
engages in activities such as the BPST only when “it feels like an important objective” 
for the UK to do so, “for our own purposes, not just because the customer wants it.”551 
Given their limited scope even a comprehensive role in those programmes would not 
compare to the dozens of billions industry earns in the USA through providing 
military aid. 
Nonetheless, the UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy foresees 
some support to UK defence industry exports.552 Unlike in the USA, however, the UK 
only very rarely pays for foreign procurements of UK goods and services. According 
to a senior source in the MOD this is partly because of the way the MOD is funded; 
Parliament has no prerogatives to fund individual line items as the US Congress does, 
and there is no equivalent to FMF.553 The UK also does not offer its own acquisition 
channels like the USA, and almost no funding to purchase goods in the UK. Its support 
to companies in securing sales overseas is limited to the work of its defence attachés 
and representatives of the UK Trade & Investment government department (UKTI).554 
The UK thus concentrates its more limited funds on projects that immediately further 
its foreign and defence political objectives, and does not shape its defence 
engagement policy with industry squarely in mind.555 Confirming the findings from 
chapters II and III, the UK devotes relatively less attention to the domestic defence-
industrial base in the design and pursuit of its core defence political objectives than 
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the USA which considers the national defence industry to be central to its national 
security architecture. 
V. 2.  The Drivers of Outsourcing Foreign Military Assistance 
The drivers of outsourcing foreign military assistance in the USA and the 
reasons for the lack thereof in the UK correspond with the previous findings. 
First, there is the strategic element. As noted above, the USA understands that 
it cannot “kill or capture its way to victory” and therefore reappraised its stance 
towards military assistance policy.556 DOD subsequently re-evaluated its long-
standing disinterest in conducting security assistance for the State Department. It had 
long regarded security assistance as only marginally beneficial to national security, 
and had not considered the training of foreign forces to be a primary task for its 
regular soldiers. Following 9/11 this attitude changed, especially towards countries 
in which the US military may view intervention as necessary because of the presence 
of terrorist groups. Security cooperation became a responsibility for the general 
purpose force,557 and in keeping with DOD’s mindset this responsibility was 
approached comprehensively. 
The passing of the Section 1206 authority epitomises this change of heart. As 
then-Secretary of Defense Gates explained, the US military had been trained to defeat 
other organised forces, while the national security infrastructure and legislation were 
outdated. Section 1206 therefore served the goal to bridge a perceived capability gap 
in rapidly responding militarily to evolving threats.558 Section 1206 was followed up 
with an instruction in 2010 that mandated DOD to develop and maintain “security 
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force assistance” capabilities “across all domains – air, land, maritime, and 
cyberspace”.559 
Further strategic reasons for the proliferation of contractors in foreign 
military training and related work include allowing the sending government to keep a 
low profile and to secure influence in new areas.560 Seeing as many of the new 
authorities are targeted at countries in which the USA has not had a long-standing 
military-to-military relationship or, if it did, had not maintained a large, “uniformed” 
footprint, the use of contractors must be viewed as an attractive option especially 
where US soldiers would not be welcomed or legally allowed to be present. The 
possibly most high-profile and well-known case that put the military consultancy 
industry on the political radar was MPRI’s work in Croatia in 1994-1995. The USA, 
seeking to bring a stalemate between breakaway-Croatia and its Serb opponents to an 
end but prohibited from selling arms or sending military advisors, referred the 
Croatian Minister of Defence to the company that was ultimately given two contracts. 
In 1995, Croatia’s army defeated its Serb opponents using manoeuvres “reminiscent 
of the U.S. Army’s Air-Land 2000 doctrine that the firm was expert in.”561 Following its 
success in Croatia and other Balkan countries, the company’s business – and 
contractorised training of foreign forces more generally – expanded rapidly.562 
Secondly, perhaps unsurprisingly, this created manpower challenges. As was 
shown in earlier chapters, when faced with a trade-off between manpower levels on 
the one hand and the levels of technological sophistication or strategic scope on the 
other, the USA opts for the former. Given that Section 1206 in particular and the 
institutionalisation of security force assistance more broadly came in response to a 
perceived capability gap and at a time in which the military appeared to be under 
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severe overstretch, their origins share the dynamics that were shown to have driven 
outsourcing. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the private sector from the start took a 
central role in the implementation of both. Regarding Section 1206, most “train and 
equip” work was being provided by private contractors,563 while regarding security 
force assistance contractors were formally included from the very start into the force 
mix.564 Moreover, given that a lot of military assistance still formally flows through 
the State Department, these shortcomings were even more pronounced. DOS is a 
manager and broker of aid but lacks the “personnel, funding, security forces, and 
operational know-how” to implement large-scale security assistance operations.565 
This is why DOD implements these cases in the first place, and given the pressures 
which the military is under, drawing on contractors becomes a necessity given the 
scope of these programmes. 
Moreover, coupled with and exacerbating the manpower issue is the problem 
of knowhow that was pointed out in chapter III. As the quote by Shapiro underscored, 
a defence sale does not end with product delivery, but continues potentially for 
decades to involve regular training, operation, and maintenance requirements. The 
military has neither the manpower nor all of the necessary knowhow and intellectual 
property rights to provide these services and spares over long periods of time even if 
it wanted to.566 
Thirdly, there is an important economic argument that was alluded to in 
section V.1.ii. States with an indigenous defence industry encourage international 
sales by their domestic companies to reduce their dependence on sales to their own 
government, reduce prices through achieving economies of scale, and support the 
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domestic job market. When coupled with the understanding of the military as a core 
competency combat force, paying for a uniformed soldier to deliver certain services to 
a foreign army could be viewed as bad practice. Training foreign forces is neither a 
core responsibility of a combat soldier, nor would doing so support private sector 
jobs. The sums of FMF, let alone FMS, are too significant to discard this argument, as 
most US foreign aid funds are spent on US-sourced goods and services in accordance 
with limitations contained in the Foreign Assistance Act.567 Put most candidly, the 
Chief of Foreign Military Sales in Jordan – a country whose purchases are almost 
exclusively funded by the US government – said that such aid was not least a “US jobs 
programme.”568 
Fourth, there are two organisational causes for the outsourcing of the delivery 
of foreign military assistance that – again – apply predominantly to the USA, and that 
go beyond the general proclivity to draw on the private sector for as much non-core 
government work as possible. On the one hand, the styles in foreign military training 
differ. The UK typically takes a longer-term perspective and applies a train-the-
trainers approach. The USA, by contrast, focuses more on short-term effects by 
teaching operational and tactical skills by its own people (uniformed or not).569 The 
British approach should eventually require a smaller manpower given its train-the-
trainers approach, while the US approach raises the footprint because it creates a 
constant need for outside trainers throughout the training mission.570 On the other 
hand, the job implications for soldiers engaged in training efforts may play a role in 
the degree to which such tasks are attractive to troops or alternatively outsourced. 
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Training foreign troops is encouraged (but not mandatory) in the UK, but is regarded 
as detrimental to career advancement in the US Army.571 
The two latter drivers highlight reasons for and nuances of the variance 
between the USA and the UK regarding foreign military assistance policy, including its 
contractorisation. Fundamentally, as noted in earlier chapters, the UK enjoys a lower 
level of resources and of reserves that it could mobilise for foreign military assistance. 
The UK is therefore willing to become interdependent with other states for its 
security in general and for supplying its forces in particular, and to assume a more 
limited global defence posture. The UK is thus forced to focus much more closely on 
its own armed forces and more narrowly defined immediate interests than on an 
expansive posture and the benefit to other states or industry. Coupled with a strong 
political rejection of subsidies, the UK limits its efforts to supporting its industry with 
selling products and services to other countries, but not by paying for these sales 
itself.572 The UK therefore pursues a limited policy that draws on personnel that “is 
already paid for” and only contemplates outsourcing when all in-house options have 
been exhausted.573 This approach is made more successful because training foreign 
forces is not detrimental to career progression, and because the number of required 
trainers decreases with the increasing numbers of local trainers. In the USA, none of 
these factors apply; it has considerably more resources, and assigns its domestic 
defence-industrial base a central place in its national security architecture. There 
appears to be no limit to the perceived possibilities and desire to build and affect 
other nations’ military capabilities and capacities, only limits to the means available 
to do so which are exacerbated by the manpower-intensive training style. With 
governmental support for US industry’s foreign sales dramatically higher, collectively 
these factors make outsourcing a much more attractive and possibly even necessary 
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572 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources. 
573 Telephone interview with UK MOD source on defence engagement policy. 
199 
course of action in the USA; as the US FMS chief in Jordan put it, “if we can, we like to 
outsource.”574 
V. 3.  Process and Participants of Outsourcing Foreign Military 
Assistance 
There are two levels regarding the use of contractors in foreign military 
assistance in the USA. On the one hand, the formal process of foreign military sales 
(including government-funded assistance) is closely regulated. It comprises the 
identification of requirements, advertisement of tenders, competition, funding, 
delivery, monitoring, and evaluation. On the other hand, informality is similarly 
essential here as it was in the making of high defence services acquisition policy. 
In juxtaposing the two this section finds, first, that the formally intended role 
for industry is already far-reaching, and secondly that by harnessing the vast informal 
spaces this role extends even further to cover the entire hierarchy and timeline of the 
process. To US industry, foreign military aid is just another source of revenue to tap 
into, while more generally the observations made below further underscore the 
increasingly complementary nature of government and industry’s interests. 
The limited evidence from the UK supports the assertions that contractors are 
used very rarely, in an ad hoc fashion, and that the UK is more focused on increasing 
the “value for money”-element of its foreign aid policy by joining forces with other 
international actors and organisations rather than supporting the domestic defence 
services industry.575 
                                                             
574 Personal interview with Lt Col Keith Harrington. 
575 Given the very limited activities of the UK in this domain, the following necessarily devotes 
more space to the USA than the UK. 
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V. 3. i. The “Textbook” Process in the USA 
FMS cases formally follow a highly standardised procedure and – like the 
policy more generally – are closely driven by the high-strategic interests and 
objectives that trickle down from the executive leadership to the individual country 
levels.576 FMS cases, which include most FMF-funded aid programmes, formally begin 
with the purchasing country identifying a requirement and submitting a Letter of 
Request (LOR) to the US Embassy or Military Liaison Office. The LOR is then sent on 
to DSCA who may liaise with the armed services in order to produce non-binding 
information on “Price and Availability” (P&A). Since DSCA lacks the in-house 
knowledge to comprehensively estimate the costs and workload of FMS cases, the 
development of P&A information by necessity often involves the private sector that 
provides such information (and later the product or service).577 Following approval 
from DOS and Congress, the involved parties develop a Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOA) which – if approved by the purchasing country – goes back to DSCA and the 
Security Assistance Command for implementation via one of its implementing 
agencies (IA) – usually one of the armed services –578 who in turn routinely draw on 
contractors for much or all of the resulting work. 
Throughout the process, including before making a formal request, potential 
customers are thus in close contact not only with US government officials but also 
with industry. The DSCA’s Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 
(DISAM) Green Book states accordingly that “[normally], there should be ongoing 
                                                             
576 For the process of Section 1206 programmes that begins with both Secretaries and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, see Serafino, “Security Assistance Reform”, p. 7 and Serafino, “Section 1206”, 
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577 See as one of countless examples U.S. Department of the Army, Army Contracting Command 
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consultations between the customer and US representatives ... to assist the customer 
with defining and refining its requirements. … [F]ollow-on discussions will often 
expand to include US defense contractors” and “include topics such as security 
agreements, acquisition alternatives, training plans, transportation plans, methods of 
financing, and concepts of operations and support.”579 Survey teams that provide the 
country with assistance in further reviewing and identifying capabilities and 
upcoming requirements also typically comprise representatives of the US 
government, the purchasing country, and commercial contractors.580 In fact, the 
Security Assistance Management Manual even includes contractors as part of US 
government representation on lower levels vis-à-vis foreign nations.581 
This participation extends to the planning for logistical and other support for 
the life cycle of a deal. Such support, often very long-term, may be of superior 
monetary value than a piece of equipment alone. Between the submission of an LOR 
and the signing of an LOA, logistics support planning often involves a site survey in 
the purchasing country that typically includes contractors.582 Thus, even though the 
sale has not yet been agreed with a particular manufacturer, industry is formally 
involved in identifying the customer’s requirements. 
The later award of an FMF-funded contract follows the same procedures as if 
DOD was the purchaser. Foreign military assistance cases therefore share the same, 
strong business-orientation as DOD acquisition policy. The DSCA’s self-ascribed core 
competencies accordingly include among others the “integration of policy and 
business processes” in its dealings with defence articles and services.583 
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For follow-on support to aid recipients, DOD becomes reactive to requests 
and again offers its acquisition channels. It is therefore preferred to follow US 
standard procedures which, like the “Total Package Approach”,584 again heavily rely 
on industry. 
Ten countries, including Jordan and Egypt that are mentioned in more detail 
below, are eligible to conduct their purchases individually and directly with industry 
“who may have a continuing support plan available”.585 In other words, although this 
is generally not permitted with FMF funds, ten countries can spend their 
appropriated funds on US products and services as they please,586 and these ten 
countries receive almost the entire annual FMF budget. 
The potential non-participation of the US military in much of the transaction, 
especially when measured against its long time-span, further widens the potential for 
contractors to influence the customer’s acquisitions, as is discussed next. 
V. 3. ii. Filling in the Blanks in the Formal Process in the USA 
While the foreign military aid process already formally accommodates 
industry very closely, it suggests that industry is a relatively passive actor, responsive 
to customer and US government demands. By examining the many unregulated – one 
might say “human” – elements of the process, it becomes apparent that informality 
plays a similarly central role as it does in the higher end of defence services 
acquisition policy-making. On both the higher strategic as well as the lower 
acquisition levels, industry is much more present than the seemingly tight regulations 
of the sales process would suggest. Moreover, even though it is not possible with the 
available evidence and access to identify an immediate, causal chain between lower-
level actors and interests on one hand, and the higher levels of foreign (military aid) 
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policy-making on the other, it is possible to demonstrate that they are central, 
symbiotic components of a single ‘ecosystem’. 
Evidence from Jordan 
This sub-section draws on evidence gathered in Jordan to approximate a 
general understanding of foreign military assistance policy and practice. 
The Context of US Military Assistance to Jordan 
Relations between the USA and Jordan have been long-running, and much 
more independent from short-term crises than is the case for instance with several 
Central Asian countries in the context of Afghanistan. Joint exercises and training 
have been formalised with the foundation of the “U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military 
Commission” since 1974.587 Aid to Jordan is provided in line with long-standing “U.S. 
national security interests in the region”588 and Jordan’s central location in this region 
of prime geostrategic interest to the USA.589 Jordan became a “major non-NATO ally” 
in 1996 which gives the country privileged access to US defence materiel,590 and it 
reciprocates for example by supporting US operations and by participating in global 
peacekeeping initiatives such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) as the 
first Middle Eastern member and for which it hosts a training centre.591 Finally, it is 
establishing itself as a hub for special operations training through the initially US-
funded King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC).592 
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Jordan, therefore, is not an outlier case of US security assistance spending. It is 
also more representative of the USA’s longer-term strategic interests than the various 
Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf since the latter pay for their substantial 
procurements out of their own budgets, while the USA covers most acquisition 
expenses incurred by the Jordanian military in the USA. The country receives $660 
million in aid annually from FY2010-2014, of which $300 million are reserved for the 
military and appropriated through FMF;593 in addition to these figures Jordan 
receives supplemental funding for intelligence operations or, for instance, from the 
Coalition Support Fund.594 These figures increased significantly following Jordan’s 
participation in the “global war on terror”; FMS agreements with Jordan rose from a 
total of $2.57 billion from FY1950 to FY2003 to $4.77 billion by FY2011.595 
Cases of Foreign Military Aid to Jordan 
Almost all announcements of sales to Jordan reiterate that these acquisitions 
also aim at increasing the interoperability of Jordan’s forces with those of NATO, 
especially the USA,596 further supporting the claim that aid among others is intended 
to shift some of the burdens of the USA’s expansive strategic posture to partners and 
allies. Each contract announcement also includes some boilerplate stating that the 
sale will not alter the regional balance of power and that it furthers US national 
security interests.597 
As noted, from the very early phases of a potential FMF case, industry is 
routinely consulted on the doability. It then takes over as the arguably most salient 
active actor over the longer duration of any particular military assistance case. 
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597 In a personal interview with anonymous. U.S. State Department Official. Amman, Jordan (30 
August 2012), it was confirmed that military sales to Jordan are also contingent on Israeli 
approval. 
205 
Upcoming opportunities are routinely advertised before the bidding process starts. In 
one case, the US Army announced plans to procure “materials and provide 
engineering services to include ... logistics/training support for the Jordanian Armed 
Forces.”598 This particular announcement went through nine amendments following 
contractors’ feedback,599 which also underscores that the flow of knowledge and 
information from the private sector into government both sets in very early and may 
directly shape programmes and decisions. 
Many cases are for a duration of several years and by definition involve a 
long-term presence and involvement of the private sector. For instance, a contract 
announcement in September 2006 worth up to $450 million for a comprehensive 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system notes that both US government and contractor 
personnel would be involved in providing services and technical reviews from 2006 
through 2013.600 Such systems, even after the conclusion of this contract after seven 
years, require ongoing servicing and support that is likely to be procured with FMF 
(i.e. US government) funds and potentially sole-sourced from the original prime 
contractor who by that time will have built a deep working relationship with the 
Jordanian Armed Forces. Also, in such contracts, the number of US government and 
contractor personnel is often negotiated as the programme progresses;601 given the 
noted manpower shortages of the US military and its preference not to second 
                                                             
598 US DOD DA (ACC), Government intends to Release a RfP. 
599 Ibid. 
600 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (2006), “Jordan – 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance System,” 28 September 2006 (Washington, D.C.), Press Release Transmittal 
No. 06-58, accessed 7 December 2012, available at 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2006/Jordan_06-58.pdf. 
601 See e.g. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (2008), “Jordan – 
Increment 2 Requirements for Border Security Program,” 09 September 2008 (Washington, 
D.C.), Press Release Transmittal No. 08-97, accessed 7 December 2012, available at 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2008/Jordan_08-97.pdf. 
206 
uniformed personnel for such duties,602 the contractor-government personnel ratio is 
likely to be large. Overall, therefore, the logistical tail-end of equipment and services 
acquisition leads to the very early involvement of and long-term business 
opportunities for industry in such FMF-cases, and the use of the Total Package 
Approach further strengthens this dynamic.603 
 
The ubiquity of industry from the pre-award phase through to re-award that 
exceeds the “textbook” process outlined earlier is not the end of the line. Two 
examples of specific FMF cases in Jordan further highlight on the one hand the 
pervasiveness of informality, and on the other point out that foreign aid policy may in 
practice come in second behind business development or particularistic interests.604 
A Mobile Combat Training Centre 
The first instructive case study that highlights the nexus of requirements 
identification, production of official correspondence, the acquisition and delivery of 
systems and services, and the subsequent benefit of customer-provider relationships 
is the sale of a mobile combat training centre by Cubic to the Jordanian Armed Forces. 
A well-informed source points out that in general “the way it would tend to work is 
that the company would work directly with the foreign military to build the 
requirement, not with the US government, and get the foreign military to make the 
request.”605 This would begin with P&A requests and continue all the way through 
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LORs and LOAs until an eventual contract tender and signing. Together they “would 
build that requirement from the ground up if it is a new requirement.”606 
The mobile combat training centre was one such new requirement. It was 
announced in 2009,607 valued at $12 million, delivered in 2012, and said to have 
provided a new capability to the Jordanian military.608 That sale started with a 
grassroots campaign with the Jordanian simulation centre several years earlier. At the 
beginning, Cubic conducted an education programme on the training products and 
services that are available to enhance the Jordanian military’s live training capability. 
To begin with, Cubic provided information on laser or tactical engagement simulation, 
instrumented simulation, force-on-force training, and showed videos. The company 
also invited the prospective customers to the USA, where both they and the US 
military – after the Jordanian customers liaised with the US Security Cooperation 
Officer (SCO) in Jordan – hosted them in various locations and demonstrated training 
equipment and technologies. Upon returning to Jordan, the case essentially ‘trickled 
up’ from the action officer to the head of the simulation centre and ultimately to the 
chairman of the Jordanian Armed Forces who approved the planned acquisition. 
“That was the first step – they then had to sit back and start writing requirements. 
Defence companies like Lockheed or Boeing or Cubic will help write the 
requirements”.609 This happens because foreign military staffs often lack the 
necessary technical background to write such a document, when there is no 
indigenous defence industry to support the effort, and because the SCOs generally 
have a high number of cases on their desks that span programmes of such technical 
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and other breadth and depth that it is impossible for their small teams to be able to 
complete all the relevant work on their own or to have all the detailed technical data 
and knowhow available.610 
Once the requirements document for the simulator had been written it was 
sent out to industry for comment. Since Jordan intended to procure the system with 
funds out of its FMF account, the document went through the aforementioned process 
of passing through the SCO and DSCA until it eventually turned into a standard US 
acquisition process.611 
As the above underscores in more detail, the role of the contractor can be 
even more salient than the “textbook” process suggests. On the one hand the 
companies become active much earlier than the regulations suggest (which would be 
during the follow-on discussions to a P&A request). Here, industry helped identify, 
develop, and request the requirement. Moreover, Cubic hoped that Jordan would 
decide to buy from them after market-testing, with the source saying that as a 
company “you would hope that [your advice] prevails, that you have built the proper 
relationship”. In other words, these grassroots efforts, that predate the contract 
tender by as much as five years,612 are part of the company’s business plan and 
investment into the future as the company becomes an increasingly known quantity 
to the customer. Moreover, successful programme delivery can be an evaluation 
criterion in future competitions.613 This makes the successful delivery of an initial 
project an even more valuable investment, especially if follow-on services are 
necessary and extend over years during which the relationship develops further. 




613 Interview with anonymous. U.S. Military Sources with Intimate Knowledge of Foreign 
Military Assistance Programmes (2013). 
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The King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) 
Another case study of significant geopolitical interest is the aforementioned 
special operations training centre KASOTC. According to a US special forces 
representative, it was aimed at enhancing “regional theater security interoperability” 
and thereby “[strengthening] multi-national counterterrorism capability”.614 It has 
grown to become a major training facility for special forces from US allies in the 
region. Since its inception it was driven from the highest political levels in both Jordan 
and the USA, giving it a particularly political nature that also dominated its 
procurement process. 
In this case, FMF essentially served as a tool of convenience for a project that 
was politically wanted by the US and Jordanian governments. It was public 
knowledge that KASOTC had been planned earlier but abandoned due to a lack of 
funding. It was eventually funded through a supplementary emergency budget 
request in FY2005, following several suicide bomb attacks in Jordan’s capital Amman 
that highlighted, to the USA, the need to bolster counter-terror capabilities in Jordan 
and the region. According to a leaked cable KASOTC was supported as a “centerpiece” 
of the “extensive cooperation on [counter-terrorism] and intelligence issues.”615 In 
other words, it is the kind of project ‘that is going to happen.’616 
KASOTC’s pre-history runs counter to the key concern of cost efficiency and 
competition. Upon completion, operations and maintenance were contracted out to a 
company that did not have the best price but who was said to have a close 
relationships with both the Jordanian royal court and the implementing agency in the 
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USA.617 This is remarkable insofar as the operation and maintenance of KASOTC had 
been a thorny issue since its inception, as leaked documents suggest,618 with 
anonymous sources pointing out that the facility was at least initially not financially 
viable without financial support from the US government.619 It is not clear whether US 
funds continue to support KASOTC’s maintenance and operations directly, but at least 
indirectly this is the case through booking training courses there.620 
The case of Cubic’s sale showed the importance of FMF as a source of funding 
for business – the sale would have been unlikely to happen without it. KASOTC 
meanwhile additionally underscores FMF’s direct links to high-level strategy and how 
they may override other concerns. 
Triangulating and Extrapolating the Evidence from Jordan 
The in-depth evidence from Jordan is also more generally valid for other 
contractors than Cubic and regions other than the Middle East. First, foreign sales are 
– unsurprisingly – a source of income to be developed as any other business 
opportunity, not least because it is of little relevance to the company where the 
money ultimately comes from. In 1998, Cubic reported an opening of defence exports 
to Latin America and that it had immediately expanded its “marketing efforts and 
product demonstrations” there.621 Similarly, in 2013, the company noted that it was 
working to leverage its mission support division’s expertise in special operations 
capabilities “to develop new international customers.”622 In 1998 Lockheed reported  
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successfully completing a “world tour to 32 countries” to showcase its C-130J aircraft 
that had “generated 28 proposals.”623 
These observations directly tie into the relevance of foreign sales to industry 
and, as argued later, the proclivity of companies to lobby on foreign military policy if 
sales are substantially endangered. Cubic’s defence division made 39% of its sales to 
foreign customers,624 and calls its “international footprint in more than 35 allied 
nations ... a key ingredient to [its] strategy.”625 At Lockheed Martin the figure stands at 
17%,626 and at 10% at Northrop Grumman.627 While Cubic is however a relatively 
small company, Lockheed – despite its lower macro-level dependence on foreign 
sales overall – for instance depends on foreign buyers for entire product platforms 
such as the F-16 aircraft;628 in 1999 all 124 F-16s went to foreign buyers, 74 of which 
(i.e. 60%) went to Egypt and Israel and are thus most likely FMF-funded, while Israel 
had an option for another 60 F-16 aircraft,629 raising the potentially FMF-funded 
component to at least 73%. The relevance of foreign military sales is set to increase 
with the relaxation of export controls and because of declining US defence acquisition 
budgets.630 Lockheed hopes that its international business will grow,631 while 
Northrop Grumman wishes for international sales to at least partially offset reduced 
domestic sales.632 While US government-funded sales are more immediately relevant 
to the question of contractors contributing to US strategic interests since the USA is 
spending its own money on them, it should be recalled that any foreign military sale is 
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considered to be of strategic, bilateral relevance to the US government.633 This is why 
sales grew from an annual average of $12 billion in the 2000s to over $30 billion 
under President Obama and a peak of at least $62 billion in notified sales in 2012.634 
This is not least because Shapiro “consistently advocated on behalf of U.S. companies. 
And I am not the only one. Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary Nides, other senior 
State Department officials, regularly advocate on behalf of U.S. bidders on foreign … 
procurements. It is no longer just our Ambassadors who promote U.S. defense trade 
in a given country.”635 
The observations further underscore the growing relevance of long-term 
services and relationships for contractors’ balance sheets, investors, and business 
plans. Asked whether companies who have worked in Jordan for years and built a 
close working relationship with the Jordanian military would use these contacts to 
directly pitch ideas to the Jordanian military, the FMS chief in Amman replied “they 
would be silly not to!”636 Cubic, for instance, despite primarily appearing to be a 
producer of hardware, made 58% of its sales in FY2013 from services-related 
work.637 Such longer-term, relatively stable revenue flows are intended to bring a 
modicum of stability to an industry that often experiences significant fluctuations in 
business.638 Maintaining long-term relationships with customers is equally important 
and communicated as such to shareholders and regulators.639 Both should translate 
into success in “re-compete contracts to retain ... customers”640 and to “leverage ... 
returns through follow-on business with existing customers” as was assumed 
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above.641 The company therefore seeks to focus more on international customers to 
whom it is easier to sell “multi-year, turnkey contracts” covering products and 
services.642 
Foreign military aid is of course not limited to the Middle East. In fact, this 
attractive business domain is expanding. The US global strategic footprint is far from 
receding; drawdowns of uniformed personnel from some regions do not necessarily 
signify a reduction in the overall presence. Contractors, in fact, can be a welcome 
substitute for the thinly stretched regular armed forces, so that the drawdown may in 
fact lead to more business, not less. There is, on the one hand, the shorter-term 
business that is directly linked to major military operations and a subsequent US 
presence. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the training of new army and police forces has 
been predominantly conducted by private contractors. $1.5 billion were appropriated 
for 2011 and 2012 for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and were spent at the discretion 
of DOD and through its channels, thus often flowing back into US industry.643 In 
Afghanistan, as of November 2011 81.27% of the total workforce training the Afghan 
National Police were contractors.644 
In addition to these shorter-term activities there is also long-term business 
security, underscored in the ongoing US military expansion into Africa. The private 
sector plays a critical role as force multiplier without which the USA would arguably 
be incapable of conducting its operations on the continent.645 The USA from the start 
outsourced the majority of its efforts. It set up an umbrella contract in 2003 to 
                                                             
641 Ibid, p. 10. 
642 Ibid, p. 12. 
643 U.S. Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2012), 
“Interim Report on Spend Plans for Fiscal Years 2011-2012 Iraq Security Forces Funds”, SIGIR 
12-015 (Arlington, VA), pp. 1, 4. 
644 78.47% of the workforce involved were support contractors, while 13% of trainers were 
contractors, bringing the total to 81.27%. Cf. U.S. Government Accountability Office (2012), 
Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor 
Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, GAO-12-293R (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office), p. 3. 
645 See e.g. Kwesi Aning, Thomas Jaye, and Samuel Atuobi (2008), “The Role of Private Military 
Companies in US-Africa Policy,” in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 118, 
pp. 613–628. 
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implement the training of peacekeepers.646 Contractors were involved in all major 
African peacekeeping and training projects since the 1990s, beginning with the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), its successor African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), and the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI).647 The most famous case may be Liberia, where DynCorp first 
demobilised the old force and then recruited, vetted, and trained the new armed 
forces. Sean McFate, who was the programme manager in this case, correctly foretold 
in 2008 that the newly established Africa Command (AFRICOM) would likely 
outsource much of its capabilities, “given the complementary interests of supply and 
demand,”648 further underscoring the overlap of government and industry’s interests. 
This business is substantial; for instance, the USA is estimated to have spent $500 
million on contractors to train about 13,500 of the 18,000 African Union troops to be 
deployed in Somalia.649 It is therefore unsurprising that Africa is seen as possibly the 
most promising future market,650 not least to offset declines in business “once the 
Iraq and Afghanistan ‘bubble bursts’” as McFate predicted in 2008651 and an industry 
publication confirmed in 2012.652 Industry therefore developed the capabilities that 
are most likely to be in demand – training and equipping, security sector reform, and 
                                                             
646 Renée de Nevers (2012), “Looking Beyond Iraq: Contractors in US Global Activities,” in 
Contractors and War: the Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations, eds Christopher 
Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 60–81, at 
p. 70. 
647 Marquis et al., Building Partner Capacity, pp. 88–90. ACOTA training, for instance, is 
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648 Sean McFate (2008), “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as 
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p. 653. 
649 Jehron Muhammad (2012), “U.S. Military Contracting Out Operations in Africa,” in Final Call 
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 See also Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt (2011), “U.S. Relies on 
Contractors in Somalia Conflict,” in The New York Times (10 August 2011). 
650 De Nevers, “Looking Beyond Iraq”, p. 69. Business is also significant for instance in Latin 
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651 McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries”, p. 653. 
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war-zone logistics –653 so that its future business development efforts are more likely 
to succeed. As in Jordan, the US government involves industry early on, even 
advertising requests for information that are explicitly not remunerated or tied to a 
future contract tender. Industry’s high response levels further prove that these 
activities are nonetheless seen as worthwhile investments.654 
Finally, the reciprocal dependency between contractors and the US 
government extends to the domain of foreign military assistance. For industry, these 
sales – from the bilateral political relationship and the licensing of defence exports to 
the creation and funding of programmes like FMF – occur at the behest of 
government. The government also makes the decision to outsource – almost by 
default – rather than attempt to meet these responsibilities in-house. But this 
dependency also works in the reverse and highlights the strong reciprocity of the 
relationship and of the government’s dependence on industry to implement its 
foreign military aid policy. As the FMS chief in Jordan put it, “without the commercial 
sector, military assistance operations would be severely scaled back. If it were not for 
the contractor workforce, there would be much less we could do in terms of 
capacity”,655 meaning that US foreign military assistance to a large extent is only 
possible because of contractors. 
V. 3. iii. Observations from the UK 
The UK’s efforts in foreign military assistance are much more limited. Also, in 
line with its broader defence political guidelines, they are much more ad hoc and 
targeted towards specific areas and regions of interests, open to multi-national 
cooperation and the pooling of resources, and not designed with the benefits of 
industry in mind. While the UK provides support to its industry to increase sales 
                                                             
653 McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries”, p. 654. 
654 See e.g. U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy Air Systems Command (2011), “FMS Global 
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),” Solicitation Number: N61340-11-R-0025, 10 January 
2011 (Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Orlando, FL). 
655 Personal interview with Lt Col Keith Harrington. 
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overseas, it does not subsidise the purchase of UK goods and services by other states 
by setting up FMF-style programmes or sharing its acquisition channels with aid 
recipients.656 In fact, UK programmes are of no comparable scale to those of the USA. 
The possibly largest, longest-running security sector reform programme 
began in Sierra Leone in 1997 and by 2001 staffed 65 regular personnel in the 
IMATT.657 While there were higher strategic considerations, most notably the 
intention to eventually provide Sierra Leonean forces for international peacekeeping 
missions especially in Africa,658 the reasons for going into Sierra Leone were mostly 
found in UK politics. They included lobbying in London to intervene, the strong sense 
of a moral imperative to act in the former colony, and using Sierra Leone as a testing 
ground for the UK’s ability to fulfil its conflict prevention and stabilisation role.659 
Yet, even such a relatively large single project involving the comparatively 
smaller UK armed forces did not involve civilian contractors as trainers but at best for 
minor menial tasks. The UK itself routinely draws on its model of “Short Term 
Training Teams”,660 an inherent institutional capability of British Army units who are 
“already paid for”,661 and who in return maintain in-house expertise in this domain 
while “training the trainers”.662 The general evidence provided earlier thus fully 
applies to the Sierra Leonean case and further underscore that internal organisational 
arrangements inhibit the outsourcing of foreign military training by the UK. The very 
few contracts that are let do not follow a regular pattern as in the USA but rather an 
ad hoc one depending on the case, for instance “in-country through Defence Sections 
or their host Embassy or High Commission. These contracts are shaped by the 
                                                             
656 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources. 
657 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson (2009), Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 
1997-2007 (Birmingham: GFN-SSR), p. 54. 
658 Personal correspondence with Joe Edkins. 
659 Albrecht and Jackson, Transformation Sierra Leone, p. 171. 
660 Personal correspondence with Joe Edkins. 
661 Telephone interview with UK MOD source on defence engagement policy. 
662 Personal correspondence with Joe Edkins. 
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appropriate policy desks in line with Defence Engagement objectives”.663 While it is 
not possible to discern the total contractor component of the entire Conflict Pool 
expenditure, only about 19.2% of the MOD’s Defence Assistant Funds of £12 million 
were spent on contractors in 2011-2012.664 
The UK’s mission in Sierra Leone benefited from contracting only in two 
peripheral ways; first, other UK government departments hired individuals under 
contract for advisory functions and capacity-building programmes, underscoring the 
similar shortage of in-house capabilities in the civilian agencies that also prevails in 
the USA. Secondly, and more relevant to the immediate training mission, the UK-led 
programme in Sierra Leone benefited from the mostly US-funded ACOTA programme, 
under which US contractors provided elements of the training for the first unit 
rotation to Somalia and were expected to do so again in May 2014. Among the 
objectives of these linkages between IMATT and ACOTA is to make efficient use of 
available resources,665 i.e. the British concern for “value for money”. 
Other cases of UK aid are quite limited, with sources listing examples such as 
the transfer of used vehicles or field beds.666 Overall, UK military aid thus in no way 
compares to, for instance, US government-funded purchases of entire aircraft fleets or 
maintenance services, for instance. More importantly, in no case does outsourcing 
automatically occur or is the private sector prominently present. The effort rather 
appears to grow almost entirely out of the government agencies who, if in need of 
synergies, draw on and share resources with other available programmes and 
resources such as ACOTA before contracting for a capability on their own. 
                                                             
663 UK MOD, “Response to FOI Request 18-01-2013-142054-012”. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Personal correspondence with Joe Edkins. 
666 Interviews with senior and mid-level UK government sources. 
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V. 4.  The Foreign Military Assistance Policy Networks 
Previous chapters showed that industry is a participant, or at least an 
observer, throughout the process and across its hierarchy, ranging from problem 
identification and deliberations through agenda-setting, delivery, and evaluation of 
acquisition policy. At the same time, no potential veto player of comparable clout was 
observed on the higher policy levels. The examinations above both support these 
findings while also highlighting an important divergence. The UK, whose high defence 
services acquisition process differed comparatively little from the USA, displays a 
significant variance regarding the outsourcing of foreign military assistance. This 
variance originates in its different approach to domestic industry, its stronger focus 
on immediate gains to its own armed forces and national security objectives (which 
do not include industry to a comparable degree as in the USA), and the significantly 
different role of its legislature in framing and affecting ongoing and future policy. 
As noted, foreign military assistance occurs on two levels, a higher, politico-
strategic one and a lower, acquisition and implementation-oriented one. They are 
however by no means entirely distinct or disconnected, with defence attachés, 
military cooperation offices, and various brokers maintaining an uninterrupted link 
between these two analytically separated levels. 
On the strategic level, the network comprises the legislature (in the USA) and 
the central government departments for foreign and defence affairs. Both the US State 
Department office for political-military affairs and its counterpart in the UK MOD 
engage little with industry, liaising mostly internally, with other government 
departments, and with the legislature (more so in the USA than the UK).667 
It is primarily at the US Congress that industry and foreign military sales enter 
the strategic level of foreign military assistance policy in the USA, while its near-
                                                             
667 This was invariably confirmed in a personal interview with US DOS sources, interviews 
with senior and mid-level UK government sources, personal interview with UK MOD source, 
and telephone interview with UK MOD source on defence engagement policy. 
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absence in the UK Parliament partly explains the variance. While the US Congress 
appropriates funds on a line-item basis for foreign spending, the UK Parliament does 
not have such detailed controls over UK government spending, making it an 
uninteresting target for industry, while the executive government departments were 
shown to be little interested in subsidising UK industry to provide foreign military 
assistance. In the USA therefore, and by contrast to the UK, foreign diplomats 
- through lobbyists, brokers, and possibly companies – focus in particular on Congress 
to lobby for their interests, but also target the policy-setting offices within the State 
Department and elsewhere in the executive.668 This likely results in part from the 
revolving door that spins more freely between Congress and industry, think tanks, 
and consultancies than with government departments, and the possibility of making 
campaign donations to lawmakers. Unfortunately, lobbying records are inconclusive 
as they give no practicable information on the content of conversations with 
lawmakers beyond at best mentioning something akin to ‘discussing foreign military 
sales policy’, and DOD does not make lobbying disclosure forms publicly available.669 
As noted earlier, there are important connecting points to the lower 
implementing levels and specific sales cases. On the one hand there are the host 
country governments and armed forces. In the case of Jordan, both anonymous and 
on-the-record sources report that even government ministers and MPs have no 
possibility to gather information about the inner workings of what is routinely called 
the “black box” of the military unless they are themselves senior members of those 
                                                             
668 In the US political system, the number of involved agencies makes it a steep effort to lobby 
all of them, but it also means that a “no” from one does not mean that the matter is decided. By 
going around some who had refused expanding economic aid to Jordan in the 1997, for 
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eventually receiving even more than the requested sum, according to the country’s former 
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Washington, D.C., now Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington, D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Offices, Washington, D.C. 
(06 May 2013). 
669 FOI and other requests by this author asking about lobbying records in general and 
regarding the US-Jordanian military aid relationship in particular were unsuccessful. 
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inner circles.670 These policies are made directly by the royal court, with HM King 
Abdullah II himself being a Major General in the Jordanian Special Forces,671 and his 
brother Prince Feisal sharing the military background and interest in the country’s 
armed forces.672 The Jordanian military attaché in Washington, D.C. serves as the 
main official gateway to the US government and Congress and gatekeeper for military 
aid and companies in the USA. LORs and LOAs would pass on his or her desk, and he 
or she serves as a point of contact for the US security cooperation office in Amman. 
The attaché’s work is said to be unknown to civilian Jordanian officials, who are not 
involved in those discussions.673 Not only officials such as Prince Feisal, but also 
individuals with close relationships within those circles pitch FMF-funded 
acquisitions directly to the Jordanian military who then approaches the US embassy 
for want of indigenous funding to procure – against the discouragement of sole-
sourcing – the specific product or service from a specific contractor.674 
Further connecting both levels are the military cooperation offices and US 
embassies overseas. Embassies, including the SCOs, are in constant contact with 
industry on the one hand and the host military on the other. DOD operates military 
cooperation offices in approximately 150 countries, and there are currently more 
than 10,000 US government employees involved in security cooperation.675 Although 
the UK also operates defence attachés and military liaison offices that proactively 
identify local needs and develop projects, the fact alone that they are not present in 
                                                             
670 Personal interview with Bassam Haddadin. Member of the Jordanian Parliament. Jordanian 
Parliament, Amman, Jordan (28 August 2012), and personal interviews with senior and other 
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671 Sharp, “Jordan”, p. 2. 
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nearly every country, let alone with an average of 67 working in some capacity for 
military cooperation per country, further underscores the difference in scope. Also, 
the direct links with UKTI further highlight the increasing profit orientation of also 
the military relationship, i.e. the facilitation of larger sales.676 
Brokers and various types of industry representatives complement the link to 
the implementing country levels. On the one hand, they facilitate contact or directly 
pitch products on behalf of industry. One of these brokers, mentioned by two 
anonymous sources, is said to control 80% of the military sales market in Jordan by 
successfully networking with Jordanian officials, connecting companies with senior 
Jordanian officials who have some leverage over acquisition decisions, and 
supporting the funding process.677 On the other hand, sales representatives should 
also liaise and have a relationship with the US embassy; “the good ones do.”678 They 
also operate within various social networks or at large gatherings such as Jordan’s 
biannual Special Operations Forces Expo (SOFEX) that take on an entirely informal, 
yet potentially influential role regarding specific FMF cases.679 On more than one 
occasion anonymous sources pointed out that conversations at social gatherings 
allow for informal information exchange and the discussion of ongoing or potential 
FMF-cases. Such gatherings can involve any combination of the actors identified 
above, and provide a confidential setting to make progress without the constraints of 
standard operating procedures.680 
Implementing agencies are then the main active link to industry once a 
programme is implemented. They regularly interact with customers before LORs are 
                                                             
676 Cf. telephone interview with UK MOD source on defence engagement policy and interviews 
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submitted,681 with anonymous sources suggesting it may be as often as half the time 
for some implementing agencies,682 and work closely with industry as the military 
“implementing” agencies increasingly become managers of projects rather than the 
actual implementers.683 
The network map below confirms the earlier finding that, in the USA, industry 
is involved throughout the process and virtually across the entire hierarchy. While it 
did not routinely get involved at the highest levels, section V.5 shows how industry 
may try and affect high-level decisions regarding foreign military policy once its core 
interests are directly affected, rather than waiting for others whose core competency 
is framing strategic debate to do so. The above also confirmed that foreign military 
assistance in the USA is a policy around which networks develop that overwhelmingly 
share an interest in furthering the relationship and expanding the practice. As the 
involved actors are almost exclusively government, industry, consultants or brokers, 
and the military, the significant overlap of their interests and the absence of potential 
veto-players is further underscored. 
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Figure 5.1: The US foreign military assistance network, centred around industry. Relevant 
relationships not directly involving industry are included, also to demonstrate the 
contrast with the UK below. 
 
The above map underscores that industry has links to and working 
relationships with all actors involved, and probably is the only actor to whom this 
applies. Its relationships are in fact central and (what the map cannot show) cover the 
entire timeline of the process. Moreover, the simultaneous lack of veto-points and 
potential veto-players who do not have an immediate stake in foreign military aid as 
well as the considerable overlap of interests suggest a relatively narrow scope of 















The symbolic absence of the legislature in the UK’s network represents the 
key difference in terms of the process. Industry is structurally at best peripheral to 
the UK’s foreign military assistance policy, which revolves much more closely around 
immediate politico-strategic aims.684 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The UK foreign military assistance network, centred around government. 
V. 5.  Problems and Concerns 
The oft-noted mutual dependency between contractors and government as 
well as the overlap and increasing convergence of their interests are central to some 
of the concerns and the problems raised by the evidence in this and the next chapter. 
The concerns revolve around the state’s autonomy in decision-making in the context 
of sweeping contractorisation,685 as well as the militarisation of foreign policy 
                                                             
684 The SSR effort in Sierra Leone, for instance, is not viewed to have created tangible economic 
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efforts, esp. USA 
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through the increased implementation of assistance efforts by the defence 
establishments at the relative expense of diplomatic and development agencies.686 
V. 5. i. Making and Shaping High Political or Strategic Decisions 
Regarding the question of who owns political decisions, it is feasible to 
distinguish between two kinds of decisions; high politics or strategy on the one hand, 
and acquisition and programmatic decisions on the other. Regarding the higher 
political levels, industry is certainly active in this regard, especially when it views its 
core interests as being directly threatened. As was observed in chapter II, industry 
routinely reproduces those narratives and discourses used by the government and 
that favour high spending and commitments in the domains in which they are active. 
This occurs in small surroundings such as the delivery of the combat simulator in 
Jordan which reiterated the increased interoperability with US and other allied 
forces.687 This may also occur less explicitly when industry advocates or 
representatives appear on national television shows on a daily basis, often without 
disclosing their ties to industry while advocating for expansive policies, most recently 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.688 Statements in support of either pre-existing 
government policy or of expanding commitments are not surprising either, as the 
existence of such revenue streams creates an incentive to harness them. Such 
recitations aim at network selectivity by narrowing the potential agenda so that it 
supports continuous investments in interoperability, building partner capacity, 
intervention capabilities and so on. 
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On the reverse, if these revenue streams are endangered, industry can gear 
into action to oppose government policy. Industry has previously shown willingness 
to lobby for FMS as well as the smaller FMF programme, for instance under the Carter 
administration. After the passing of Presidential Directive (PD) 13, whose bottom line 
was reducing FMS and FMF-type spending from FY1978 onwards to only comprise 
cases with direct relevance for US national security, and no longer introducing new 
advanced weapons systems in other world regions,689 DOD sent out what its critics 
called the “Leprosy Letter” to US embassies directing them “to no longer speak with, 
interface with, or support US military or defence industries doing business in those 
countries.”690 About thirty or forty defence companies from the United States banded 
together and formed a lobbying group, the American League for Exports and Security 
Assistance (ALESA). ALESA hired a recognised union leader as its head and several 
former Congressional staffers “who knew the ins and outs of Capitol Hill”, and 
received funds from all member companies to lobby against PD 13.691 While President 
Carter did not respond to the pressure, President Reagan reversed the directive 
within five months of taking office. He applied the opposite argumentation as to the 
international security ramifications of military sales and aid, and emphasised the 
economic and other benefits of such sales.692 The size of the companies matters in this 
context; companies that depend on foreign sales in general or for individual 
production lines – like Lockheed Martin for the sale of its F-16 aircraft – are more 
likely to get involved if FMF or FMS are limited. 
Supporting this analysis on a country-specific level, Shana Marshall dissects 
how the close military-to-military relationship between the USA and Egypt, the 
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sizeable FMF funds appropriated annually for military aid, and the jobs argument 
create a confluence of interests that encourages the continuation of aid despite severe 
criticism of the Egyptian Army’s behaviour since the 2011 uprising in the country. 
The US embassy in Egypt and its military planning colleagues are quoted in a leaked 
cable to have been “especially concerned” with those production lines that depend on 
foreign customers, an argument that is repeated by lobbyists on Capitol Hill.693 Given 
the composition of the network, they would not face substantial opposition from 
veto-players given industry’s clout and economic value to the country; significant cuts 
are therefore unlikely “[whatever] muted criticism of the aid program exists within 
Washington”.694 
The crisis elicited by the removal of President Mohamed Moursi in Egypt on 3 
July 2013, and subsequent calls for the cancellation of military aid, are a case in point. 
As a company like Cubic would have to lay off only one person and not discontinue 
any production lines if aid was suspended for a full year, it did not lobby on this 
issue.695 Lockheed Martin’s reaction was markedly different. The company received 
the largest share of FMF-funded contracts in Egypt between 2009 and 2011, among 
others for F-16 jets and maintenance.696 Faced with minor reductions in military aid, 
the Egyptian government, for its own image repair, hired a lobbyist who, incidentally 
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or not, also represents Lockheed Martin.697 The eventual freeze in aid that the US 
government imposed was more symbolic than substantial. It only withheld major 
equipment while continuing to send supplies for border security, counterterrorism, 
spares for US-origin military equipment, and military training and education.698 
Moreover, financial shortfalls were offset by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia, two US allies.699 
The above also underscores yet again the importance of the role assigned to 
the US defence industry in national defence, making the US government willing to 
delegate even important foreign military political activities. For instance, after the 
1991 Gulf War, the head of the operations directorate in Saudi Arabia, who was a pilot 
in the Royal Saudi Air Force, praised the Allies’ air war and noted that the Royal Saudi 
Air Force needed a long term vision. The officer hired what a well-informed source 
called “some of the best and brightest operational and tactical thinkers from the 
defence industry”, and put them in a place called the “cave”, a basement in downtown 
Riyadh.700 There they met for over two years on a daily basis to build the long-term 
and short-term plans for the Saudi Air Force, addressing questions about its 
composition, the kind of equipment it would have, how it would train, what kind of 
weapons it would have, and how it would interface with other parts of the Saudi 
armed services and with US Central Command (CENTCOM). The US and UK 
governments, when they became aware of what was going on, reacted “very 
positively” given the “spectre of Iran”. While remaining in the loop, they maintained a 
hands-off approach while industry advised the Saudi military on its strategy and 
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acquisitions for the future.701 The UK government’s reaction in particular underscores 
its willingness to allow industry a lot of leeway in its international business dealings 
while not actively subsidising the effort. 
In sum, where there is concern for others’ military capabilities, for the 
domestic defence industry, mutual dependence between government and industry, 
and programmes or channels in place which connect them, there are abundant ways 
for various actors to successfully raise concerns throughout the hierarchy.  
V. 5. ii. Making and Shaping Acquisition or Programme Decisions 
The example from Saudi Arabia, only secondarily about military aid,702 
epitomises the fuzzy border between higher political decision-making and lower 
acquisition and programmatic decision-making. The project aimed at establishing 
Saudi Arabia as a militarily formidable US ally in the region, and planned the 
military’s equipment acquisition in detail. On the lower levels contractors were 
shown to take on a prominent, potentially dominant role that manifests itself 
especially but not exclusively in sourcing decisions. 
While the desired involvement of contractors was already shown to be high, 
the unregulated space for influencing acquisitions is vast. This is most clearly 
epitomised in concerns about sole-sourcing, i.e. buying products or services from a 
particular source without competition.703 The online forum “Ask an Instructor”, in 
which US security cooperation officers and other government officials can ask for 
advice from instructors at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 
contains numerous examples.704 Sole-sourcing is officially discouraged by DOD, which 
                                                             
701 Ibid. 
702 The country in the early 1990s struggled to pay for its purchases and had to rely on 
industry accepting a delay in payments under the general guidance of the US government. Ibid. 
703 Sole-sourcing must not be confused with single-sourcing, which means that there exists 
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704 Cf. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “Ask 
an Instructor,” accessed 5 March 2014, available at http://www.disam.dsca.mil/aai/. 
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states that competition should be the normal procedure.705 Several questions enquire 
about “exceptions” and “loopholes” in the ability of government personnel to “inform 
a FMS customer to provide Sole Source Direction for any procurements”706 or to 
speed up acquisitions by buying from a source that already provided similar services 
or equipment.707 
Moreover, even though every acquisition request must formally originate 
from the purchaser, the above forcefully illustrated that the purchaser may be in 
ongoing, non-memorialised contact with various subject-matter experts who could 
for all intents and purposes be the de facto originators of the idea, as was the case 
with Cubic’s combat simulator. The government is both aware and apparently 
untroubled by this seeming contradiction, accepting the natural customer-provider 
relationships as normal and beyond their control.708 The FMS chief in Jordan simply 
said that “business development people want to make business with Jordan”,709 a 
process to which the identification of requirements is inherent. Thus, even though the 
USA discourages sole-source acquisitions, it cannot stop the type of process from 
occurring in which a company “may approach HRH Prince Feisal or somebody else 
and pitch an idea. The Jordanian Armed Forces, for instance, may get excited about 
the product or service”, and for want of indigenous funds ultimately use FMF to 
purchase that product or service sole-source against the recommendation of the US 
government,710 especially when the country has relatively strong autonomy in how to 
spend its funds as in the case of Jordan. In other words, the contractor comes in much 
earlier than the regulations suggest is the norm, which would be after the initial 
                                                             
705 US DOD DSCA, Security Assistance Management Manual, C6.3.4. 
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708 Interview with US military expert sources on FMS, and interview with senior source with 
knowledge of CTC sale to Jordan. 
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710 Ibid. 
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identification of the recipient country’s requirements.711 Thus, rather than being 
merely responsive to the customer’s needs, industry aims to shape its customers’ 
thinking and acquisition interests and hopes that – when the purchase goes out for 
competition – their company is in a good position to win.712 As the FMS chief in Jordan 
put it, industry “would be silly not to” use their relationships in the country to pitch 
sales ideas.713 
On the programme level, industry can thus take a very prominent role in the 
running of the foreign military relationship. The Egyptian Army’s spokesman went on 
the record to state that contractors not only support the US and Egyptian 
governments with a plethora of services; “the companies are brokers who help 
manage the aid.”714 While this may not be the norm and depend on the role the host 
country allows the company to play,715 it represents yet another avenue for business 
to be close to or even occupy a key node in the foreign military relationship. This 
should be especially attractive in countries that are entitled to spend their FMF-funds 
directly with US companies.716 
Finally, contractors can bring their weight to bear in budgetary disputes. 
According to sources familiar with the review process to the FY2011 budget, when it 
came to foreign military assistance funding “the Pentagon effort, supported by civilian 
contractors, [was] far more massive than at State, giving DOD an advantage in terms 
of research, preparedness, and execution.”717 The Section 1206 authority, that had 
                                                             
711 US DOD DISAM, Management of Security Cooperation, chapter 5, pp. 2-3. 
712 UK sources confirmed that, in general, informal consultations with government officials are 
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 Cf. also footnote 612. 
713 Personal interview with Lt Col Keith Harrington. 
714 Marwa Awad (2012), “No Foreign Army Bases in Egypt, Army Spokesman,” in Reuters (12 
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715 Interview with US military expert sources on FMS 
716 Cf. US DOD DSCA, Security Assistance Management Manual, C9.7.3. 
717 Josh Rogin (2009), “The Real State-Defense Turf War Begins,” in Foreign Policy (03 
November 2009), accessed 23 August 2012, available at 
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been opposed by some in the State Department on the grounds that this type of 
authority traditionally belongs there rather than in DOD, remained – well-funded – in 
the Pentagon, despite pledges by the Secretary to demilitarize foreign policy.718 
Contractors are thus a force to reckon with in the policy and budget battles on Capitol 
Hill, in this case for a programme that was predominantly implemented by 
contractors.719 The sense of involvement and being part of a team in budget 
negotiations, observed in chapter IV, also applies here.720 
V. 5. iii. Playing into the Militarisation of Foreign Policy? 
The last example leads over to the wider concerns about a militarisation of US 
foreign policy721 that also arose specifically with regard to DOD’s expanding foreign 
military assistance authorities, programmes, and spending.722 Not only the Army 
regards its soldiers as “uniformed ambassadors of the nation … [who] provide the 
nation strategic access” to otherwise inaccessible places, as the Chief of Staff of the 
Army put it;723 as noted earlier, contractors are strategically drawn on for the same 
purpose.724 By enabling a quasi-military presence in areas where a uniformed 
presence would be unwelcome, contractors make the military course of action – 
already advantaged over its diplomatic and development-political counterparts in 
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terms of budgets and manpower –725 even more feasible; decision-makers need not 
look for a non-military alternative. 
Thus, in the USA, despite the declining percentage of military aid in the 
foreign aid budget there is no indication of an overall decline in military cooperation. 
Rather, with the new DOD authorities and programmes, the practice has diversified 
and now increasingly escapes the direct control and funding of the State 
Department.726 In the UK, meanwhile, the cross-government programme in Sierra 
Leone led to the acceptance of a potentially central role for the military in 
development policy and among the development community.727 It thereby also 
gradually normalised a security-oriented approach to post-conflict reconstruction 
and made the use of the military instrument more likely in the future. 
On the receiving end, military assistance policy can also run counter to the 
broader political and economic objectives pursued in the host country. The longest-
serving member of the Jordanian parliament for instance points out that there are no 
debates about security and defence as the governing majority regards this as a 
taboo.728 There is no parliamentary committee for security or defence despite having 
been proposed in the past. There is therefore no possibility, not even for members of 
parliament, parliamentary committees, or members of the governing cabinet to gain 
insights into the military relationship. The Jordanian Ministry of Planning, in reports 
and data it provides on foreign aid, lists the full amount of $650 million of aid from 
the US (of which $300 million is earmarked for military aid) but does not mention 
military aid at all in its breakdown.729 Military aid to Jordan, according to anonymous 
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sources, is not subject to human rights or democratisation concerns unlike the non-
military aid budget.730 Being weighed against the strategic benefits, and lacking 
credible and sustained high profile criticism, the same interpretation applies to 
Jordan as Marshall made regarding Egypt;731 aid to Jordan is not likely to face a 
credible threat of cessation despite the strategic, acquisition, and ethical concerns 
discussed above. 
V. 6.  Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine whether the findings made at the high 
political levels, especially in chapters III and IV, apply as strongly to sub-domains as 
assumed, and how outsourcing both contributes to selectivity and creates 
opportunities for change. In broad terms it found evidence to support the claims that 
the combination of the contextual factors of strategic posture, resource constraints, 
and a general prominence of and preference for industry in providing services drives 
military outsourcing. This chapter confirmed the assumptions developed in 
section III.3.ii: states narrow down their notion of “inherently governmental” when 
faced with resource constraints. The current practice of supplying defence policy 
creates incentives for industry to coalesce and pursue revenue streams. Also, the 
network comprises mostly government and industry actors, and – not least due to the 
dearth of veto-points and strong veto-players – change is relatively unlikely. 
However, it also underscored the relevance of an intervening factor that 
introduces variance to our cases, namely the willingness to subsidise the domestic 
defence industry, and relatedly the degree to which defence policy focuses primarily 
on immediate national interests and their own armed forces. Combined with the 
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different role of the legislature these factors go a long way to explaining the variance 
between the USA and the UK regarding both the scope of foreign military aid efforts 
and the degree to which they are outsourced. In line with Policy Network Theory, the 
USA and the UK did not utilise the same policy instruments in order to reach the same 
policy goal,732 and thus display a variance in their acquisition outcomes. 
Overall, the chapter confirmed both the systemic nature of contractorisation, 
with the ‘bias towards business’ being unmissable in US foreign military aid 
programmes, and the factors reducing its levels in the UK being equally located in the 
contextual and systemic frame of the policy process. Similarly, the concerns raised 
originate on the systemic level, with a strong dependency, patchy regulations, and 
incomplete paper trails allowing for the effective takeover of military assistance 
practice by industry and the further equation of industry’s interests and activities 
with those of the US government. The militarisation of foreign policy through 
contractorisation is then systemic, but ultimately only a by-product. Finally, the use of 
contractors allows the US government to skirt the question of reappraising its 
otherwise untenable gap between political commitments and available economic and 
manpower resources while continuing to extend its military-to-military relationships 
and the provision of military assistance in pursuit of (support for) its globe-spanning 
military operations. In other words, the implementation of policy – the third part of 
the process as per PNT – so far successfully feeds back to reaffirm rather than 
challenge the contextual factors identified earlier. 
And yet, the chapter also highlighted the avenues that could lead to a potential 
change of these structures. On the one hand this could be an ideational shift that leads 
to a reappraisal of the value of the domestic defence-industrial base. In the UK, this 
could lead to an increase, in the USA to a decrease in foreign military assistance 
efforts and the use of contractors therein. On the other hand, the political process – 
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while all but devoid of veto-points and potential veto-players – could substantially 
alter its fundamental operating logics. This would happen in particular if the 
legislature in the USA, on whom much of the policy, its funding, and the centrality of 
industry in these Congress-appropriated programmes hinge, reappraised its stance 
towards either of the driving forces. Similarly, either of the involved public actors 
could renounce the mutual dependency between industry and government and thus 
similarly force a reduction of either of the driving forces identified above. In other 
words, change would require the introduction of a significantly interested and well-
connected veto-community. 
Nonetheless, as it stands now, foreign military assistance is likely to display 
‘more of the same’ in the foreseeable future, as neither of these developments are on 
the horizon in either country. In the USA, the expansiveness and durability of defence 
strategy and posture remain unchallenged as they are not seen to have abjectly failed, 
as do the valuation of private sector knowhow, products, and workforces, and the 
pervasive informality that reinforces rather than challenges the prominent role of 
industry throughout the process and across its hierarchy. Moreover, the formal 
linkages of foreign military assistance to national security present formidable 
challenges to any actor wishing to substantially alter the policy.733 Levels of funding 
and its attractiveness to companies’ business development divisions and lawmakers’ 
electoral districts are set to remain high. There are no material or political incentives 
for actors to challenge the status quo from within, with international sales being 
encouraged not least to offset reduced defence spending at home. Moreover, neither 
country, as the next chapter underscores, fears the mutual dependency between 
government and industry, while in the UK neither a strategic nor an economic or 
financial realignment appears likely in the foreseeable future. Introducing the UK 
Parliament into the process represents a much larger challenge than changing the 
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thinking within the US Congress because it would require constitutional rather than 
merely procedural change. The UK’s military aid policy should thus also remain 
largely unchanged for the time being. Future policy cycles should further normalise 
and institutionalise the practice in the USA and keep it relatively limited in the UK. 
The policy and practice of foreign military assistance thus confirm the 
selectivity that narrows down policy options in such a manner that the remaining 
alternatives all involve ‘more of the same’. They also provided further support for the 
view that in the USA the interests of government and industry are converging ever 
more. And yet, at least formally, in foreign military assistance industry remains an 
addendum to ostensibly government-led policies, and merely provides products and 
services as required on a seemingly ad hoc basis. As the next chapter illustrates, the 
USA and the UK are going a significant step further in a much larger sub-domain of 
the defence enterprise. In military logistics, rather than maintain a formal division 
between public and private actors and workforces, we are witnessing a deliberate, 
formal, doctrinal, and force structural reshaping of military support services into a 
public-private enterprise. Interests do not only partly overlap but are increasingly 
becoming one. Representing both the origin of the contemporary wave of 
contractorisation as well as one of the most money-intensive domains, the 
outsourcing of military logistics is therefore especially representative of the 
trajectory of military services contracting well into the future. 
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VI.  Outsourcing Military Support: Heralding the Trajectory and 
Ramifications of Military Services Contracting 
This chapter concludes the overarching analysis. The previous four chapters 
established the context and drivers of contractorisation, mapped the high politics of 
contracting, and identified their “bias towards business”. They also argued that the 
relatively successful implementation of defence policy with contractors reinforces 
these driving forces and creates incentives for industry to organise in pursuit of 
business opportunities. Moreover, regarding the trajectory of outsourcing, they 
suggested that the future is likely to witness more contractorisation rather than less, 
not least because of the distribution of access to decision-makers, the dearth of veto-
points and strong veto-players, and the resulting network selectivity. The cases of 
foreign military assistance and military logistics serve to prove these assumptions. 
This chapter, while also affirming the first points, in particular sets out to identify the 
future trajectory of military services contracting. 
The present chapter provides ample evidence in support of the contention 
that the USA and the UK are facing an ever-narrowing range of policy options, i.e. an 
increasingly strong network selectivity. The process manifests a selectivity due to 
which contracting will expand and increasingly become normalised as standard 
procedure. This comes at the expense of other potential options of generating and 
supplying military capability, and is representative of the further shrinking of the 
“core competencies” of the armed forces. This chapter draws on possibly the most 
relevant and thus representative area of military services contracting for the purpose 
of identifying the future of military outsourcing: support services, or military logistics 
broadly conceived. While it again reappraises the drivers, politics, and practice of 
outsourcing, this chapter thus addresses perhaps most comprehensively the last 
research question about the feedback effects and future trajectory of military services 
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contracting and its ramifications. It thereby completes the arc of the analysis that 
began with the background and context of military outsourcing, continued with its 
contemporary politics, practice, and likely trajectory, and now concludes with 
confirming the above. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it establishes the relevance of military 
logistics and support services to strategy, decision-making, and the policy process. 
Secondly, it surveys the drivers and practice of the very far-reaching 
contractorisation of military support that confirm the general findings above.  
Having set the stage, it then provides detailed evidence for the claim that 
military services contracting in the USA and the UK is on a path not only towards 
‘more of the same’ (i.e. stabilisation of the practice) but its deeper entrenchment. It 
conducts an in-depth survey of doctrinal, practical, and policy evolutions over the 
past decades and into the future that points towards the intentional and formal 
integration of public and private workforces in this area to demonstrate the 
reaffirmation and deeper entrenchment of the contextual driving forces identified 
earlier. Being one of the largest, most labour and money-intensive domains, and 
stretching back deep into history, logistics outsourcing sets standards. The identified 
drivers, actors, and trajectory are thus particularly representative of the long-term 
future of military services contracting in the USA and the UK.  
Finally, the chapter discusses the trajectory’s ramifications for the policy 
process. As in chapter V the key issues are closely tied to the increased mutual 
dependency between government and industry. They are operational security, 
assured capability, the recurring question of contractors’ role in government 
decision-making, and the potential effects on the incentive structure of government 
officials. 
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VI. 1.  Military Support Services and their Relevance to Strategy and 
Defence Policy-Making 
Military logistics has been around for as long as there has been warfare.734 
William Tuttle, a retired U.S. Army General, postulates that it has two major 
components: the projection and sustainment of military force, that is the movement 
and supply of both soldiers and their equipment.735 It is a critical component of 
warfighting because it directly determines the size and type of military force that can 
be deployed to an operational theatre, how long the deployment will take, and which 
tempo of operations can be sustained.736 Martin van Creveld famously concluded not 
only that logistics is of equal importance as strategy, but that it is the ultimate 
determinant of strategic possibilities.737 US joint doctrine on logistics includes 
engineering and maintenance services, underscoring its immediate ties to the 
defence-industrial base and the services industry.738 Schulte thus calls logistics “the 
hinge between industry and war”,739 giving it prime strategic relevance. Kane thus 
finds that “logistics takes its place in strategy as an arbiter of opportunity.”740 
Support services are not only the backbone of strategy but also cover both the 
entire timeline of the policy process as well as the entire civilian and military 
hierarchy of operational planning and implementation. Kane therefore argues that 
“logisticians must participate in the making of strategy, not only in the planning phase 
of a campaign, but every step of the way.”741 Military logistics is a particularly fitting 
case study of military outsourcing given its direct links to industry and politics which 
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provide for ample observations of direct and indirect effects on the policy process. Its 
sheer scope, and manpower and money intensity moreover suggest that the 
observations made here are representative of the broader phenomenon of military 
outsourcing, including and particularly its future trajectory. 
VI. 2.  The Drivers and Practice of Outsourcing Military Logistics 
Contractors, especially in military logistics, have always been part of the 
defence enterprise.742 They have been used as early as the U.S. War of Independence, 
or more recently in the Vietnam War.743 The US military introduced the Civil Reserve 
Air Fleet in 1951 to use civilian airliners’ planes in emergencies, for which the carriers 
in return are “given preference in carrying commercial peacetime cargo and 
passenger traffic for DOD.”744 It has in fact abolished its Military Air Transport Service 
in 1966 and the successor Military Airlift Command in 1992.745 Nonetheless, despite 
being part of the defence enterprise for centuries at the very least, the contemporary 
degree, pace, comprehensiveness, and organisational formalisation, normalisation, 
and integration of the use of contractors differ qualitatively from the past. 
Security contracting, especially the corporate type, is correctly seen to have 
expanded tremendously after the end of the Cold War. However, despite what the 
literature implies by centring its entire discussion of the spread of contractorisation 
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more broadly on the outsourcing of security responsibilities,746 private security does 
not represent the beginning of the phenomenon. Even though most studies 
acknowledge that especially logistics had been outsourced much earlier and is of 
prime strategic relevance, Singer for instance falsely claimed that the booming 
logistics sector was born after the post-Cold War downsizing.747 While it is true that it 
grew most rapidly after 1990, chapter III in particular demonstrated that the 
foundations for logistics outsourcing were laid decades earlier, including the policy 
vehicles still being used today such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. In 
fact, even at the height of the seemingly self-sufficient military of the Cold War, 
military support services were the most likely to be outsourced at least to a limited 
extent, long before such a move would have been contemplated regarding security. As 
was shown, contractorisation in the 1990s was the reaffirmation of processes that 
had begun decades earlier rather than the start of something new. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that after the Cold War the contractorisation of logistics followed a 
similar logic as in the security domain. Most notably, the new uncertainty in the 
security environment, coupled with demands to cut defence budgets and the 
reiterated push to buy into the privatisation paradigm, created pressure to expand 
(not begin) and further formalise the practice that had rapidly accelerated throughout 
the 1980s in particular. The end of the Cold War thus exacerbated but did not create 
anew many of the driving forces that stretched back much further. 
It is for this reason, i.e. because the practice of military outsourcing more 
generally is most closely associated with and historically goes back the furthest to the 
costs of the support end in the 1950s, that the drivers of logistics outsourcing were 
already covered in some detail in chapter III. Various US doctrine documents agree 
with the general characterisation of the drivers identified in chapters II and III, and 
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use an almost identical formulation to describe the driving forces behind 
contractorisation. They however lack the cyclical element, that is the reinforcement of 
these drivers with every iteration of this mode of supplying force, and an appreciation 
for the fundamental role of broad strategic objectives. Joint Logistics doctrine for 
instance names as among the factors that have led to the increased reliance on private 
contractors in defence logistics the reduction of troop numbers especially in the tail 
end, increases in the number and tempo of military operations, increasing complexity 
and sophistication of equipment, and the imperative of creating efficiencies and 
economies precisely by outsourcing “commercially adaptable functions.”748 This last 
point underscores the centrality of ideas, of buying into core competency and various 
other ‘best business practices’.749 The following therefore focuses on providing 
additional nuances that are more specific to logistics and were therefore not 
discussed in chapter III. 
VI. 2. i. Changing the Orientation from Threats to Capabilities 
First, there is the strategic aspect to contractorisation. During the Cold War, 
Western governments maintained almost self-sufficient military supply chains 
because of the need to guarantee operational capability and a dependability of 
supplies. Using an alternative model was regarded as impossible because of the risk 
to collective Western security in the event of military failure.750 While advocates of 
contractorisation would assert that the market is actually quicker and more efficient 
in responding to contingencies, the point here is that states were not ready to take the 
potential risks involved in outsourcing. 
The end of the Cold War and the resulting absence of a known, long-term 
adversary engendered a change from a threat-based to a capabilities-based defence 
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posture, with wars of choice against often ill-defined enemies replacing existential 
wars of survival in defence planning and practice.751 Rapid and global power 
projection capabilities became essential especially to US military planning. As a 
thought leader in the field, former Director of Logistics (J4) at the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Lt Gen. (ret) C. V. Christianson put it, “[gone] are the days when we had the time and 
resources to position large stores of assets in response to a stable, predictable 
threat.”752 Rather, the future operating environment would be defined by dispersion, 
complexity, and uncertainty.753 Uncertainty became the central variable around 
which the military supply chain is organised,754 and logistic capabilities more 
generally occupy the centre-stage of post-Cold War strategy and operations.755 
Creating a capabilities-based force reinforced some of these pressures and 
engendered new ones, especially in the field of knowhow, as is discussed next. The 
same applies to the noted practice of politically setting troop caps for deployments 
that led to reduced uniformed logistics components of deployed forces since they can 
politically (and often legally) be more readily replaced than combat and combat 
support forces.756 
VI. 2. ii. New Capability Requirements and Resource Constraints 
The broader range of potentially sudden military operations created a series 
of new sophisticated capability requirements. The logistics systems of the Cold War 
era were notoriously slow and cumbersome, not least because they did not have to be 
especially quick or flexible until the Cold War ended. The simultaneous pressures to 
reduce defence spending made the acquisition of new systems and capabilities 
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especially challenging, which may not have been pursued so swiftly without cutting 
off funding.757 The Peace Dividend removed the funding, while the military bought 
into the Revolution in Military Logistics. 
Central among the new required capabilities was sustaining rapidly deployed 
forces around the globe. This entailed moving away from large stocks of pre-
positioned supplies and towards lower but much faster moving stocks. The key 
objective was “just-in-time logistics” in order to drastically reduce turnaround times, 
and the system to be implemented was “distribution-based logistics” (as opposed to 
supply-based logistics that operated off of high stockpiles). From the start, the 
acquisition of these capabilities intentionally involved the private sector. The main 
document of reference for buying into the RML – which was acknowledged by three 
successive U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff to be a prerequisite for any Revolution in Military 
Affairs –758 was the Joint Vision 2020. It stated that the military “will work jointly and 
integrate with the civilian sector, where required, to take advantage of advanced 
business practices, commercial economies, and global networks.”759 The private 
sector was included by default mostly because, as the subordinated 1998 Army 
Science and Technology Master Plan put it, “the RML requires logistics to acquire a 
number of capabilities it currently does not have”,760 but which are to be found in the 
private sector, such as bar coding, GPS, and various inventory techniques. 
This approach corresponds with the broader spirit at the time that was 
discussed in chapter III, in particular the valuation of private sector knowhow, the 
adoption of commercial practices, the suggestion by the CORM that the military 
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comprehensively outsource numerous logistics capabilities, and the accelerated shift 
of maintenance work to OEMs. These plans were supported among others by 
Business Executives for National Security, whose Paul Taibl wrote a report that is 
distributed by the military’s Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and that 
argued for much more aggressive outsourcing and privatisation than was envisaged 
in the 1997 QDR.761 The noted DSB task force report similarly recommended that the 
military “use contractor logistics support for new systems” and “discard [the] concept 
of ‘core’ logistics requirements” or at least revise them in such a manner “to allow 
reliable contractors to perform ‘core’ work.”762 As was suggested at the end of 
chapter III, the “core” continually shrinks under the current circumstances. 
VI. 2. iii. Core Competency, Force Structure, and Manpower Issues 
These strategic and technological changes and challenges directly affected the 
military force structure, reproducing manpower pressures that had existed before. On 
the one hand the serving armed forces had already gradually lost in-house logistic 
knowhow since the switch to an all-volunteer force and the expanding 
contractorisation of various support responsibilities since the 1980s. The 
introduction of entirely new technologies and processes in the 1990s could not be 
fully absorbed by the uniformed troops for want of capacity, and neither was this 
desired with the adoption of the core competency model. Moreover, with intellectual 
property rights remaining in the private sector, the growing flow of technologies, 
techniques, and processes from the civilian into the military sphere therefore 
included the personnel necessary to install the new systems, train the military in their 
use, and maintain them for decades to come. As three U.S. Army Generals wrote in 
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1999, the RML therefore “equates to strong partnership with industry”.763 With 
current contract spending on operations and maintenance in the USA exceeding those 
on new equipment ($150 billion and $100 billion annually, respectively),764 their 
statement was proven right. In the UK, similarly, building on earlier efforts of close 
public-private cooperation,765 “Through Life Capability Management” was introduced 
in 2006. It involves, in particular, the transfer of assets to industry and long-term 
partnerships that span the entire life-cycle of a system from research and 
development through production, operation, maintenance, training, and 
decommissioning.766 
On the other hand, partly predating these technological developments, was an 
unintended consequence of the all-volunteer force that, combined with the loss of 
organic knowhow in the active forces, further drove contractorisation. Having to 
become active on the job market for recruitment, the military had to make attractive 
offers to potential recruits. Recruits now demanded higher quality services, especially 
when deployed on operations overseas. Illustrative thereof, Lt Gen. (ret) C. V. 
Christianson recounted that shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Army 
“could not have [the troops] living off of food in a bag, we had to give them regular, 
healthy meals”.767 Thus, already in the early stages of the war, Army commanders on 
the ground were provided with almost anything they asked for, including “burgers 
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and ice cream and Xboxes”.768 As the remaining in-house knowhow on feeding the 
troops was very basic, further outsourcing was inevitable to satisfy these demands. 
The New Employment Model in the UK that seeks to ensure the military profession 
remains attractive and that is discussed in more detail below, shows that the same 
dilemma applies in the UK.769 
Finally, in addition to the core competency model that already shrank the 
uniformed logistic component, and the increased technological sophistication of 
equipment and other systems that necessitated the growing use of contractors, there 
is a political driving force to reduce especially the uniformed support end of a 
deployed force. The use of contractors can further lower the number of deployed 
uniformed troops, and because contractors do not appear in official counts of 
deployed total forces (or in casualty counts), replacing a regular soldier with a 
contractor source can fulfil the political objective of making a military operation 
appear smaller than it is. A former U.S. Army logistics instructor confirms as much, 
writing that “one way to circumvent limitations on military personnel is to use 
civilian contractors.”770 Moreover, as the U.S. General Accounting Office acknowledges 
in a report on LOGCAP, even when outsourcing was a choice of last resort “Army 
officials stated that it is often necessary to use LOGCAP ... because of planning 
considerations such as ... the political sensitivity of activating guard and reserve forces 
... and the desire to maintain a relatively low U.S. presence.”771 Former ACDS (LogOps) 
Jeff Mason confirms that the same is true in the UK,772 where the problem is politically 
exacerbated because the planning commences with troop counts rather than, for 
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instance, the number of helicopters that need to be deployed to reach an objective 
and then deploy the required number of troops to operate the kit. As a result, 
reconciling manpower caps with required capability means that the military is 
pressed to outsource capabilities in order to satisfy both demands.773 
In summary, the above again confirms the interlinked nature of strategy, 
technology, and manpower in driving contractorisation in general, and underscores 
the trailblazing role of military logistics within military outsourcing more generally. 
The following briefly surveys three key areas in which these factors substantially 
drove outsourcing. 
VI. 2. iv. The Practice and Expanding Scope of Contractor Logistics 
Outsourced military support covers a wide range of services. Taylor offers a 
useful typology of the types of services provided by contractors overseas: transport 
into theatres of operations, maintaining capability within theatres of operations by 
supporting both people and equipment, using military capability (e.g. intelligence, 
interpreting, operating equipment such as drones, or interrogation), and conducting 
reconstruction operations (including security sector reform, static security 
provision).774 Figure 6 below is a simplified, amended version of Taylor’s 
classification, additionally containing the planning function but removing the 
reconstruction function. 
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Figure 6: Typology of Contractor Support Roles in Overseas Military Operations 
 
The following surveys key areas that have undergone the most extensive 
contractorisation: planning and management, basic people support, maintenance, and 
transportation. These three areas cover all logistics-relevant types of tasks 
undertaken by private contractors in overseas theatres of operation as identified by 
Taylor, and are therefore appropriate for the purposes of wider generalisation.775 
This survey highlights the dependency of the US and UK militaries on contractor 
support and provides the basis for the examination of the trajectory of logistics 
contracting in particular and military services contracting more generally. 
Planning and Management Services: LOGCAP and CONLOG/OCSS 
The U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program mostly covers fairly 
mundane tasks which are of no interest to the literature on the “privatisation of 








































security”. More importantly, it marked the beginning of the U.S. Army’s shift to a 
distribution-based combat service support system,776 directly tying it to the RML and 
the future of logistics outsourcing. Introduced through legislation (Army Regulation 
700-137) in 1985, “LOGCAP is aimed at providing another support alternative by 
capitalizing on the civilian sector in [the continental USA] and overseas locations.”777 
LOGCAP includes preplanning for the use of civilian contractors in wartime to 
augment regular troops who are thereby released to conduct other missions. The 
legislation explicitly suggests converting existing uniformed logistics units to fulfil 
other duties,778 effectively transferring these responsibilities to the market. 
Within a short time, LOGCAP’s scope expanded considerably. First, LOGCAP 
was intended “to provide basic life, facilities and [logistics operations centre] support 
until other force support capabilities arrived or could be arranged”.779 However, it 
almost immediately became the standard mode of supplying Army troops in theatre 
rather than remain true to its name and be an ‘augmentation’ program.780 Secondly, 
its third iteration applied a considerably broader definition of “contingency” that 
described any operation deemed to be in the national interest. LOGCAP thus became 
the “contract of choice” in the war on terror after 9/11, and was furthermore 
extended to a period of up to ten years to reduce the costs of competition.781 Thirdly, 
LOGCAP contractors were so “adept at integrating [their] staff into the [military] 
commander’s staff” while replacing almost all organic capability, that Army 
commanders in Iraq would say that they “needed more KBR” when speaking of 
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logistics services.782 Overall, therefore, rather than augment force structure the Army 
thus got rid of force structure to the point of being unable to operate without 
LOGCAP. As a result, the U.S. Army is “wedded to LOGCAP now unless you want to go 
back and reinstitute the organic support that you pretty much jettisoned.”783 
The UK emulated LOGCAP and introduced its own umbrella contract 
Contractor Logistics which unlike LOGCAP serves all three Armed Services.784 KBR, 
who also held several iterations of LOGCAP in the USA, has held CONLOG since 2004 
and its successor contract Operational Support Capability Contract since 2012.785 The 
contract provides a planning team that is embedded at the UK military’s Permanent 
Joint Head Quarters, and provides reach-back planning and task execution capability 
to the Armed Forces in various operational theatres, excluding security and courier 
services.786 
Maintenance and Contractor Logistics Support 
As noted, OEMs reoriented some of their efforts to secure maintenance work 
in the 1990s. By retaining the technical data on new systems they all but ensured that 
they had the best chances of winning support contracts.787 An early example was the 
U.S. Army’s Rapid Response to Critical Systems Requirements Program for $5.4 billion 
from 1998 until 2003 for services to rapidly activate and sustain older weapon and 
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communication systems, including overseas. Its successor expanded its scope to 
include research and development and no longer focus only on critical systems.788 
Longer-term contracts that epitomise the government’s (often deliberate) 
dependency on industry’s knowhow are the various “contractor logistics support” 
(CLS) arrangements. For instance, the U.S. Special Operations Command awarded 
Lockheed Martin a contract in 2009 for nine years worth up to $5 billion for 
worldwide CLS services (aircraft, vehicle and equipment maintenance, critical 
infrastructure support, and business process transformation).789 The UK has pursued 
such arrangements as standard procedure for years before the USA.790 This grew 
possibly out of the much stronger budgetary pressures that forced the government to 
relinquish control over logistics, and the UK’s stronger willingness to mutually 
depend on other actors. The model with maximum contractor involvement, 
“Contracting for Capability”, sees a prime contractor providing a total support 
package.791 This model is on the increase because it makes budgeting easier for the 
MOD in a difficult budgetary environment, as it enables the military to access 
capability without making high down payments but rather spend limited amounts 
over long periods of time, often decades. For instance, the Royal Air Force is expected 
to lease new strategic tanker aircraft over periods extending to 27 years.792 UK 
doctrine acknowledges approvingly that such arrangements further increase the 
“interface and dependency between commercial supply chains and the Joint Support 
Chain (JSC) as Defence contractors seek to optimise” their processes “from ‘factory to 
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foxhole’.”793 In other words, the mutual dependency of government on industry’s 
capabilities and of industry on government contracts grows. 
While there is evidently an expansion of maintenance support in both 
countries, the aforementioned 50-50 rule in the USA represents a statutory obstacle 
to a much more comprehensive level of maintenance outsourcing. During the height 
of military operations the military depots that remained after the reductions of the 
military in the 1990s ran at near-capacity, prompting renewed calls to reform Section 
2464 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code that contains the rule.794 That said, half of existing 
maintenance work does go to the private sector, and the trajectory – discussed in 
more detail below – certainly does not aim at an increase of the military’s own share 
of the work, but rather towards its reduction. Even with the 50-50 rule remaining 
formally in place, DOD in the FY2002 and FY2003 NDAAs introduced exceptions to 
this rule that were made permanent in the FY2007 NDAA and that aim at enabling 
partnerships – such as PBL – to occur in depots without being subject to the 50-50 
rule.795 
Transportation 
The reduction of the defence transport infrastructure has long been ongoing, 
leading to government dependency on private transport capabilities and capacities. 
As noted, the US military abolished its air transport service in 1966 and its successor 
airlift command in 1992, and is banking on a civilian air fleet and similar sealift 
arrangements. The UK has similarly scaled back its domestic infrastructure as well as 
                                                             
793 UK MOD, JSP 886: CLS, p. 8. 
794 See Steffes, “Maintenance Depots.” 
795 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics & 
Materiel Readiness), “Title 10 Requirements (50/50 Partnering)”, accessed 10 December 
2014, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/mr/5050_partnering.html. 
255 
global transportation capabilities for decades as well as reduced its naval surface fleet 
drastically since the 1980s.796 
Beyond tapping into existing civilian transportation infrastructure and supply 
chains, both militaries also operate dedicated contracts with civilian transport 
providers, including logistics giant DHL. In the USA, DHL primarily runs the military’s 
postal services, while in the UK “DHL moves anything that needs to be moved 
internationally for MOD that is not moving or cannot be moved on a military vehicle 
(e.g. RAF plane or a naval vessel), except into live theatre.”797 Most DHL services for 
the UK are in support of training exercises or the resupply of permanent bases 
overseas. DHL’s global forwarding division has held such contracts with the DOD and 
MOD for up to 25 years, which entails using DHL freight capacities for the movement 
of items.798 DHL is embedded at PJHQ. There, it sits within the Defence Supply Chain 
Operation and Movements department.799 
Contractor transportation services are also highly relevant for battlefield 
logistics and more widely within areas of operation. Retrograde operations of the US 
military in Afghanistan relied extensively on industry, where a few uniformed 
logisticians “[oversaw] a small army of civilian contractors”.800 The US military has 
signed numerous short-term contracts in support of retrograde from Afghanistan, 
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some lasting as little as six months.801 The military supply chain into theatres of 
operation, in other words, has become closely integrated into the globalised supply 
chains of the private sector, underscoring the dependency of government on the 
private sector for the supply and sustainment of military operations. 
VI. 3.  The Trajectory of Contractorising Military Support (and of 
Military Services Contracting Writ Large) 
The cited logistics contracts provide pointers as to the direction of travel of 
military services contracting. LOGCAP, for instance, underwent a type of mission-
creep-development that turned an initially ad hoc activity into a standard procedure 
that was also true of contracting more generally. Beginning in the 1980s as an often 
ad hoc, stopgap measure, it has since become widespread and normalised, with the 
US and UK governments depending on contractors (and often vice versa). The 
following traces this trajectory beyond the status quo into the future. It provides 
supporting evidence for the assertion that contractorisation becomes further 
entrenched due to network selectivity and as long as there are no shocks to the 
system and process. The further deepening of the pubic-private relationship can be 
divided into three stages and aspects: 1) formalisation of outsourcing in policy, law, 
and doctrine, that led 2) to the public-private integration of capabilities, workforces, 
and processes, and that 3) is accompanied by the continued transfer of knowledge 
and assets out of the military. Defence is becoming a public-private enterprise, in line 
with Christianson’s observation that “a 21st-century organization does not have to 
‘own’ all of the assets” it needs to deliver desired outcomes.802 
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VI. 3. i. Formalisation 
The UK: from Contractors on Deployed Operations to the Total Support Force 
After years of utilising contractors on deployed operations without a specific 
policy in place to govern such deployments, the UK introduced the Contractors on 
Deployed Operations policy. CONDO “is a concept of utilizing contractors within 
operational areas to support and augment the capability of the UK’s Armed Forces as 
part of the civilian component of the military force.” As a guiding principle, CONDO 
“should be attractive for the contractor whilst demonstrating value for money for the 
MOD.”803 CONDO deployments, for whom responsibility mostly lies with PJHQ, ACDS 
(LogOps), and the Front Line Commanders, could be both pre-planned to meet 
routine demands or in response to urgent requirements in ongoing operations.804 
Underscoring the gradual move from ad hoc stopgap contracting to the 
increased standardisation of the practice, CONDO policy states “that the early 
involvement of the Contractor in the planning process is key to the successful 
deployment of the Contractor” in order to be able to respond quickly to “any existing 
or likely future needs.”805 And yet, even in 2011, the military and civilian leaderships 
in operational planning did not include contractors sufficiently, if at all, in the early 
planning stages.806 CONDO’s initial acceptance had remained more of an intent than a 
followed practice. 
During the course of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the scope of 
responsibilities held by contractors under CONDO expanded rapidly, resulting in the 
new term Contractor Support to Operations (CSO). CSO unites support in logistics, 
combat support, equipment, infrastructure, and personnel services, including CONDO, 
CLS, CONLOG, and Sponsored Reserve contracts.807 To identify the requirements of 
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future deployed forces, then-ACDS (LogOps) Maj. Gen. (ret) Jeff Mason initiated the 
formation of a Tiger Team composed of government and industry officials.808 
The Tiger Team departed from the interpretation that the Armed Forces 
cannot address the future requirements on their own using only uniformed 
personnel. This is noteworthy insofar as the military is seen to have been culturally 
strongly opposed to outsourcing.809 As Mason points out, the British experience in 
Afghanistan in particular, despite not being an exemplar for future wars, had clarified 
the need for more contractor involvement in the UK since “the capabilities that were 
being provided by contractors could never be replicated by the military.”810 The Tiger 
Team Report (TTR) found accordingly that CSO was “no longer confined to logistic 
support” and that contractors represented up to 40% of the overall UK force in 
Afghanistan, and criticised that contracting had remained often ad hoc despite the 
dependence and scope.811 The team thus recommended a formalised, close 
integration of contractor and regular forces into an overarching “Total Support Force” 
which combines military, civilian, and CSO components as well as external support 
elements from other government agencies, countries, NGOs, and other actors. It seeks 
to foster a “one team – one fight” approach.812 
Having been launched around the same time that another group within the 
MOD developed a new Whole Force Concept (WFC),813 the TTR ended up not as a 
standalone report but became an integral component of the comprehensive 
reorganisation of the UK military, as is discussed below. 
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The USA: Contractors in Policy and Doctrine – the “Total Force” and Beyond 
The doctrinal and strategic accommodation of contractors has long remained 
inconsistent in the USA. On the doctrinal level, joint doctrine in 2008 included 
contractors in its definition of the joint logistician.814 The U.S. Army’s field manual 4-0 
on sustainment from 2009 however merely mentions the industrial base without 
acknowledging its centrality, stating that “[deployed] U.S. forces rely increasingly on 
contracting to supplement organic sustainment capabilities and on contractors to 
perform a growing percentage of many sustainment functions. … Commanders should 
also consider contracting and host nation support options as possible sources of 
support” (emphasis added).815 Similarly, joint doctrine states that “theatre support 
contractors assist deployed engineer forces”.816 These formulations suggest that the 
military still had a choice whether or not to draw on industry or that this was done ad 
hoc on a needs-basis whereas by that time it was already dependent on it. In fact, by 
2009 contractors matched and partly exceeded the number of regular troops 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, almost matched their numbers in the entire 
CENTCOM area, and in their majority provided the armed forces with sustainment 
services.817 The formulations were thus highly out-of-date. The same holds true even 
for Army Regulation 715-9 on Operational Contract Support, the successor to the 
LOGCAP regulation. It states that, in essence, contractor support should be a last 
resort option to “be utilized after full consideration of all sources of support, to 
include organic Army resources, deployable Army civilians, other Services, 
multinational, and host nation support agreements.”818 
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US doctrine and policy have not yet completed the step of formalising the 
integration of contractors into the force structure to the extent that the TSF does in 
the UK. Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of the centrality of contractor support is 
considerably more advanced on the US policy than the military level. The 2006 QDR 
included a statement that should have provoked more debate than it did, and which 
scholarship has been slow to pick up on. It defined the “Total Force” – which 
“constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity” – as comprising the DOD’s “active 
and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors”.819 More 
recently, the FY2013 NDAA included several line items that had been suggested by 
Senator Claire McCaskill who had been highly active for many years on 
contractorisation, in particular in the context of the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting.820 Section 843 of the FY2013 NDAA mandated DOD to publish guidance 
clarifying authority and responsibility regarding operational contract support by 
2014. Among the issues to be covered is assessing “total force data in support of 
Department force planning scenarios, including the appropriateness of and necessity 
for the use of contractors for identified functions”.821 Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which 
provides the legal basis for the US military and the DOD’s roles, missions, and 
organisation, was amended to mandate the measurement of capability now and for 
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future military operations, and – more importantly – for the inclusion of contingency 
contracting in the military educational curriculum.822 
By firmly establishing contractor support to military operations in the early 
planning stages, military education, and management processes, contractor logistics 
will no longer be treated as a potential, ad hoc option but as a standard practice. It has 
become further entrenched over the course of the post-9/11 wars, and the translation 
into standard procedures, education, and doctrine strongly suggests that this should 
stabilise the practice for the longer term. The likely creation of a U.S. Office of 
Contingency Operations (USOCO) epitomises the long-term formalisation of overseas 
contracting as it places contractors squarely in the minds of military planners.823 
VI. 3. ii. Integration 
The formalisation of contractor support to deployed operations is a 
significant process in and of itself as it normalises the practice politically, 
organisationally, and financially. Mere formalisation is however not the most 
advanced form of contractorisation as it alone does not necessitate the use of 
contractors in operations but merely offers the vehicles required to outsource if 
intended. The next step that is being taken in both states – more forcefully in the UK – 
is putting the increasing integration of public and private manpower into practice by 
creating a joint public-private workforce for the long term. 
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The UK: Realising the TSF – Integrating Industry and Military in New 
Employment Structures, Processes, and through Collective Training 
The realisation of the TSF is a strong manifestation of the deep involvement of 
industry in force structure policy and planning. As the 2012 White Paper put it, 
industry is working with the MOD to develop and realise the TSF to create a “fully 
integrated and sustainable military (Regular and Reserve), Civil Service, and 
contractor support force”. Work had “begun and continued industry involvement is 
being facilitated through dedicated [CSO] working groups.”824 
DHL’s Paul Glanville described an example of such industry input into the 
design and realisation of the TSF. He suggested picturing the relationship between 
industry and the military as “a bit like a slinky.”825 Initially, the TSF had seemed to 
concentrate mostly on how to get contractors out on deployed operations, how to be 
able to rely on doing so, and how to increase this practice. At the same time, military 
planners had neglected the other side of the “spring” or “slinky”. Drawing on the DHL-
operated airport in Brize Norton as the centre of the spring, Glanville described that 
when, for instance, aircraft handling personnel is deployed forward, that can create a 
vacuum at Brize Norton, leading Glanville to suggest to the MOD to think about how 
to pull in manpower from the private sector to allow such deployments, and reversely 
to facilitate those same people moving out into industry when not deployed on 
operations.826 His suggestion appears to have resonated well within the MOD, as a 
discussion organised by ADS in summer 2013 centred around the notion of “putting 
surplus resources out into industry as well as pulling from industry”, the first time 
Glanville – who attended many workshops and events around the TSF – heard that 
conception being discussed in a wider circle.827 
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In addition to such solicited input from industry into government, another 
industry source discussed at length how the business development division of one of 
the largest service contractors routinely sends unsolicited studies and concepts to the 
MOD. This occurs on all levels and concerns topics related to the TSF, logistics 
contracting more generally, and the “New Employment Model” for the armed 
forces.828 Regardless of government’s openness to such input, industry takes every 
opportunity to try and inform such decision-making today and the thinking about 
contracting well into the future. This confirms both the earlier assertions made by the 
MOD’s Mr Hamber in chapter IV as well as the general finding that industry 
contributes to a narrowing selectivity of the ‘thinkable’ items that make it onto the 
agenda to comprise those that generally expand industry’s role. 
These are but two examples of the close coordination between industry and 
MOD in the design of the future military force structure and the management and 
operating procedures of the defence enterprise. As Gordon Lane of ADS put it, the 
relationship between the trade group, ACDS (LogOps), and PJHQ is “one of the best 
examples of close industry-MOD cooperation.”829 ADS and its forerunner 
organisations have long been closely involved in CSO and its predecessor policies. 
There exists a series of steering groups that began working on CONDO, then CSO, and 
now the TSF for over a decade as of 2014. These joint MOD-industry groups, 
facilitated by ADS, are co-chaired by an industry representative through ADS and by 
ACDS (LogOps) at various working levels, mostly include only companies that were 
involved in delivering CSO in the past, and are accessible by invitation only. The 
government has been very forward-leaning in identifying those “enabling 
capabilities” that need not be executed by soldiers in uniform and asks industry to 
propose and identify areas where it would be able to deliver a required capability.830 
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This “close cooperation has helped make a real difference”, with industry suggesting 
services that it can deliver beyond what it has done in the past. Lane’s description of 
the process is confirmed by the MOD’s Mr Hamber who is himself in charge of parts of 
CONDO policy and is closely involved in the realisation of the TSF. According to him, 
the main way to receive the necessary input are industry open days, while chapter IV 
described the nature of these daily interactions across issues and levels in MOD.831 
In addition to the above, the realisation of the TSF also includes the tackling of 
an issue that has long been identified as a problem of increasing public-private 
cooperation and trust. Joint training is generally considered to build bonds and trust, 
as well as familiarity with each other’s operating procedures. A lack of military 
education on the risks and benefits of outsourcing, despite contractors being 
embedded in PJHQ, was cited as one reason among many for the problems of 
outsourcing practice, including the lacking inclusion of contractors in operational 
planning.832 Shouesmith accordingly found that contractors must be better integrated 
into military doctrine, training, and planning,833 and the TTR recommended as much 
by suggesting both an MOD-internal training drive to increase awareness about CSO 
as well as regular joint peacetime and pre-deployment training of contractors and 
MOD.834 UK doctrine on the support network, affirming this realisation, stresses the 
importance of collective training,835 and the recognition among uniformed logisticians 
and Quartermasters that they are no longer the owners and managers of inventory 
but rather its custodians.836 
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832 Personal interview with Jeff Mason. 
833 Personal interview (2011) with David Shouesmith. 
834 UK MOD, TTR, p. 31. 
835 UK Ministry of Defence, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Log Ops) (2010), Support Network 
(Shrivenham: UK Ministry of Defence, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre), 
chapter 4, p. 2. 
836 Ibid, p. x. The same applies to the USA, cf. Christianson, “Global Logistics Organization”, 
p. 45. 
265 
In addition to training, the “New Employment Model” also finally followed a 
recommendation that dates back to the Fulton Report from the 1960s – a regularised 
revolving door between the public and private sectors. The model, aiming to increase 
the attractiveness of public sector jobs, seeks to facilitate the transfer of employees 
between both sectors.837 
The TSF and its realisation are illustrative of the aforementioned view that is 
becoming increasingly widely accepted in the UK government: government is to 
discharge its micro-managing decider role and focus on what it wants rather than 
how that is delivered. This includes accepting that it will no longer own all assets and 
processes or continually retain the same workforce. 
The USA and the UK: Reserves as Troops vs. Reserves as Quasi-Contractors 
An integral part of the TSF is the role assigned to reserve forces, especially the 
“Sponsored Reserves” (SR), while the Reserves in the USA may also experience a 
reappraisal of their role in overall defence planning. In both cases the aim is a more 
efficient and balanced use of available manpower, including contractors, especially to 
avoid some of the sensitivities involved in sending contractors to warzones. But while 
the SR concept in the UK incorporates much of the contractual thinking that defines 
military outsourcing, and SRs are planned for in conjunction with contractors who 
remain the preferred option of the UK government, reserve forces in the USA are 
planned for in a manner that suggests if not a turn away from contractors at least a 
slight rebalancing in favour of traditional manpower. 
In the UK, a key concern is ensuring that capability is only “in uniform” when 
it needs to be, and that it is delivered by a supposedly cheaper contract source 
whenever possible.838 The SR must be seen in this context. They are defined as 
“members of a civilian workforce who are required to join the volunteer or ex-regular 
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reserves as a condition of a contract, which their civilian employer has entered into 
with the MOD to provide a capability under normal conditions as well as on 
operations.”839 Confirming their role in the integration of public and private 
workforces and the close coordination between government and industry, the SRs 
“are an established element of the Whole Force which have supported UK operations 
at home and abroad ... through a commercial contract.”840 Being in uniform when 
deployed as SRs, their use mitigates many accountability problems that have 
dominated much of the debate on military outsourcing; normally being employees of 
the private sector, SRs can moreover often stay in an operational area when the 
situation has quieted down and ‘change from their uniform into a suit’ and continue 
doing the same work for a company under contract with the UK military.841 The SR is 
thus designed and integrated entirely around the contracting paradigm. 
Until 2010, the USA, in stark contrast to the UK, had planned for its Reserves 
only in a very generic manner.842 This changed with a comprehensive DOD review 
published in April 2011 that, if implemented over the coming years, will significantly 
overhaul US Reserves policy.843 Similar to the broader “strategic workforce program” 
mentioned in chapter IV, it recommends that the US military plan for a more creative 
use of active, reserve, civilian, and contractor components in order to better balance 
the force and avoid repeated overstretch. It explicitly views the use of reservists as a 
potential counterweight to contractors.844 The Army began putting at least some of 
these recommendations into practice, focusing on the sustainability of its force 
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generation.845 The planned use of reserves in the USA as a possible corrective to the 
overreliance on contractors echoes the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce that 
similarly sought to balance the workforce by making more use of DOD’s civilian 
workforce for tasks that are often performed by contractors, even if the CEW did not 
explicitly frame its objectives in this manner.846 
Overall, the increased intended use of reserve forces in the future in both 
countries does not signify a turn away from contracting. To the contrary, the SR 
concept in the UK follows contract practices, is based on close cooperation with 
industry, and intends for SRs to be used only for the shortest possible time and be 
replaced by civilian contractors as soon as possible. In the USA, it is not yet clear how 
far the plans will be implemented. If they will be, they may only have a limited impact 
on the use of contractors as a more efficient use of the (often limited) remaining in-
house resources does not qualitatively reduce the need for contractors, while there is 
no mention of reducing the use of available contract vehicles such as LOGCAP. Also, 
past experience has shown that this may be more of a budgetary exercise to maintain, 
on paper, a sustainable force structure as was intended in the 1970s after the 
introduction of the all-volunteer force which had formally contained most of its 
support element in the Reserves, but saw these tasks performed in practice by 
contractors from the 1980s onwards. Finally, as the next section shows, the 
intellectual trajectory in the joint US military leadership is towards further instituting 
the functional, capabilities-focused use of manpower that in the past meant more 
contractorisation, and in the future means a further relative loss of control over the 
defence enterprise by the military. 
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The USA: the Joint Logistic Enterprise 
The Joint Staff in the USA is working on a radically altered vision for the future 
of joint logistics which is not entirely dissimilar to the TSF in the UK. Its “Joint Concept 
for Logistics” (JCL) is intended to serve as a stepping stone towards “developing 
future logistics capabilities, doctrine, and force structure.”847 Its timeframe stretches 
from 2016 to 2028, underscoring its relevance for our appraisal of the future of US 
military logistics. 
The JCL “proposes the Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) to integrate DOD 
capabilities ... with those from the interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, and 
commercial world.”848 Most important to the JLEnt is its understanding of the logistics 
enterprise as a network comprising real-time information on and visibility of 
requirements and available resources.849 Christianson, who serves as senior mentor 
for the experiments and further development of the concept at the National Defense 
University in Washington, D.C., points out the challenges and expected gains from the 
shift from hierarchy to “structured networks.” Networks are expected to radically 
improve efficiency and effectiveness, with one experiment suggesting that “just by 
connecting two people in a disaster mission here in the United States we could 
improve the performance by up to 40% without changing anything else.”850  
The JLEnt’s use of social network theory stands in direct contrast to the 
military’s preference for hierarchy.851 In a network scenario, a remaining concern 
thus is the maintenance of public control and ownership over the process in the 
absence of classical command and control on which the military tended to “pretty 
much base everything”.852 Even though there is structure within the network, with 
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some members for instance being able to order actions,853 the JLEnt confirms a 
fundamental shift that has been identified throughout this study: relinquishing 
“control” and thinking in terms of managing “outcomes” without micromanaging 
individual activities is fully in line with advocacy and practice that seeks to turn the 
government into a smart buyer, customer, and custodian of its defence enterprise 
rather than its owner in the classical sense. In this respect, even though not yet being 
fully implemented, the JLEnt bears significant resemblance with the TSF in the UK. 
VI. 3. iii. Continued Knowledge and Asset Transfer 
In line with the trajectory identified above which saw the military formalising 
its reliance on contractors and integrating its workforce with various non-
governmental actors (of whom industry is the largest), its logical conclusion – in the 
spirit of shedding ownership and embracing custodianship – is the continued transfer 
of knowledge and assets out of the military. This process, which is almost irreversible 
unless governments take drastic action such as reintroducing conscription or 
renationalising industries, began gradually in the 1980s with basic logistics and 
accelerated in the 1990s throughout much of the defence logistics enterprise. Now it 
is most visible in the mandating of performance-based logistics and contractor 
logistics support arrangements that further reduce the military “core”. 
Mandating PBL and Integrating CLS Contractors 
In line with DOD Directives 5000.01 and 5000.02, PBL has become “the 
preferred product support strategy” in the USA.854 In the FY2013 NDAA, the USA 
made further strides towards entrenching long-term partnership arrangements in 
equipment support. It mandated that life-cycle management of major weapon 
systems shall maximise competition and value for money; PBL is named first on a list 
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of product support arrangements that are to be used.855 The Acquisition Reform 
Working Group, which includes the PSC, supported this section of the NDAA. It 
commended “especially its focus on a strategy for life-cycle management and product 
support, cost-benefit analysis, outcome based approaches, and the variety of product 
support arrangements and the recognition of their benefits.”856 In other words, 
Congress mandated the military to pursue logistics practices that broadly affirm and 
adopt the ideas, processes, and evaluations that industry has long lobbied the 
government on.857 
The push for CLS arrangements falls into the same category. The USD (AT&L) 
set up a task force to review DOD’s “organization, doctrine, training, and planning for 
contractor logistics support of contingency operations”,858 strongly suggesting that 
DOD seeks to expand arrangements similar to PBL on deployed operations. The UK is 
ahead of the USA in this regard, with doctrine already stating that “[contracted] 
support must be an integral part of the [support network]”.859 In its business plan for 
the years 2010 to 2013, the procurement and support organisation of the MOD, 
Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), lists among its strategic objectives to 
“[excel] in managing through life a portfolio of complex projects ... in a way that 
demonstrates commercial best practice.”860 DE&S also aims to deepen its relationship 
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with industry to enable access to its supply chain, and to increasingly work “on the 
basis of mutual understanding and trust”.861 
As both the US and UK governments intended, industry and government are 
becoming “one team” in which industry increasingly owns the technologies and 
manpower necessary to operate the defence enterprise. The growth of the sphere in 
the defence enterprise that is offered to and occupied by industry also further 
increases their stakes in the public-private model in the long run to maintain 
industry’s willingness to invest in innovation, capacities, and their own manpower. 
Therefore, not only are individual support arrangements such as PBL and CLS highly 
popular among industry. The perspective of such long-term business further 
invigorates and explains the resistance to insourcing efforts such as the initiative 
discussed in chapter IV, as insourcing could pose a possibly dramatic threat to 
business prospects.862 Cubic, for instance, which had refrained from lobbying on aid 
freezes to Egypt despite its relative dependence on foreign sales, did lobby against the 
sequester.863 The company fears that all of its contracts in the USA “are at risk of being 
cut or terminated”.864 Moreover, the company is concerned with losing business for 
re-competed contracts that it had been awarded on a sole-source basis.865 This makes 
long-term arrangements such as PBL and CLS particularly appealing as they generally 
reduce the occurrence of re-competition cycles, unlike “indefinite delivery / indefinite 
quantity” contracts.866 These fears should be allayed as both states are further 
reducing the “core” of military responsibilities, ownership, and knowhow and thereby 
ensuring a high level of business well into the future. 
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The USA and the UK: Further Reducing the Core 
The scope of “core competencies” shrank particularly much in the field of 
military logistics. The most pertinent examples are the reduction of organic 
engineering, operations, and maintenance capabilities. Even in 2009, the US military 
identified logistics and force support as “DOD core competencies”, defining them 
respectively as “[the] ability to project and sustain a logistically-ready joint force” and 
“[the] ability to establish, develop, maintain and manage a mission-ready Total Force” 
and installations across the force.867 While the designation of an activity as a “core 
competency” would typically preclude it from being outsourced, the DOD’s review of 
roles and missions cites as a success for intra-theatre airlift CENTCOM’s “ability to 
meld commercially contracted intratheater airlift options into the mix of airlift 
capabilities.”868 Much like the now preferred PBL and CLS arrangements, capabilities, 
systems, and services are outsourced rather than maintained, let alone further 
developed in-house in line with the incremental reduction of the “core”. 
In the UK, the SDSR announced that to meet financial challenges it plans the 
“sales of assets such as the Defence Support Group” (DSG).869 The DSG had been 
founded in May 2007 as a merger of two trading funds but remained owned by 
MOD.870 The DSG provides strategic in-house capability for maintenance, repair, 
overhaul, and technological upgrades.871 The UK government plans to privatise the 
DSG despite the crucial nature of its services, and without being able to ensure that a 
privately-owned and operated DSG would be able to assure the provision of capability 
                                                             
867 U.S. Department of Defense (2009), “Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report”, (N.A.: 
U.S. Department of Defense), pp. 3, 7. 
868 Ibid, p. 21. 
869 UK Government, 2010 SDSR, p. 31. 
870 See UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Support Group (2012), “History,” (2012), accessed 4 
December 2012, available at http://www.dsg.mod.uk/History.asp, and 
 UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Support Group (2012), “Who We Are,” (2012), accessed 4 
December 2012, available at http://www.dsg.mod.uk/content.asp?page=2. 
871 UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Academy, Joint Services Command and Staff College 
[2012], Defence Policy and Strategic Programming, Teaching Material for the Advanced 
Command & Staff Course, p. 75. 
273 
at short notice and affordable cost,872 while nonetheless expecting the DSG to do so.873 
The sale of the DSG will not only consolidate but further increase the UK military’s 
dependency on the private sector for equipment support services, in line with the 
view that government reorients its attention to outcomes rather than micromanaging 
processes and the people who execute them. Industry, for its part, views 
opportunities arising out of the sale, looking whether the private sector could do 
more for the MOD.874 
This shedding of in-house knowledge also extends to much more fundamental 
requirements of troops on deployed operations. David Scholes, who had to stand in as 
logistics manager of Camp Bastion in Afghanistan for KBR, noted that “[the] Royal 
Engineers working on Camp Bastion had never built” deployable temporary 
accommodation before. The British Army had not retained in-house knowledge or 
skills regarding such a fundamental requirement and had to rely on its contractor 
which, in the case of Camp Bastion, performed poorly for long stretches of time.875 
Christianson’s aforementioned assertion thus rings true not only in theory but 
in practice in both the USA and the UK.876 Neither military still ‘owns’ all assets it 
needs to deliver desired outcomes. Rather, increasingly much of it resides in the 
private sector and will, if anything, only increase, not decrease. As a deeply involved 
source in the MOD put it, the UK government will not “pay for activity transfer. It will 
not be able to afford to pay to transfer back from the private sector once it has let it go 
to the private sector.”877 Similarly, the USA will continue to use LOGCAP for years to 
come because a unilateral “termination of LOGCAP support is not an … option” 
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according to a former LOGCAP manager.878 The trajectory above that comprises the 
formalisation of contracting out capabilities, integrating public and private 
workforces, the shedding of in-house knowledge, assets, and manpower, and the 
resulting rapidly growing mutual dependency is firmly in place. On the one hand, the 
interests of government and industry considerably overlap while the above highlights 
the recurring observation of a “bias towards business” and, through omission, a 
simultaneous systemic absence of veto-points and potential veto-players of 
comparable clout, on the other hand. The latter is one of the issues discussed next. 
VI. 4.  Problems and Concerns 
The outsourcing of military logistics highlights issues that emerge out of the 
use of these contractors in warzones, the heightened degree of (mutual) dependency, 
and the deep integration of workforces. These issues are directly relevant for the long 
term as they affect the structure within which defence policy is made and 
implemented.879 They are operational security, the question of how far contractor 
capability is assured to the military, the recurring question of direct and indirect 
participation of contractors in the making of (sensitive) decisions, and finally how the 
simultaneous mutual dependency and tighter integration of workforces affect the 
incentives of officials. 
VI. 4. i. Operational Security 
Operational security concerns the safety of pieces of information that – if 
someone managed to group them together – could lead to the identification of the 
bigger picture. As noted, contractors are embedded with the military at various 
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operational headquarters in order to facilitate accelerate, and contribute to 
operational planning, especially planning for the contractor contingent. It is therefore 
necessary to examine whether contractors participate in operational planning and, if 
so, from what point onwards, in order to determine whether they represent a risk to 
operational security and by extension to the decision-making process. 
Interestingly, a number of logistics problems in Iraq occurred because 
contractors held security clearances that were too low for participating in operational 
planning. Rather than being potentially able to divulge classified information, the 
contractors in fact had only little time to respond to military requests for capability.880 
LOGCAP contractors who are involved in providing support to operational planning 
and require access to sensitive data require security clearances like government 
personnel. The late whistleblower, former LOGCAP manager Charles Smith said that it 
was not a concern in the Army that contractors could divulge sensitive information; 
“our contractors can operate with classified documents.”881 Former ACDS (LogOps) 
Maj. Gen. (ret) David Shouesmith moreover points out that there is not much in most 
operational plans that could be harmful. “Are you going to call the Taliban and tell 
them that we are going to build a base somewhere?”882 Given the necessity for 
security clearances, the issue in both countries is therefore not one of being a 
contractor or government employee, as this “is not exclusive about the relationship 
between MOD and contractors but applies also within MOD.”883 Information is 
circulated on a need-to-know basis to everybody, not just contractors.884 
Some concerns for operational security however remain. As Mr Smith pointed 
out, at some point in time “you run into brute facts.” In September 2002, for instance, 
stock was moved from Qatar to Kuwait, a contract was ordered to be set up for the 
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881 Telephone interview with Charles Smith. 
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repair of war damage, and all of this was to be classified. While the paper trail could 
be suppressed, under the given circumstances “it was kind of obvious that this was 
not an exercise but that we were preparing for war at that point of time.”885 The 
involvement of contractors widens the net of those aware of such movements while 
simultaneously “people are moving, equipment is moving”. Thus, already in 
September 2002 “a lot of people were figuring out” that the USA was making specific 
preparations for war.886 
This issue should grow in the future. The move towards a lean, distribution-
based, just-in-time logistics system dramatically reduces stock levels for the military 
to work off of so that it has to approach industry much earlier in the planning process. 
Coupled with the fact that the workforce is hugely diversified – especially for 
ostensibly simple tasks such as moving and storing equipment – it must accept that 
more easily visible information such as stock movements will become public 
knowledge considerably earlier than in the past. Although wars rarely break out 
completely unannounced, such information can nonetheless affect the course of 
events. In September 2002, for instance, it could have pressured the Iraqi government 
to surrender to US pressures, or alternatively suggested to the public that diplomatic 
efforts were a red herring rather than intended to avoid a military confrontation. 
VI. 4. ii. Assured Capability 
A more serious problem is the military’s ability to assure services delivery in 
warzones.887 This issue becomes more pressing with the growing dependency on 
contractors as the military would have fewer, if any, options left to replace a shortfall, 
certainly at short notice. There are a legal and a practical angle to this problem, which 
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concern the military’s ability to force contractors to perform and contractors’ ability 
to pressure the government, respectively. 
While occurrences of contractors refusing to work are certainly not the norm, 
they do exist and problematise the government’s dependency on them. Rasor, 
Bauman, and Charles Smith recount instances in which KBR threatened to cease 
performing for LOGCAP in Iraq. In one case, KBR threatened, probably in 2004, to 
cease work if the Army did not pay outstanding bills, which federal regulations allow 
KBR to do.888 In other cases contractors left Iraq when the civil war heated up, forcing 
KBR to cease convoys for two weeks and leading to food rationing among troops in 
Anbar province.889 LOGCAP manager Smith does not believe that KBR would have 
gone through with its repeated threats to cease operations. Invariably, when a liaison 
officer at KBR suggested that KBR may not be able to go on working, the next day the 
company’s president or vice president would call the commanding general of the 
command managing LOGCAP and assure him that KBR would never walk away from 
the contract or stop supporting the troops.890 
Despite such incidents, the problem here is not that it is a frequent 
occurrence,891 but rather that it is a potential occurrence which would place the 
military in a situation in which it may not be able to immediately replace the 
capability in an active warzone. This problem would be virtually inexistent had the 
military retained these capabilities in-house because soldiers fall under military 
jurisdiction – the Armed Forces Act in the UK and the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) in the USA – which mandates them to follow orders. Although attempts and 
                                                             
888 Rasor and Bauman, Betraying Our Troops, pp. 1, 5, 42, 44, 70, 135. 
889 Ibid, p. 70. 
890 Telephone interview with Charles Smith. 
891 Criticism in the literature tends to focus more on KBR’s management than on its employees, 
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legal changes have been made in recent years, it still remains questionable whether 
contractors actually fall under military jurisdiction. 
The literature on the legal status of contractors focuses on the persecution of 
crimes committed by contractors.892 In 2007, some provisions of the UCMJ became 
applicable to contractors with US citizenship working for US government agencies 
during wartime or contingency operations.893 There however remains scepticism 
among experts whether the enforcement problem would be solved given the close 
relationship and dependency of the US government on contractors,894 and especially 
following a Supreme Court ruling that further severely limits the applicability of the 
UCMJ to contractors.895 In the UK, the Armed Forces Act does not apply to contractors 
at all, limiting the ability of uniformed troops to detain or otherwise limit the freedom 
of contractors to cases of criminal misconduct.896 The ability of contractors to 
theoretically quit their job on the spot further questions their liability under the UCMJ 
even in the few cases that the code may apply to them. The Sponsored Reserves 
model is partly aimed at lowering the likelihood of this and of ‘no-show’ occurring by 
putting SRs in uniform during the high-risk stages of an operation.897 
In sum, there remains a residual risk in comparison to the ideal-typical self-
sufficient military with regards to the uncertainty as to whether contractors can be 
forced to fulfil their job in warzones, which in turn may jeopardise an operation. 
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VI. 4. iii. Contractors in (Sensitive) Decision-Making 
Logisticians should ideally be included in politico-strategic decision-making 
early on.898 Key to the examination of contractors’ effect on decision-making is the 
analytical distinction between “should” and “could”.899 The former denotes the 
decision as to whether an action should be taken at all, while the latter concerns the 
ability to do so. Dozens of interviewees from across the spectrum without exception 
agreed that the “should” decision should not (and does not) involve contractors, and 
that industry would only come in – possibly very early on – to help determine the 
“could”. 
It is however questionable to which extent the two are in fact separate. 
Decisions on whether or not to intervene, for instance, cannot be taken without 
considering the ability to do so. An especially illustrative example of this occurring on 
the highest levels of government is the involvement of KBR in the run-up to the 2003 
Iraq war and the “Restore Iraqi Oil” contract. Months before the war began in March 
2003, the high-level Energy Infrastructure Group, composed mostly of government 
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, the CIA, and 
other departments met in Washington, D.C. to plan for the response to the anticipated 
damage to the Iraqi oil infrastructure. As former LOGCAP manager Smith wrote, the 
initial plan was to conduct this work under LOGCAP. The contract was held by KBR at 
the time, and the company was present at the group’s meetings that were otherwise 
highly classified because of their immediate relevance for the planning, conduct, and 
post-war politics of the Iraq war that began months later.900 
Beyond such singular cases, contractors’ role in generating “actionable 
knowledge” through the collecting, processing, analysing, and presentation of data 
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ensures they will be routinely involved in operational decision-making in the 
future.901 Contractors are embedded in every combatant command and involved in 
the routine writing of general plans for possible theatres of operation. Logistics 
contractors thereby affect scenario planning more broadly. Moreover, being in close 
contact with future General Officers who will hold real clout in the future, contractors 
may influence how plans are created in the bigger scheme of things.902 While such 
influence may be one degree removed, its knock-on effects may be considerable, even 
if they are unintended, with the reinforcement of patterns and practices to which 
contracting and contractors are inherent. Moreover, this link will likely become 
stronger with the tighter integration of workforces and the growing reliance on 
contractors for non-combat tasks. Therefore, even if the “should” decision was taken 
by government alone, industry will have to be brought in as early as possible 
thereafter to inform on the “could” given its involvement in mission-critical tasks. 
The above moreover provided further support for earlier observations that 
industry is deeply and closely involved in shaping future acquisition and logistics 
policy. For instance, it is not clear what role industry played in advocating LOGCAP; 
an FOI request filed by this author to the U.S. Army remained unanswered. 
Christianson however assumes, as a default expectation rather than based on direct 
observations, that industry will have lobbied for the programme.903 Charles Smith 
moreover suggests that, unlike systems acquisition, logistics did not have a champion 
lobbying for its retention in the military.904 Coupled with previous examinations of 
industry’s involvement in much narrower matters, it would therefore be most 
surprising had there not been any lobbying efforts at the time in support of 
contractorising support to overseas operations. Moreover, the record shows that the 
decision to award LOGCAP as a major umbrella contract was taken in August 1992 
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after a classified study by KBR’s predecessor Brown and Root Services had 
recommended precisely such an arrangement that same year. LOGCAP I was then 
awarded to Brown and Root Services shortly thereafter.905 
This type of influence may also play out in such a manner that industry 
ultimately affects government’s strategic decision-making although its input concerns 
defence-industrial policy. For instance, if government were to drastically shrink its 
global defence posture – a key driving force of military outsourcing – this would 
directly affect industry’s business prospects for the future. The same applies to 
government plans to reduce the breadth of technological and operational capability it 
expects the military to hold. While industry would approach these policies from an 
ostensibly economic and industrial perspective, highlighting the long-term 
consequences for industry’s ability to supply the armed forces into the future, the 
results may well be strategic if the government decides to rescind these decisions. For 
instance, as the former Director Land at ADS put it, “from an industrial perspective, if 
[the government] will no longer have a capability ... we will certainly point out where 
that capability currently exists. We will stress the importance of research and 
technology because [of the long lifecycle] to continue to be able to deliver the 
capability you need going forward. If there is not a market for [certain] products and 
services within the UK today, then the market forces will dictate and industry will no 
longer” maintain them.906 Therefore, “the UK government needs to be aware whether 
that capability will be available” in the future, and ADS “would definitely identify 
things that are critical to UK capability” and make sure the government is aware of 
the potential long-term impacts of such policies.907 In the USA, Mr Soloway, the 
President and CEO of trade group PSC, similarly placed his criticism of plans to limit 
the government’s ability to label some procurements as “commercial items” as 
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affecting the “DOD’s mission writ large”,908 creating a seemingly inherent link 
between strategy and acquisition from industry. We thus cannot truly separate the 
government’s “should” decision for a course of action such as strategic, military-
technological, or acquisition-related realignment from industry’s input into the 
ostensible “could”. 
Moreover, not only can the two not be separated, resulting in the permanent 
participation of industry in these decision-making processes. The process is also even 
more unchecked by potential veto-players than was the case regarding broader 
defence acquisition policy. Former LOGCAP manager Mr Smith worked at the Rock 
Island Arsenal in Illinois for 30 years. Asked about being exposed to critics of current 
outsourcing policy and practice such as POGO, he stated “I never had any dealings 
with them until I left. I did not see any influence from groups like that at the level I 
operated.”909 The limited outside influence that was exerted at the Arsenal was from 
Congress and industry groups. “It was a pretty closed circle.”910 
The same applies in the UK, where the working-group level is not exposed to 
scrutiny and does not involve equivalents of POGO either. The Defence Suppliers 
Forum (DSF) was created by the new government in 2010 as “the major conduit for 
MOD-industry relationships”, is chaired by the Defence Secretary, and comprises 
representatives from prime contractors and small and medium-sized companies. Its 
objective is to facilitate interaction between the MOD and industry and to inform 
logistics and supply policy.911 Minutes of DSF meetings contain minimal information 
on their substance, but underscore the weight of industry as they represent the only 
non-government participants and appear to take the lead on several issues. Regarding 
the realisation of the Total Support Force, a meeting on 13 February 2013 decided to 
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collect examples of successful CSO which in the first instance were to be sent to Mr 
Andrew Higginson from Higginson Associates, who advises the MOD on the TSF, and 
only copied to ACDS (LogOps).912 This also applies more generally. Advisory channels 
exist in order to provide the industry-wide perspective to the UK government, with 
“no closed door to any provider.”913 The future trajectory of UK outsourcing policy is 
all but free from outside interference that would question the overall direction of 
travel. Rather, confirming the view that outsourcing contributes to a technicalisation 
of defence policy and policy-making, NGOs such as POGO are not represented in the 
process at all.914 “It is not politicised, not out in the open. The formal conclusion is 
technical”.915 
Kinsey was thus correct when he found that, overall, contractors “are now 
part of the decision-making process as to whether an operation should go ahead” by 
virtue of being the military’s enablers through the provision of critical services and 
equipment.916 In fact, this applies even more broadly to the entire current and future 
practice and trajectory of the supply of the armed forces, and by extension quite 
possibly to the content and patterns of strategic decision-making. 
VI. 4. iv. Loyalties and Interests 
Criticism of how outsourcing and public-private partnerships can negatively 
affect the incentive structure for government employees focuses on the “revolving 
door”. Related to it are cases of misconduct in which companies are favoured by 
officials in sales cases so as to facilitate walking through that revolving door into 
industry in the future.917 There is also a less reported issue in the context of 
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outsourcing that is related to but goes beyond the creation of incentives to be 
potentially unduly “friendly” towards industry in order to secure a post-government 
career. It is salient in the USA but not the UK, and additionally underscores and 
reinforces the wider bias towards business and the relative absence of veto-players. 
This additional, systemic problem is the further removal of internal opposition to 
contracting policy and practice inside the government, a stark downside of the ‘bias 
towards business’. This is a very timely concern in light of the trajectory that is 
characterised by the convergence of interests, blending of workforces, and growing 
selectivity of the policy process well into the future so that checks and balances will 
be increasingly difficult to uphold.  
In the military command managing LOGCAP in the USA, the Rock Island 
Arsenal in Illinois, this issue played out in the case of the aforementioned former 
LOGCAP manager and eventual whistleblower, the late Mr Charles Smith.918 Smith 
worked for the Army for 31 years and “managed the LOGCAP contracting process 
from 2000 to late 2004” when he “was abruptly relieved of that position” after 
confronting the LOGCAP prime contractor KBR about problematic business practices 
and announcing a freeze of payments until these issues were resolved.919 His 2012 
book provides detailed, first-hand information on little-known intricacies and 
internal dynamics which were augmented by a lengthy interview of this author and 
triangulated by drawing on other sources. Smith's insights filled a long-standing gap 
of first-hand accounts into the management and implementation of one of the largest 
military service contracts of the US military. 
At Rock Island Arsenal, Smith criticises that the “institutional Army” – as 
opposed to the Army leadership – was “not always [supporting] the ideals of its 
leaders”, occasionally failed to acknowledge mistakes and problems, and was “too 
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close to contractors”.920 It therefore depended to some degree on whether the 
command focused on the civilian chain of command or the military one. The former 
goes up to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA (ALT)) and the Secretary of the Army, while the latter reports up to 
the Chief of Staff of the Army. In the 2000s it was the “civilian side that seemed much 
more responsive to the contractor” than was the case with the military side.921 This 
played out in a dispute with KBR on billing practices for dining facilities. The highly 
confrontational situation, which ultimately led to his reassignment and that of his 
lead contracting officer Ms Watkins, was about what Smith and his colleagues 
considered unreasonable costs KBR was charging for dining facilities but that it could 
not prove or justify. Smith decided to withhold payments to the company and sent a 
letter to the company announcing a withholding of 15% of the billed costs. Ms 
Watkins, who had contacted KBR to enquire about the impact of the 15% withhold 
was removed from her post and the waivers continued. The Commander, Maj. Gen. 
Johnson decided, after a call with senior leaders in the Department of the Army, to 
order “[rescinding] the letter imposing the 15% withhold.”922 
The situation evolved further. The company RCI, now Serco, audited KBR – a 
responsibility of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) – and found almost all 
costs to be allowable. Mr Smith’s successor – who unusually for this position 
continued to chair the board that determines award fees for good performance – 
went on to award KBR fees for good performance. He also changed the contract to a 
fixed-price model after the service had been delivered, and based it on RCI’s estimate. 
This meant that payments were made in full and no longer subject to an independent 
audit.923 
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KBR continued to receive preferential treatment. To Smith, as to other 
authors,924 there appeared to be high political interest in shielding KBR from risks. 
Halliburton, KBR’s mother company, was facing an asbestos lawsuit forcing it to settle 
with a mix of cash and stocks. KBR threatened to increase the amount of cash having 
to be paid out if its disputes caused the stock price to drop. This was avoided as KBR 
was not penalised by the Army.925 The support went so far that the director of the 
DCAA, April Stevenson, was removed from her post after testifying to the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting about problems with KBR’s business system. She was 
replaced by the head of the Army Audit Agency, effectively ensuring that the Army 
would no longer be criticised for its handling of KBR’s performance in LOGCAP.926 
What is more, according to Smith the ASA (ALT) and the commanding general of the 
Army’s Sustainment Command defended KBR rather than their own employees at a 
Senate hearing, and made false claims about KBR’s performance which they later had 
to retract.927 In Smith’s opinion, besides the political interest in KBR and Halliburton, 
the Army appeared to have created contractors that – like their counterparts in 
finance – were “too big to fail”,928 and by extension distorted the incentive structure of 
the individual Commander. 
The case of Mrs Bunnatine Greenhouse falls into the same category, also 
involves KBR, and is the closest to producing “fingerprints” supporting the claims of 
direct political interest in and preferential treatment of KBR. The above is thus not 
singular, neither for KBR nor for other contractors.929 Mrs Greenhouse’s case is 
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intimately linked to the aforementioned Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract. As noted, the 
original plan was to conduct the work – putting out anticipated well-fires following 
the invasion of Iraq – under LOGCAP. Mr Smith had voiced opposition in the high-
level meetings at DOD that LOGCAP could not engage with the oil industry, and 
moreover opposed sole-sourcing the work to KBR because market-research had 
shown that other companies were capable to do the work and had done so in 1991. 
The next day, following a decision taken at a party the night before between the then-
Commander of the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Secretary of the Army, 
Smith was removed from the meetings and replaced by the USACE. The Corps 
ultimately sole-source awarded the contract to KBR for approximately $7 billion. 
Greenhouse, the USACE’s most senior civilian objected to this and other awards to 
KBR, and to favourable treatment of the company.930 She also opposed on regulatory 
grounds. KBR had been paid $1.9 million for a study on contingencies about how RIO 
would unfold, which would usually preclude the company from bidding for the 
contract, let alone receive it on a sole-source basis. What is more, KBR was present at 
the noted meeting in February 2003. Greenhouse signed the contract the next day 
under pressure given the timing on the eve of war, and wrote by hand that she 
cautioned against extending what was a potentially five-year-long cost-plus contract 
beyond the initial one year period.931  
Greenhouse, like Smith, interpreted the situation thus that the assumption 
was that KBR would get the job. By first trying to award the job under LOGCAP, the 
work would have automatically gone to KBR. When Smith suggested conducting a 
quick, classified competition, the response was immediately negative and the episode 
unfolded as above. Therefore, this contract, in light of those involved and the 
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meetings occurring within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with high-level 
officials, “from day one, at the highest levels of the Department of Defense, was going 
to KBR.”932 A Time Magazine article from 30 May 2004 brought to light what may be 
closest to “fingerprints” indicating a direct link between Vice President Cheney and 
Halliburton in these matters. The article quotes an email as saying that “action” on the 
RIO contract was “coordinated” with Cheney's office. The article cites an email by 
then-USD (Policy) saying he “approved arrangements for the contract ‘contingent on 
informing WH [White House] tomorrow. We anticipate no issues since action has 
been coordinated w VP's [Vice President's] office.’ Three days later, the Army Corps of 
Engineers gave Halliburton the contract, without seeking other bids.”933 
Mrs Greenhouse had been questioning non-competitive contracts that were 
handed to KBR since the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003, and been writing caveats on 
them by hand. She had received top ratings for her work at the Corps for many years, 
but was given evaluations as “less than fully successful” twice in a row during the 
time that she opposed various waivers and favourable treatments of KBR, and was 
eventually demoted.934 
Other publicly known examples which provide further support for the 
concern that internal opposition is unwanted and may be removed if deemed 
necessary also often involve KBR, not least because it is an unusually large company 
with unusually large contracts and close ties to high-ranking officials.935 
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Regardless of whether the highest levels of government were as actively 
involved as some of the evidence above suggests, these cases required only low 
participation. In other words, while some of the cases above involving KBR may be 
extreme cases, for them to unfold in this way did not require a massive institutional 
conspiracy. At Rock Island Arsenal, all that was necessary to successfully exclude 
those internal opponents was the acquiescence of the commanding general’s 
immediate superior, a Lt Gen. (ret) Hack – who later went on to work for KBR – on the 
military side, and the ASA (ALT) on the civilian side. Hack himself had first stayed 
unusually long in Washington, D.C. after being appointed to the post – suggesting that 
the turn from a critical to an accommodating approach to KBR may have been 
decided then at higher levels – and later went on to work for Honeywell.936 In other 
words, it is a systemic problem of incentives that can – given the “right” combination 
of people involved – play out this drastic way. However, and this should be stressed, it 
does not necessarily, let alone in a majority of cases, play out this way. Smith lists 
several senior military retirees who deliberately did not join the military industry but 
sought to succeed with their skillsets elsewhere.937 And yet, there is a systemic, in-
built incentive to appear to be friendly towards contractors for those individuals who 
are eyeing a post-retirement career in the private sector. “It is not that you go to work 
for the specific company you ‘helped’ if you helped a specific company; it is that you 
are known as the kind of person who was business-friendly.”938 
In sum, outsourcing removes opposition not only incrementally on the higher 
political levels, where it was shown that the standard agenda now revolves 
unchallenged around outsourcing. It also does so on the lower, implementing levels. 
On one extreme end, the incentive structure is reshaped in a problematic way when 
there are opportunities for abuse. But it should be noted that outsourcing also 
                                                             
936 Telephone interview with Charles Smith. 
937 Smith, War for Profit, pp. 258–267. 
938 Telephone interview with Charles Smith. 
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generally reduces opposition from within the ranks of public employees. A retired Air 
Force Colonel is quoted as saying “that much of the scut work now being contracted 
out ... was traditionally performed by reserve soldiers, who often complain the 
loudest.”939 In essence, outsourcing – perhaps unintentionally – moves those who 
complain most from the military chain of command into the private sector. 
In the UK, there have not been reports of similar occurrences. However, the 
indirect marginalisation of opposition to contracting, for instance by removing most 
veto-points, and overcoming the military’s ‘culture of resistance’ to outsourcing had 
the same result. Within MOD, the confrontation over whether or not to outsource is 
over, and even such far-reaching projects as the TSF and practices such as knowledge 
and asset transfer are no longer disputed. The discussions rather focus on 
technicalities and processes,940 the outcome being given. 
Overall, four key variables can be derived to estimate how likely these 
problems are to unfold: the size of the company involved; the company’s access to 
and relationship with decision-makers, which also implicates the revolving door; the 
government’s dependence on a company’s services and/or knowhow in a given 
situation or for the longer term; and the personal element, as most military officers 
were shown to be exceptionally responsible and ethical, with significant numbers 
leaving the military not for the defence industry but elsewhere where they cannot 
leverage their professional relationships. 
VI. 5.  Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter completed the analytical arc of this study. While it also 
reappraised previous assumptions, bolstered previous findings, and cumulated 
                                                             
939 Jane Mayer (2004), “Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for Halliburton?” in The 
New Yorker (16 February 2004), accessed 18 July 2013, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/02/16/040216fa_fact?currentPage=all. 
940 Telephone interview with Richard Hamber. 
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knowledge on military outsourcing, it focused in particular on the last part of the 
policy process – policy implementation and its feedback effects – and established both 
the trajectory of military services contracting more broadly and its ramifications well 
into the future. 
The chapter both deepened our understanding and challenged existing 
notions of the drivers of military services contracting more generally. It highlighted 
that it is misleading to centre analyses of the broader contemporary wave of military 
services contracting around the outsourcing of security functions after the Cold War. 
Rather, logistics outsourcing predates security contracting by decades, and moreover 
established both the necessary ideational notions as well as contracting vehicles that 
arguably enabled security contracting to rapidly take root from the 1990s onwards in 
the first place. It is unconvincing to argue that governments would have been willing 
to outsource armed security tasks had they not been able to build on the decades-long 
experience of contracting out support services both at home and overseas. 
The chapter also confirmed the centrality of the question of who primarily 
benefits from contract services that was assumed to explain the variance in 
contracting policy and practice regarding foreign military assistance. The UK military, 
when faced with severe pressures to reconcile resources to supply its own military, 
found itself unable to even work off of the assumption of supplying its own forces only 
with uniformed troops. Speeding ahead of the USA in its response, the UK decided to 
outsource responsibilities, integrate workforces with the private sector, 
institutionalise a force structure that extensively relies on non-state actors and 
thereby institutionalises a revolving door, and thus continues to shift assets and 
knowledge into the private sector. It is thus remoulding its military to increasingly 
resemble an ideal-typical “core competency” force. The UK’s inclusion of the private 
sector throughout the planning, design, and implementation stages confirms this 
point as much as its concern for the longer-term health of the support services 
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industry; neither of this was the case in foreign military assistance policy, as there 
was no perceived urgency comparable to that of securing the sustainment of its own 
forces into the future. The UK has thus contractorised much of its Armed Forces, as 
the centring of its reserve policy around notions of contractorised work – epitomised 
in the Sponsored Reserves – underscores. The USA, having a larger buffer to wear off, 
has not yet implemented the same steps but was shown to be on a very similar 
intellectual trajectory. The JLEnt underscores the similarity of guiding ideas and 
principles, and the deep entrenchment of networked, de-politicised thinking in which 
the wearing of a uniform and the delegation of responsibilities to contractors become 
peripheral concerns. 
This chapter also identified three often implicit potential downsides of this 
trajectory. One is the further marginalisation of potential and actual opposition and 
the simultaneously tight integration of industry across the process. Relatedly, another 
is the narrowing of alternatives to the current trajectory to such an extent that the 
government incrementally loses its remaining autonomy in designing a potentially 
different force structure and sustainment models in the future. The third, finally, is 
the potentially problematic, systemic reshaping of the incentive structure of state 
employees to more closely align with that of industry. Given that much evidence here 
relied on whistleblowers or other insider information, this gives cause for concern for 
the accountability and transparency of the defence policy process. For instance, 
governments are increasingly able to ‘have their cake and eat it too’ as they continue 
to quantify military commitments and operations solely in terms of its uniformed 
contingents. It remains to be seen whether the first UK military deployment of a force 
designed with the “total support force” in mind changes this state of affairs. 
Being the backbone of strategy and thus of decision-making, logistics is much 
more important than is often acknowledged. Its contractorisation aims to alleviate the 
persistent tensions between strategic commitments, technological demands, and 
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available resources and manpower. In the longer term, it delays or even prevents 
decision-makers from acknowledging the potential unfeasibility of their states’ 
expansive postures and commitments – key contextual factors behind 
contractorisation –, thus indirectly reaffirming their perceived viability. By 
simultaneously further increasing the selectivity of the policy network in such a way 
that outsourcing becomes without alternative for decades to come, it helps further 
establishing the underlying drivers and ideas as seemingly universal truths. Perhaps 
most importantly, this includes the view that industry, government, and the military 
are no longer separate entities. This latter point, lest it be forgotten, is sometimes 
explicitly recalled by industry in public. In a situation that appears like a reversal of 
roles – industry interpreting the security environment and government analysing the 
perspectives of the industry – “Lou Kratz, Chairman of [the National Defense 
Industrial Association’s] Logistics Management Division and a Vice President of 
Logistics and Sustainment at Lockheed Martin introduced [an industry forum] with 
an assertive view of American overwhelming force and power projection, facing an 
immediate insidious threat (i.e. terrorists and insurgents) with a peer competitor (the 
official euphemism for China) rising over the long run.” One of the next speakers was 
the responsible Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, 
who sought to reassure industry that its outlook had improved.941 Government and 
industry are, after all, both in it together. 
                                                             
941 Defense Industry Daily, “NDIA Logistics Forum 2013”. 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
This thesis sought to establish the big picture that holistically ties together the 
drivers, politics, processes, and future trajectory of military outsourcing. 
Corresponding with the three parts and sequences of the policy process according to 
Policy Network Theory, it therefore set out to answer three research questions: first, 
why do states outsource military capability overseas? Secondly, how do outsourcing 
as a practice and industry as actors participate in and affect the defence political 
process? And thirdly, consequently, what are the ramifications and likely future of 
military outsourcing? Are we likely to see more of the same, and/or are there sources 
of change that could lead to a reversal of the trend towards military 
contractorisation? 
The following remarks draw together the findings. In systematising them, the 
conclusion also argues for their broader validity beyond the two countries examined 
(the USA and the UK). It then identifies the study’s limitations, avenues for future 
research that emerge out of the study, and in so doing highlights both the study’s 
contribution to the academic literature as well as its relevance beyond academia. 
Key Findings 
First, this study dissected the strategic underpinning of defence policy that 
cannot be divorced from outsourcing, especially through its links to technological 
requirements. It also sensitised us to the high relevance of the place of domestic 
industry in the national security architecture, highlighted the importance of 
differentiating military responsibilities, and explored the impact of fundamental 
budgeting assumptions. Finally, the study established how the politics, process, and 
implementation of military outsourcing reproduce and reinforce these driving forces, 
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but also how they may potentially challenge the fundamental operating logics and 
thus the future of military contracting. 
On the Drivers of Military Outsourcing 
The study made a series of interconnected findings regarding the drivers of 
military services contracting in the USA and the UK. The literature had provided 
diverse views on why states outsource various functions that were previously, at least 
during the Cold War, mostly fulfilled by uniformed soldiers. They mostly focused on 
political, ideological, economic, technological, and functional drivers of outsourcing 
which usually comprise the adoption of neoliberalism, the seeking of efficiencies and 
economies by drawing on industry, the struggling with extracting manpower and 
other resources from the civilian population, and governments’ growing purchases of 
technologies that are mostly or entirely owned by private industry. While individually 
all of these factors were found to be relevant, what remained lacking – with the 
exception of Taylor’s brief consideration of this factor –942 was an appreciation for 
what turned out to be a fundamental driving force of contracting: defence strategy 
and posture as potential sources of both outsourcing and insourcing. 
Chapters II and III retraced in detail the full causal links between all of the 
above and found that the expansiveness and durability of grand strategic posture and 
commitments since the beginning of the Cold War created equally expansive and 
long-term demands for military capabilities. Digging deeper into official government 
strategy documents, these chapters found that because both states prioritise 
technological and operational “full-spectrum dominance”, they soon faced a 
persistent gap between commitments and resources. Full-spectrum dominance 
required frequent investment into ever more expensive, sophisticated equipment, 
which in turn required more training for soldiers on how to use and maintain it, and 
                                                             
942 Taylor, “Contractors on Operations, Equipment Support”, pp. 190–191. 
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generally led to the growth of the logistical ‘tail end’ of the military force structure for 
operations and maintenance. Being increasingly researched, developed, produced, 
and thus intellectually owned by industry, equipment operation and maintenance 
became a progressively more attractive source of business. In terms of PNT, these 
factors can be considered to be general, long-term, contextual influences. 
The manpower requirements increased further with the global footprint, in 
the USA especially with the high number of military bases across the world, each of 
which had to be supplied with these services and equipment. The turn to an all-
volunteer force and the concomitant shift of support responsibilities to the Reserves 
then spelled the beginning of the end of the self-sufficient military as it contained at 
its core a key assumption of contracting: it is uneconomical to train soldiers for 
combat but then use them for non-combat tasks. With war-related expenses paid for 
by contingency budgets due to ‘peacetime’ assumptions, the reduction of the active 
military force became increasingly appealing to defence managers. 
Having sought to address the gap between resources and commitments – 
already since the 1960s – with concepts and practices borrowed from the business 
world, the neoliberal turn in the 1980s fell on relatively fertile, prepared ground. 
Being constantly reiterated at every subsequent juncture in which budgets clashed 
with strategic aspirations, the turn towards business practices and contractorisation 
became standard by the early 2000s. Not least because of the input provided by 
advisory boards and commissions which more often than not comprise industry, 
defence by that time had become defined by a “corporate culture”.943 Potential 
alternatives were gradually marginalised because of a lack of incentives to think 
beyond these strategic, defence-managerial, and defence-economic parameters. 
Practically nobody involved in the defence enterprise is incentivised to argue for a 
more limited defence posture or funding, for less sophisticated military capabilities, 
                                                             
943 Uttley, Contractors on Deployed Military Operations, pp. 29–30. 
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or lower reliance on industry. In the USA in particular, any course of action that 
substantially challenges the defence-industrial base faces enormous resistance 
because of the central place “democracy’s arsenal” occupies in the country’s security 
architecture. Defence thus enjoys a high level of ‘system integration’ that shields it 
from many of the pressures that other policy domains face, especially welfare 
spending. The willingness to transfer knowledge, assets, and manpower out of the 
military and into industry, as well as to become increasingly interdependent with 
industry follow from the above, and are stronger the more acute the resources-
commitment-gap is, and the more central the defence-industrial base is to national 
security. The end of the Cold War was therefore not the driver of outsourcing that 
much of the literature made us believe but rather the point in time when decades-
long, tentative processes were merely reiterated and fully embraced. The end of the 
Cold War thus represents the beginning of the end of a process in the course of which 
far-reaching outsourcing, knowledge and asset transfer, and public-private workforce 
integration became standard practice. 
We can thus observe the interplay between grand strategic posture, defence 
political commitments, technological demands, and political-economic ideology that 
drive or constrain the propensity to outsource military capability. Were it not for the 
global scope of military posture, presence, and force projection, it stands to argue 
whether the USA and the UK would have ceded control over their military supply 
systems as comprehensively as they have and when they did. After all, the military 
was shown to prefer ownership and control over delegation, so that giving up assets 
and processes was not a path without resistance. It stands to argue that the military 
only acquiesced because the posture is an accepted fundamental determinant of 
defence policy, within which defence managers then have to accommodate the 
demands for technological and operational superiority. The quest for operational and 
technological superiority should thus also be more relevant than the factors identified 
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in the literature. Accepting less-than-full spectrum dominance and technological 
sophistication would have alleviated some of the pressures on the defence economic 
and managerial systems that eventually led to outsourcing. The combination above 
thus first made contracting a preferred option, especially with the triumph of ideas 
such as core competency. With interdependence growing between government and 
industry for technology, manpower, knowhow, and for income, contracting then 
turned from a preferred to the primary, often even the only option. 
On the Politics, Process, and Implementation of Military Outsourcing 
The drivers of military outsourcing represented the backdrop for the 
subsequent examination of the contemporary defence policy process. They enabled 
us to identify the mechanisms of admission to the relevant policy networks and their 
operation. The examination provided extensive details of the day-to-day policy 
process, decision-making, and a deeper appreciation for how contracting not only 
operates today, but how this affects the future trajectory of defence (services 
acquisition) policy and practice. 
The debates and practice of military outsourcing are becoming depoliticised 
as is epitomised for instance by the political motivation behind reducing the 
uniformed footprint, thereby making operations look smaller than they are. The 
tensions between strategy, commitments, and demanded technological capabilities 
are negotiated in non-political or low-political terms,944 thereby focusing on 
ostensibly technical, functional, or managerial solutions to problems that could have 
just as well been viewed as highly political (such as calling up reservists instead of 
contractors for overseas deployments, or an appraisal of the ostensible need for 
global military presence and superiority). Even on the higher political levels the 
debate revolves around ostensibly apolitical, technical problems such as assessing the 
                                                             
944 This corresponds to some degree to the suggestion put forward by Leander, “Portraits in 
Practice”, p. 9. 
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financial costs of a contractor source or the efficiency of industry-centred logistics 
systems. They thus avoid the less palpable cultural and social questions of employees’ 
loyalty, cohesion of the civil service, and civil-military relations that arise out of the 
introduction of an additional actor into the relationship. Specific examinations of 
military responsibilities further down the chain of command demonstrated that this 
is even more pronounced at lower levels for reasons summarised later. 
Moreover, the deep internalisation of managerial and ‘best business’ practices 
and ideas over several decades and the concomitant adaptation of defence processes 
strongly circumscribe admission to the policy network. The technical, functionalised 
nature of the debate translates into a higher valuation of the resources that industry 
holds exclusively. With knowhow, assets, and manpower being incrementally shifted 
out further from government into industry, this dynamic becomes stronger, and 
eventually translates not only into a preferential admission of contractors into the 
policy network, but also turns their participation in defence-related deliberations into 
a necessity. Another reinforcing factor is the mounting concern for the industry’s 
health, as growing government dependency on contractors makes it increasingly 
difficult to replace private providers with indigenous manpower should industry 
become unable to perform its duties. This concern for the wellbeing is epitomised by 
the formalised, normalised, and frequent interaction between government and 
industry in various fora, and the passing of legislation or organisational reform that 
further mandates close public-private cooperation for the long term. 
Collectively, these factors underscore not only the relevance and preferential 
access to the policy networks granted to industry. They also highlight the huge 
incentives the private sector has to pursue the constant stream of revenue provided 
by government, and to coalesce around common interests. The other side of the coin 
is that there is both little room and incentive for veto-players to emerge and organise 
that could stand up to the enormous, well-organised, and preferentially treated 
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defence-industrial base. The military, after all, is not unionised and must voice dissent 
through the chain of command. The military leadership however was shown to have 
bought into outsourcing over the past years, not least because of career prospects 
within and outside the armed forces. The few NGOs in the USA that criticise 
contracting practice from an oversight and transparency perspective do not have 
similar stakes in the game as industry, are comparatively hopelessly understaffed and 
underfunded, and succeed only when acting in concert with public officials and 
exploiting a sizeable window of opportunity and rare veto-point. By extension this 
means that in the day-to-day business of policy-making, the few critics who target 
contracting policy and practice face an infinitely larger effort from industry who can 
moreover offer campaign donations and benefits from the revolving door. The UK 
does not even have a single such NGO, meaning that the status quo receives 
practically no public scrutiny. 
The overall bias towards business then faces only negligible challenges in 
terms of the politics, practice, and actors involved in military services contracting. 
The US legislature shows little to no interest in fulfilling its oversight functions in day-
to-day contracting (which could have worked to increase the emergence and 
potential clout of critics and veto-players by improving their reputation and funding), 
while the UK Parliament’s prerogatives are almost inexistent in this regard. Neither 
government communicates with critical actors (epitomised in the skewed access 
statistics to senior leaderships and advisory boards) or demonstrates substantial 
introspection that would go beyond the noted fundamental parameters. With veto-
players all but out of the picture, the network’s substantial selectivity means that 
gradual internal change from within the policy networks is unlikely. On the higher 
political levels, the status quo remains intact unless any of the fundamental strategic, 
economic, or technological drivers of contracting undergo a qualitative shift or 
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experience a substantial “shock” that would re-set the policy cycle, re-evaluate 
resources and beliefs, and re-form the incentive structure of the involved actors. 
Given their subordination to decisions made on these higher levels, the 
implementation of specific military responsibilities by contractors therefore generally 
presents even less of a challenge to the status quo. However, as contracting-out is not 
an abstract concept that is only discussed on the higher political levels but 
implemented on lower levels, these examinations were both necessary and fruitful. 
They demonstrated the pervasiveness of industry throughout the process and across 
its hierarchy, and underscored the relevance of the different roles of the legislatures 
in defence acquisition and of the urgency of the resources-commitments-gap for the 
propensity to outsource. They also provided nuances as to the ideational and 
practical drivers of contractorisation, and highlighted the future trajectory which 
emerges out of contracting practice on these lower levels. In each of these domains, 
while we currently witness a very stable process with a strong selectivity, these 
examinations nonetheless highlighted where and when change may emerge bottom-
up from the inside rather than top-down, as the other findings suggest. 
Regarding the role of the legislature, the case of foreign military assistance in 
particular highlighted that the US Congress’s powers in foreign sales, and its generally 
close involvement in defence authorisations down to the detailed levels of individual 
line items of bills, makes the Congress a prime target of industry influence. This is 
exacerbated by the US system of political donations and the spread of the defence 
industry to virtually every individual electoral district in the country. The UK 
Parliament, by contrast, has almost no role in shaping the details of policy, certainly 
not on the level of line items as in the USA. This coupled with an ideational resistance 
to subsidising the national defence industry in the UK that is absent in the USA – 
where industry is central to the national security architecture – and the 
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understanding that it must focus its more limited resources on its own armed forces 
that have no reserves left to be cut. 
As a result, when it comes to most directly benefiting foreign customers 
and/or the domestic defence industry, the UK government effectively blocks off such 
demands by pointing to the needs of its own forces; it operates as a quasi-veto player 
in this instance. The UK does not have significant resources to spare for other 
militaries, which is why it accepted to downsize its posture and multilateralise its 
sources of supply beyond the domestic defence industry during the Cold War in the 
first place. The USA, by contrast, is willing to invest significant resources in support of 
its prime goal – the expansive global posture – to the benefit of its domestic defence 
industry in order to remain self-sufficient (i.e. supplied entirely by the domestic 
industry),945 and in support of foreign countries to share the burden of its global 
ambitions, to such an extent that its foreign military assistance policy would have to 
be severely scaled back if industry were not there to implement it. Foreign military 
assistance in the USA highlights the reinforcing effect contracting has on the context 
(drivers) in that it serves the realisation of strategic and defence-economic objectives, 
which are a key source of contractorisation in the first place, and delays the potential 
realisation of the non-tenability of defence objectives. 
On the Future of Military Outsourcing 
The outsourcing of military logistics, while also confirming the drivers and 
politics of contracting, was shown to be most representative of the future of military 
services contracting. Military logistics was the earliest and prime target of 
governments’ attempts to harness the efficiencies of the market. It is also the single 
largest domain experiencing outsourcing, and has historically set the tone for 
outsourcing more broadly, prepared the ground for contracting out other military 
                                                             
945 Recall the quote that foreign military assistance is, among others, a “U.S. jobs programme.” 
Personal interview with Lt Col Keith Harrington. 
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responsibilities, and continues to point out the likely future of militaries’ recourse to 
service contractors. Its examination provided further support to the identified role of 
the legislature, of who the beneficiary of outsourcing is in determining government’s 
stance towards outsourcing, and the far-reaching consequences of buying into the 
core-competency model. 
The trajectory of logistics outsourcing was summarised as 1) formalisation in 
policy, law, and doctrine, that led 2) to the integration of the military and industry’s 
capabilities, workforces, and processes, and that 3) is accompanied by the continued 
transfer of knowledge and assets out of the military into the private sector. First, 
contractors became a formal component of the total defence workforce, and 
governments created vehicles for outsourcing such as LOGCAP and CONLOG. 
However, contractors remained an ostensibly optional add-on that the military may 
have to draw on in individual circumstances while it was assumed that the military 
would be broadly capable of fulfilling its missions relatively independently. The 
growing dependence of both states on support contractors, however, demonstrated 
that industry – under the stable impression of strategic goals, defence economic 
principles, and technological demands – had become a necessary component of 
virtually every war effort. The UK military, being the prime beneficiary of logistics 
outsourcing was particularly forward-leaning in its efforts to integrate its military 
and contractor workforces into the Total Support Force, while the USA is developing 
plans for a similarly networked construct (the Joint Logistics Enterprise). Both are 
moreover pushing arrangements such as “contracting for capability” and 
“performance-based logistics” in which assets, knowledge, and work are shifted to 
industry, often for decades. As was expected, the core of military responsibilities, that 
had previously contained numerous battlefield logistics functions thus shrinks 
further as both governments continue to opt for equipment and posture over 
manpower and in-house knowhow when faced with a trade-off between the two. In 
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fact, within the US defence enterprise, several agencies are setting up offices or 
divisions that deal specifically with services contracting, especially in the support 
area, further supporting the finding that services contracting has become standard 
procedure and will remain so for the foreseeable future.946 
Logistics outsourcing, like foreign military assistance, currently does not offer 
endogenous sources of change. One of the key concerns discussed in chapter VI was 
the effect logistics contractors have on strategic decision-making. While they may not 
overtly affect the decisions of whether or not to embark on a foreign political course 
(“should we”), they were shown to be integral to the essential question of the ability 
to embark on such a course (“could we”). Even if we were to assume that the two are 
separate decisions, which is questionable, industry’s input into future capabilities 
(“could we do something in the future”) was shown to ultimately work towards 
reinforcing the strategic posture. By suggesting that certain technological and 
operational capabilities would be lost if either strategic or budgetary fundamentals 
were altered, industry’s opposition to such realignments – even if phrased in 
technical or economic terms – may ultimately lead the government to rescind such 
plans out of concern for defence-industrial health. The fact that the USA has not 
realigned its posture and requirements even under the harsh economic conditions of 
the ongoing economic crisis testifies to this fact as much as the UK’s hard-fought 
decision to both downsize its strategic objectives and reduce the depth of several 
military capabilities –947 the USA is still not willing to reassess either its global 
posture or the centrality of its defence industry in its security architecture whereas 
the UK, for want of economic reserves, has had to do just that. 
Moreover, a key concern was the gradual removal of internal dissent, possibly 
forcibly in the USA, and structurally in both states. The effects of contractorisation on 
loyalty – a component of the incentive structure for government employees – is 
                                                             
946 Personal interview with anonymous. Civilian Member of the US Military. London (2014). 
947 Cf. personal interview with Jeff Mason and David Wiggins. 
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thrown into full relief here. On the one hand, huge contracts such as LOGCAP create 
incentives for senior officers to be friendly towards contractors so as to facilitate a 
successful transfer into industry after retirement. When dissenting voices such as 
those of Mr Smith or Mrs Greenhouse, examined in chapter VI, emerge, it takes little 
effort by superiors to silence them if they are so inclined. The fact that mostly those 
responsibilities are outsourced that were held by soldiers who used to complain the 
loudest, removes the lower-level potential sources of opposition and change, while 
the incentives for senior leadership to buy into contractorisation in order to succeed 
in their careers (regardless of whether they eventually wish to walk through the 
revolving door or not) reduces higher-level internal opposition to contracting. Thus, 
logistics contracting on no level enables internal calls for change to easily develop and 
organise, while in the grand scheme of things it is equally concerned with bridging the 
gap between resources and commitments and thus with realising the ambitious 
strategic, economic, and technological objectives set by the government. Calling for a 
reappraisal of either was shown not to be in the interest of those most able to 
determine the rules of the game. 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting is a case in point. After years of 
negative press about contingency contracting, it could have substantially altered the 
rules of the game in military contracting. Yet, the commission’s final report and the 
resulting legislation were not only very limited in scope, but more importantly were 
focused entirely on making contracting better, more effective and efficient. It never 
suggested either the fundamental scrutiny of the continued viability of contracting 
specifically or of the more fundamental strategic and defence-economic drivers more 
generally.948 The insourcing initiative in the USA was similarly cancelled after only 
one year; in other words it was not given a realistic chance to succeed (after decades 
                                                             
948 Cf. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011), Transforming 
Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (Arlington, 
VA) and the cited sections of US Congress, FY2013 NDAA in chapter VI. 
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of outsourcing, one year is quite likely not a sufficient amount of time to assess the 
feasibility of insourcing and outsourcing). The process in the USA thus appears to be 
able to fend off criticisms of the status quo and defend and maintain the state’s deep 
reliance on the private sector despite a host of documented problems. 
In sum, the politics and process of contracting out military responsibilities 
contribute to a dynamic that is most likely to lead to “more of the same” in the future, 
most clearly embodied by the TSF in the UK and JLEnt in the USA that epitomise the 
tighter integration and eventual blending of public and private workforces. The 
convergence of public and private interests thereby reaches a new high point. 
Systematising, Synthesising, and Generalising the Study’s Findings 
The above suggests a series of causal links and relationships that historically 
led to military outsourcing, and that contemporarily cascade down (and up) to affect 
the politics, process, and future of military services contracting through the various 
links between them. These findings capture the structure-agency dynamic that ran 
through this entire examination. On the one hand, the contextual factors represent the 
structural constraints at the beginning of a given policy cycle. They constrain – but do 
not necessarily determine, especially if veto-players succeed in affecting the agenda – 
the valuation of actors’ resources, their access to decision-makers, and the 
composition of policy networks. Networks’ composition and operation, in turn, 
constrain (through selectivity) – but do not determine – policy outcomes. Policy 
outcomes, finally, usually serve to reproduce the context and confirm the policy, but 
do not necessarily succeed in doing so. The caveats in the preceding sentences 
indicate where agency, especially veto-players, comes in and where it becomes an 
empirical question whether structure is reproduced, slightly reshaped, or 
substantially unsettled from within or the outside. 
307 
In light of the above, it is therefore logical to assume that changes to these 
structural components – in additional to successful, less predictable agency – could 
potentially lead to insourcing and a general reorganisation of the supply of armed 
forces. More generally, the same factors that led to the status quo of comprehensive 
contractorisation and were found to be likely to continue well into the future in the 
USA and the UK, could lead to substantially different outcomes altogether elsewhere. 
The following systematises and synthesises the findings above so as to provide a 
template for future studies to test empirical evidence against such a framework. It 
points out the extent to which the future trajectory in the USA and the UK may be 
unsettled if circumstances change, and suggests how different combinations of these 
factors may explain outsourcing in other states. These systematised findings are 
visualised in a chart at the end of the section. 
The first and arguably most central cluster identified here links strategy, 
posture, and technological requirements. The expansiveness and durability of 
strategic posture and commitments, as well as the breadth and depth (or 
sophistication) of technological and operational requirements were shown to directly 
affect equipment and support requirements in both their scope and their depth, and 
in combination with other factors to drive outsourcing. A higher degree of risk 
aversion may increase the role of technology in strategic culture and thus 
outsourcing, as it suggests possibilities to reduce military casualties through hi-tech 
warfare. Simultaneously, the existence of a more existential, long-term threat may 
reduce the propensity to outsource in favour of maximising state control over the 
armed forces. Therefore, the future of military outsourcing in the USA and UK as 
outlined above could shift to a different trajectory if the deeply held beliefs about 
posture, commitments, risk aversion, and/or demands for technological and 
operational superiority change. This is also applicable more generally, as different 
combinations of strategy, posture, commitments, risk aversion, strategic cultures, and 
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arts of war should affect the likelihood and future of contracting in different defence-
economic, ideational contexts that are summarised next. 
The next cluster of factors concerns the defence industry and its relationship 
to the state and national security. Awarding industry a central place in the national 
security architecture leads to much more concern for its well-being. Outsourcing then 
also becomes a practice of supporting a key ‘producer’ of national security, and 
invites industry to intimately participate in the policy process to ensure that its 
concerns are met. Industry can then sometimes become a key beneficiary of 
acquisition decisions (as was the case in foreign military assistance in the USA), and 
more generally be the ‘winner’ when the state has to choose between troops and 
technology (especially when the state seeks technological dominance). This situation 
is facilitated if the legislature is susceptible to lobbying (especially when it has a 
potentially heavy impact on defence spending decisions), and is more acceptable 
when the state wishes to retain self-sufficiency in supplying its grand strategy from 
domestic providers.949 Also important to ask is whether industry is privately owned, 
whether it conducts research and development (and thus eventually owns the 
intellectual property rights), and the degree to which a state is comfortable with 
becoming dependent on industry as opposed to enforcing a level of self-sufficiency 
and maintaining in-house knowledge even for newly procured systems. 
While in the USA all of these apply, almost the opposite is the case in the UK 
where the incremental reduction of its global posture since the 1950s probably led to 
the decision to give up self-sufficiency in supplying its defence enterprise and 
embrace multilateral defence procurement, and where Parliament has very limited 
influence on the specifics of defence procurement. A reduced dependency on local 
                                                             
949 This is most pronounced in the numerous examples where Congress, heavily lobbied by 
industry, forces the military to purchase or maintain platforms it does not want. Particularly 
prominent in recent years was the decision to retain thousands of M-1 Abrams tanks. See e.g. 
Richard Lardner (2013), “Army says no to more tanks, but Congress insists,” in Associated 
Press (28 April 2013). 
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suppliers would then lead to a limited willingness to subsidise the domestic defence 
industry. This, in turn, can be reinforced by an ideational rejection of subsidies, and a 
more careful consideration of who the ultimate beneficiary is especially when the 
defence-economic pressures are acute. Changes in this cluster of political—defence-
economic relationships could affect the “logic of practicality”950 in such a way to 
heavily influence decisions in favour of or opposed to outsourcing. 
Budgeting also affects the attractiveness of outsourcing individual functions. 
On the one hand, there is the belief that outsourcing saves money quite generally. On 
the other hand, the mechanisms of paying for war are hugely relevant. Are defence 
budgets “peacetime” budgets, with wars being funded through supplementary budget 
requests? If so, outsourcing as many non-core functions as possible becomes a more 
attractive option because it allows creating the appearance of a small, professional, 
peacetime and peace-oriented defence policy and force, even if war is a constant 
presence. Simultaneously, the introduction of a distinct war tax, as was historically 
the norm, may raise the burdens for war more generally and reduce the appeal of 
outsourcing in two ways; first, by directly linking war tax-spending with industry, 
raising suspicions of profiteering (rightly or not), and secondly by making the supply 
of armies in wartime an exceptional procedure rather than a routine that resembles 
the processes followed in peacetime. This combination of factors is particularly 
challenged by two potential developments. First, the credibility of basing defence 
budgets on peacetime assumptions suffers when a state is faced with a permanent, 
identifiable threat; after all, why plan for peacetime if war is lurking? Secondly, if a 
cost comparison algorithm was found that severely questions the assumptions about 
short- and/or long-term efficiencies to be gained from outsourcing, outsourcing may 
lose one of its basic, foundational supporting arguments. 
                                                             
950 Cf. Pouliot, “Logic of Practicality”, pp. 276–277 and chapter I above. 
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Ideas were shown to play into several of the above. They also play heavily into 
the technologisation and depoliticisation of defence political issues, especially when 
the notion of core competency (which critically affects manpower policies) and other 
best business practices take hold. Ideational change, however, is very slow; after all it 
took approximately three to four decades for outsourcing to take root. Yet if it were to 
happen, it would be hugely influential as it challenges not only individual domains of 
contractorisation (e.g. logistics or training) but the logic of practicality more broadly. 
Contractorisation could become a seemingly less practicable policy option, with 
knock-on effects on the admission to policy networks and decision-making processes 
as discussed next. Importantly, the ideational level as discussed here goes beyond the 
split between liberal and republican views on civil-military relations and the 
economy as Krahmann’s masterful study suggested;951 it also includes beliefs in a 
state’s role in the world (and thus its defence strategy and posture) as well as the 
deeply held views on strategic culture and the conduct of war (and thus the role and 
sophistication of military technologies). 
 
The politics, process, and implementation of contractorisation mostly result 
from the above, and largely serve the realisation of structural demands. And yet, as 
the sequenced analysis conducted in this thesis underscores, they can both reproduce 
and challenge these structures. It becomes paramount to ask who the beneficiaries 
and losers of contractorisation are, and the extent to which they can organise to 
further support or try to turn back military services contracting. Relating directly to 
the formal institutional state environment as per Policy Network Theory,952 we must 
ask: how centralised and consolidated are the different stakeholders? To what extent 
can the military, the key target of outsourcing appeal to the legislature or public 
opinion? And how balanced or unbalanced is therefore the composition of the policy 
                                                             
951 Cf. Krahmann, States, Citizens. 
952 Cf. Adam and Kriesi, “Network Approach”, pp. 138–139. 
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network? This determines to a large extent whether outsourcing will occur or at least 
how expansive it will be, how formalised it becomes, and what feedback effects reach 
those who define the fundamental, structural factors that strongly drive outsourcing 
in the first place. 
Organisational and ideational notions are relevant here. Ideas affect the 
valuation of resources (e.g. business knowhow) which in turn affects the likelihood of 
gaining access to decision-makers. Similarly important are advisory structures, and 
the degree of corporatism more generally. Is the state interested in enforcing peak 
organisations and interest representation that would alleviate any potential 
imbalance? To what extent can abject failure or public criticism lead to a reappraisal 
of outsourcing policy and practice? The success of such reappraisals again rests on 
the ability to unsettle the parameters of the wider system. Germany is an instructive 
counter-case here to the aforementioned example of the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting. There was only limited bad press and concern with military outsourcing 
over the past decade, and yet the German MOD decided to insource a poster child of 
outsourcing in the country, the “Heeresinstandsetzungslogistik” (military 
maintenance services), despite the military acknowledging its dependence on 
logistics contractors.953 Moreover, within Germany’s corporatist structure the 
military is much more able to act as a veto-player in the German Parliament. The 
German Parliament is both more critical of an expansion of German defence 
engagement in general and of outsourcing in particular than its US and UK 
counterparts,954 very receptive to the military ombudsman, and thus very keen on 
fulfilling its prerogatives of overseeing civil-military relations.955 
                                                             
953 The Heeresinstandsetzungslogistik, initially a public-private partnership, was bought in full 
by the German MOD in 2013, see Heeresinstandsetzungslogistik GmbH, “Startseite,” in HIL 
GmbH, accessed 11 April 2014, available at http://www.hilgmbh.de/. 
 Regarding dependence on logistics contractors, see German Federal Ministry of Defence 
(2013), “Response to Freedom of Information Request”, Copy of the Author, Answer 19. 
954 On public opinion regarding outsourcing in Germany, see Elke Krahmann and Cornelius 
Friesendorf (2011), Debatte vertagt? Militär- und Sicherheitsfirmen in deutschen 
312 
It is also within the politics and implementation of contracting that the issue 
of government’s dependency on contractors (if it exists) is most manifest, the 
interaction between civilians, military, and contractors most routineised, and the 
potential for individual friction and opposition to contracting most immediate. It is 
here that support for and opposition to contracting can rise through the ranks or be 
quelled, as the cases examined in chapter VI demonstrated in detail. How many veto-
points exist, and to what extent are potential veto-players included in the 
implementation of defence policy? What are the incentive structures of government 
officials? Are there encouragements or discouragements of moving between the 
public and private sectors? How strong are whistleblower protections and internal 
oversight? And how closely do the interests of government and industry overlap? 
Moreover, outsourcing becomes more attractive when the uniformed soldiers have 
little incentive to perform these tasks themselves, that is when they are not conducive 
to career progression. It therefore stands to argue, on the one hand, that the ability to 
laud or criticise outsourcing from within are hugely relevant to both the present and 
the future of contracting. It is here that industry’s ability to claim to enable the state to 
bridge the gap between commitments and resources that would otherwise have been 
insurmountable, can most immediately be tested. On the other hand, outsourcing will 
become less attractive and face more internal opposition if outsourced tasks were 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Auslandseinsätzen, HSFK-Report 8/2011 (Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung), pp. 5–8.  
 The 2013 coalition agreement contained only one, but very critical paragraph about 
outsourcing. It states that the “outsourcing of military responsibilities” is not an option for 
Germany. Seeing as the country is already dependent on logistics contractors, the government 
is generally critical of outsourcing but apparently focuses its critique on armed security 
contracting. See Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (2013), Deutschlands Zukunft 
gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode ([Berlin]), p. 179. 
955 On the ombudsman as the subsidiary body of parliamentary control over the armed forces 
see Karl Gleumes (2005), Der Wehrbeauftragte: Hilfsorgan des Bundestages bei der Ausübung 
der parlamentarischen Kontrolle, rev. edn, (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag Referat 
Öffentlichkeitsarbeit). 
 The German case may also highlight the further relevance of culture and ideas as its post-
World War II defence policy is marked by a concern of control over all military 
responsibilities. 
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recognised as being core competencies again or as being beneficial to career 
advancement.956 
 
These considerations should not be regarded as advocacy in support of 
insourcing or outsourcing. Innovation currently mostly occurs in the private sector, 
and it is reasonable to expect that many who criticise private contractors’ 
malfeasance (and rightly so) would probably cringe if the consequence was 
insourcing into a big state military and compulsory military service. These are, of 
course, not the only two options, but much of the literature’s criticism seems to imply 
that the solution to what is seen to be excessive contracting would be to revert to 
idealised old ways when sizeable militaries owned the entire process. The above 
rather sought to generate an understanding of how the big picture emerges out of the 
interplay of numerous small puzzle pieces. The debate must thus be about much more 
fundamental questions such as grand strategy, political economy, the art of war, and 
many others, rather than only about knock-on effects such as outsourcing. 
Contractorisation is a consequence of these more fundamental factors, and the noted 
problems are not necessarily inherent to outsourcing but manageable (for instance by 
changing revolving door policies). That said, many of the factors above are inter-
related, so that a change in one would not necessarily lead to change overall; change 
in one would not even be likely without developments in several of the other 
domains. While the factors identified above are of course not comprehensive they 
nonetheless provide possibly the most complete picture to date of the phenomenon of 
military services contracting, contain new findings and evidence, and are kept in 
sufficiently general terms so as to encourage research into other countries to test the 
findings presented here. 
                                                             
956 Whether this opposition is successful or not again depends not least on the ability of the 
military to veto and the incentives at the top of the chain of command. 
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Thus, while the modelled policy process as per PNT in chapter I explains each 
of the stages, the following – in a simplified manner – models the systematised 
relationships as per the analysis above. It illustrates both how the drivers cascade 
down to enable or constrain outsourcing, as well as how the practice of outsourcing 
has the ability to affect one or more of the driving and intervening factors by either 
reinforcing the original assumptions (for instance about the appropriateness of 
managerialism in public policy-making when outsourcing ‘works’) or by questioning 
their viability (for instance the primacy given to technological superiority in the event 





Figure C: The key links between drivers and intervening factors of military outsourcing, 
policy networks, and the potential feedback effects of outsourcing. 
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words, how transferable are our findings to other contexts at other times? How 
generally valid are the linkages between the various factors identified in this study? 
In systematising the findings into relatively case-independent clusters of 
variables and categories in the previous section, the study sought to offer a toolbox 
and a list of variables for future researchers that is relatively universal. It is thus 
hopefully appropriate to test the validity of the claims made here regarding the USA 
and the UK specifically, as well as to ascertain their wider applicability to other states. 
The study thereby suggests new avenues for future research. On the one hand, to go 
deeper, one could examine other outsourced capabilities in the USA and the UK to 
determine the relevance and adequacy of the findings and factors above. Moreover, to 
test the findings directly on decision-makers, researchers with wider access to 
decision-makers could collect as much data as possible, possibly through surveys, on 
the foundations of political decision-making and on which future political decisions 
are thinkable or practicable, as perceived on the inside. Sociologists may opt to 
examine in more detail a representative sample of biographies from the political, 
industrial, military, and various other populations that featured in this study to test 
the assumptions about the valuation of resources, admission to decision-making 
networks, and career prospects in the wider defence enterprises for those holding 
certain beliefs and resources. Others in turn may focus on the detailed mechanisms in 
which the implementation of defence policy by contractors feeds back to reinforce or 
challenge views on strategy, the art of war, political economy, or others. Through 
which channels and involving which actors does such feedback ‘trickle up’? What 
determines whether it has an effect on the big picture trajectory? 
While such research serves to further deepen the findings arrived at here, for 
truly general findings future research will have to become broader, to move beyond 
the confines of the USA, UK, and other fairly similar states,957 and cumulate 
                                                             
957 Germany is often examined as a control case next to the USA and the UK, as is France. 
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knowledge by replicating the present examinations regarding other cases.958 Given 
the primacy of context, future research should move beyond those states that share a 
security environment, are close allies, and that increasingly develop and procure 
defence items and services together, in order to put these assumptions to a 
challenging test.959 Big states such as Russia, China, Brazil, India, and Pakistan would 
be sufficiently different to test the assumptions arrived at above. They can highlight 
the adequacy (or the need to further refine our understanding) of the impact of ideas; 
the security environment and existential nature of threats; the social, economic, and 
welfare roles of the military (and thus civil-military relations and dealing with 
manpower issues); and the often very different approaches to defence procurement 
and the conduct of war. Smaller states such as Jordan, that is attempting to build its 
own defence industry, or Israel that already has an advanced defence industry could 
accomplish the same and additionally highlight the relevance of state strength and 
size. 
The theoretical framework applied in this study enables these 
recommendations for future research to be implemented. Policy Network Theory was 
shown to be applicable in highly variable contexts and to successfully capture both 
the structural and agential aspects of the object of study, and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, when drawn upon for heuristic purposes, also provides general analytics 
that can easily transcend boundaries. The study therefore hopefully does not 
represent a standalone endeavour but rather the beginning of a new research 
                                                             
958 This is in line with the method of structured, focused comparison as outlined in chapter I. 
959 Within NATO, for instance, the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) enables contracting-critical 
countries such as Germany to indirectly outsource supply needs. NSPA provides logistics and 
maintenance services to allies on operation, which is to a large extent – but not automatically – 
provided by contractors. Germany, for instance, may thus use industry for support functions in 
Afghanistan while claiming not to have proactively outsourced. 
 Cf. NATO, “NSPA - NATO Support agency,” accessed 12 April 2014, available at 
http://www.nspa.nato.int/en/index.htm. 
 Cf. also footnote 123 regarding the diffusion of military transformation within Europe and 
NATO, i.e. including the two country cases studied here. 
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programme into the interlinked phenomena of military services contracting, defence 
acquisition and policy-making, and international relations and security. 
Closing Remarks 
Its limitations notwithstanding, this study makes an important contribution 
to several sets of the academic literature as well as to policy debates. It considerably 
widens, deepens, and refines our understanding of the drivers, politics, process, 
effects, and the future of military services contracting. For theorists of defence policy-
making, it suggests a new way to frame the topic that is applicable quite 
independently of time and place. It thereby enables the continuation of this study’s 
research agenda both within and beyond these cases. Moreover, the study 
conceptually highlighted links and collated them into a systemic perspective of the 
many components of foreign and defence policy-making. Not only does it hypothesise 
these linked components, but it also presents ample empirical data in their support. 
Not only does it appraise existing government and media data on defence strategy 
and acquisition, but more importantly it generates new data. This takes the form of 
freedom of information requests that confirm official government policy, and 
interviews with practitioners that improves our understanding of the ‘view from 
within’, which ideas are seemingly taken for granted, and how practitioners operate 
within the often abstract big picture of strategy, posture, and the political economy. In 
so doing, the study also contributes to the literature on the domestic and 
international determinants of policy-making, and highlights their reciprocity. 
For academics and practitioners alike, the study moreover provides specific 
insights into the making and trajectory of defence (services acquisition) policy. It 
highlights, perhaps most importantly, the strong effects of organisational and 
institutional structures on the full historical trajectory of a practice such as military 
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outsourcing from its background through its practice and its effects on the likely 
future. It thus suggests that both continuity and change in the practice of military 
outsourcing are most rapidly created by stabilising or destabilising its fundamental 
driving forces. In other words, if one were to wish for the USA to stop relying on 
contractors, simply passing a memo that mandates insourcing – as was done in 
2009 – is much less likely to do the trick than the successful questioning of the states’ 
demand for self-sufficiency in drawing on the domestic defence-industrial base, its 
demands for technological superiority, and the ostensible necessity of a global, 
forward-leaning posture. The same applies to the organisation of the political process, 
the channels, means, and ways to inform and lobby decision-makers, and the ability of 
potential veto-players in the process to mitigate the risks of what is here the bias 
towards business, and more generally is the risk of making policy with input from a 
limited spectrum of interested actors from either side, avoiding more fundamental 
scrutiny. 
And yet, not least because sudden big change happens rarely, the study also 
highlighted the possibilities for incremental, endogenous change if such structural 
change or external shocks remain wanting. While the memo on insourcing may not 
have led to a reversal in the reliance on contractors, in concert with a sustained 
attempt to reform force structure policies,960 the use of government employees for 
functions that are currently outsourced,961 and tighter regulations on the minimum 
and maximum pay of contractors (as was decided by the Obama administration)962 it 
may nonetheless collectively and ultimately lead to the reduction of the attractiveness 
of outsourcing individual functions because of an altered incentive structure. 
Whether this surges into a trend or not is an empirical issue; the study provides us 
                                                             
960 Cf. US DOD OUSD(AT&L) and (C), Continuation of Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Initiative. 
961 Cf. the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce in chapter IV. 
962 See Julie Pace (2014), “Obama Raises Minimum Wage for Contract Workers,” in Associated 
Press (12 February 2014) and the stated goal to limit contractor compensation in US Congress, 
FY2013 NDAA, Section 864, paragraph (a). 
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with the tools and data necessary to understand the drivers, politics, processes, 
ramifications, and future of military services contracting, both in the big picture of 
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